France Shapes Budget to Increase Net-zero-aligned Public Finance
Over the last decade, developing and deploying innovative green finance and investment tools have become priorities in France. Indeed, through pairing robust public financing interventions with a suite of tools for mobilizing increased climate finance, climate investments in the country have steadily risen.
On the public finance side, France has developed a strong reputation for incorporating climate considerations into its annual budgetary process. These efforts took off in 2017, when France committed to the Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting, an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development initiative requiring signatories to “assess the compatibility of [their] public finance trajectories with the Paris Agreement”. This commitment spurred the country to prepare plans for its first “Green Budget,” which was published in 2021 after a cross-government design process. The Green Budget provides an assessment of the “green impact of all State budget expenditures,” rating all expenditures across a variety of criteria, including impact on climate, biodiversity and local air pollution.
More specifically, the methodology rated State expenditures into five categories ranging from an unfavorable (-1) to a very favorable (+3) environmental impact. It used a grid covering six major environmental goals: (i) the fight against climate change; (ii) adaptation to climate change and prevention of natural disasters; (iii) the management of water resources; (iv) the circular economy, waste and the prevention of technological risks; (v) the fight against pollution; and (vi) biodiversity, and protection of agricultural, forestry and other green areas.
Because every governmental expenditure must now be evaluated on this scale, France’s Green Budget ensures that all government line ministries and agencies carefully consider the climate and environmental impacts of each intervention for which they are using national funds. In so doing, these departments are expected to evaluate the extent to which each decision that they make helps — or hinders — progress toward achieving net zero.
France is also exploring means by which to set standards that require minimum environmental thresholds to be met. For instance, France’s 2021 COVID-19 recovery plan required that €30 billion (30% of the full recovery package) be devoted to investments tagged favorably under the Green Budget methodology. These investments included the funding of large-scale energy efficiency and insulation projects, investments in green hydrogen development for storing and transporting energy and more.
France’s Green Budget methodology and minimum requirements for national expenditures are helping to ensure an increase in domestic climate finance. Of course, future efforts must be made to evaluate the extent to which these increased climate investments are driving tangible emissions reductions, creating green development benefits, and promoting a just and equitable transition to net zero.
thomas-reaubourg-JRUVbgJJTBM-unsplash.jpg Climate Climate National Climate Action net-zero emissions long-term strategies Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 ProjectsA Sustained Portfolio of Policies Have Transformed Denmark’s Power Sector
Denmark’s power sector has undergone a transformational shift over the past 30 years from coal-dominated generation to mostly renewable sources. Power generation from renewable sources rose nearly 30-fold from 1990 to 2020, from 3% of the generation mix to more than 80%. This has mostly been due to massive deployment of wind, which increased 24-fold over the same time period and reached seven gigawatts of installed capacity as of January 2022.
More recently, solar generation has become a contributing factor, doubling between 2015 and 2020 to contribute 4% of the power mix. Use of renewable sources for heat has also been on the rise, with renewable energy currently composing more than half of total heat generation. The scale-up of renewables has contributed to a 76% decline in carbon dioxide emissions from Denmark’s power and heat sector from 1990 to 2020 (Figure 1).
This transformation has been driven by a combination of sustained, well-designed policies and actions, including the following:
- Sustained investment in research and development (R&D): Denmark began expanding wind energy in response to the 1970s oil crisis by scaling up R&D investment. Today, Denmark has one of the highest ratios of R&D spending on wind energy as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) in the world and was the top investor in the European Union in terms of R&D spending on renewable energy as a share of GDP from 2000 to 2020. This has made Denmark a world leader in wind energy and an exporter of wind technology.
- Implementation and adjustment of a feed-in tariff for wind: Denmark first introduced a feed-in tariff for wind in the 1980s and raised it in 2008 in response to a stall in development of new wind capacity. The increase reinvigorated wind development by providing developers with stable revenue to make long-term investments.
- Institutional support for planning and installation of renewable energy: Government support and streamlined planning processes facilitated development of onshore wind with requirements beginning in 2008 for municipalities to designate areas for onshore wind. Likewise, the Danish Energy Agency conducts mapping and site identification for offshore wind, working with developers to streamline the licensing processes, which has reduced barriers and transaction costs. The Danish Energy Agency provides a single point of access for project developers through the permitting and approval process.
- Strong grid interconnection: Denmark has been a world leader in renewables integration by maintaining strong grid interconnection and market integration with other countries for export, complemented by use of combined heat and power. The transmission grid is owned by a public company under control of the government’s Ministry for Climate and Energy, which finances projects and passes costs on to consumers.
- Community ownership of renewable energy projects: Denmark’s 2008 Renewable Energy Act requires local citizens to be offered at least a 20% share in new wind projects and requires investment of revenues into local projects, increasing buy-in for new wind projects and helping communities share the benefits. Denmark’s Samsø Island, the first to be 100% powered by renewable energy, illustrates a successful shared ownership model, where offshore turbines are owned by investors, municipal government and local cooperatives.
- Upgrading aging turbines: In 2001, Denmark implemented a scrapping program to speed replacement of aging, less efficient turbines with more modern models.
- Increasingly ambitious renewable energy targets: Because of the interventions described above, Denmark surpassed targets set for renewables for 2011 (20% of Denmark’s gross energy consumption) and 2020 (35% of final energy, 50% of electricity consumption). Now, the government has further increased targets for 2030 (100% of electricity generation, 55% of total energy consumption, and 90% of district heating, or non-fossil sources), which will continue to drive the increased scale-up.
Throughout the transition, Denmark has had ongoing dialogues with unions and employers to work toward fair sharing of costs and benefits and to support workers in fossil fuel industries. Building a strong industry for renewables has been central to Denmark’s approach, paired with a robust social safety net.
febiyan-0PSCd1wIrm4-unsplash (1).jpg Climate Climate National Climate Action net-zero emissions Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 ProjectsSouth Africa Establishes an Inclusive Process Toward a Just Transition, with Broad Stakeholder Engagement
In 2020, South Africa’s president established the Presidential Climate Commission (PCC), with a primary mandate of overseeing and facilitating a just transition in the country. The PCC is unique in its position, design and means of operation. First, the PCC is situated within The Presidency, which provides the commission with an important cross-cutting role across all government departments and plans, thus elevating the just transition imperative. Second, the PCC comprises commissioners from all major stakeholder groups — government, business, labor, civil society and traditional leadership — which supports its approach of building consensus to advance the transition. Finally, the PCC operates transparently, with all meetings, events and workshops broadcast to all; and with a commitment to deep, genuine and continuous engagement with communities.
This model of operation was put into practice through the design of the Just Transition Framework, which was adopted by South Africa’s Cabinet in August 2022. The framework sets out a shared vision, principles, policies and governance arrangements to give effect to the transition — all intending to bring coordination and coherence to just transition planning in the country. The speed at which the document was embraced in national policy and by all stakeholders was largely due to the inclusive process that was followed in its development, built on years of evidence and research. In developing the just transition framework, the PCC took the following actions:
- Deepened the evidence base around an effective and equitable transition and commissioned a series of policy briefs on key issues relevant to the transition
- Conducted a series of public workshops and events on these issues, incorporating views of government ministers, civil society, business, labor, traditional leadership, youth and the research community, among others, to form a comprehensive view of the major topics for a just transition framework
- Embarked on a series of in-person community consultations to better understand the needs of communities that are being impacted in the shift away from fossil fuel-based economies, ensuring that the framework is tailored to those most impacted by the changes that lie ahead; this process included significant engagement with municipalities and traditional leaders in affected regions
- Commissioned a series of essays from experts in different fields (academia, business, labor and civil society), exploring what it will take to achieve a just transition in South Africa
- Consulted widely with workers, communities, small businesses and social partners in the country in 2021–22 on the framework, allowing impacted groups to discuss their own development pathways and livelihoods
- Invited written comments of the draft just transition framework, where written submissions were received from many stakeholder groups, including youth, labor, business, financial institutions, all spheres of government, nongovernmental organizations and academia
The significant and genuine engagement in the development of the Just Transition Framework helped build support for the transition and improve public trust and acceptance for the difficult work and decisions that lie ahead.
jolame-chirwa-Oer1kxEHzc4-unsplash.jpg Climate South Africa National Climate Action Climate net-zero emissions Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 ProjectsSTATEMENT: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Finalizes Climate Disclosure Rule
WASHINGTON (March 6, 2024) — Today the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) finalized a rule that requires larger public U.S. companies to disclose risks that climate disasters pose to their businesses, as well as greenhouse gas emissions from their own operations or energy use if this information is financially material to investors. The draft rule released in 2022 had required some companies to also disclose emissions across their entire value chain, referred to as Scope 3 emissions, but that was not required in the final version.
Following is a statement by Janet Ranganathan, Managing Director for Strategy and co-founder of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, World Resources Institute:
“This rule is a welcome first step to providing investors with insights into how the climate crisis is harming American businesses and how companies’ emissions are creating material financial risks.
“The fact that the final rule says information only needs to be disclosed if financially material is by no means a free pass for businesses. Climate risk is material to virtually all U.S. companies’ financial performance and those businesses that fail to disclose material items will risk enforcement actions by the SEC and private lawsuits.
“It is unfortunate that requirements to disclose Scope 3 emissions are glaringly absent from the new rule. These emissions account for roughly three quarters of a company’s total emissions so are a major source of risk – and also something investors are hungry to know more about. Of the 297 comment letters from investors on the draft SEC rule, a whopping 97 percent supported including Scope 3 emissions.
“Skirting Scope 3 emissions puts the SEC out of step with other regulators’ requirements, including the European Union, the State of California and more than a dozen other countries. This omission will not help investors or companies respond to the growing risk of climate change across their value chain or prepare for new opportunities in a low-carbon economy.”
U.S. Climate United States GHG emissions Type Statement Exclude From Blog Feed? 0Chile’s New Governance Structures Are Streamlining Net-zero Implementation
Chile’s long-term low-emission development strategy, submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in 2021, provides a road map to carbon neutrality by 2050, covering all gases and sectors excluding international shipping and aviation1. The net-zero target was subsequently legally enshrined through Chile’s Climate Change Framework Law (2022), which built on earlier climate policy planning efforts and reflected thousands of public comments received on the first submitted version in 2020.
Chile’s new Environment Minister, Maisa Rojas, spearheaded the law. Rojas took office under recently elected President Gabriel Boric. Boric’s pledge to make climate a top priority of his administration amplified recent climate action in the country and created a supportive environment for net-zero implementation.
The Climate Change Framework Law completely shifted climate policy implementation in Chile, creating new governance structures from the national to local levels to accelerate net-zero implementation (see Figure 1). Previously, the responsibility for implementing climate policies was not shared across government entities, with the burden falling solely on the Ministry of the Environment, resulting in a slow policymaking process and lack of binding commitments. The Climate Act decentralized and mainstreamed net-zero implementation, assigning responsibilities to 17 government ministries, with measurable indicators to track progress, as well as to regional and municipal authorities. The act created critical new structures, including, at the national level, the Council of Ministers for Sustainability and Climate Change to vet climate policies; the Scientific Advisory Committee of independent climate policy experts to advise on policy instruments and progress toward targets; and the National Council for Sustainability and Climate Change, composed of stakeholders, to facilitate public participation and accountability. At the subnational level, regional Climate Change Committees have been established for all 16 regions of the country to develop and implement local climate policies, and existing municipal government structures have been given authority for climate policy implementation.
Although the law itself was passed only recently, Chile already began to lay the groundwork in 2021 when it developed sectoral carbon budgets for the first time and assigned them to specific agencies. A series of sectoral policy initiatives were launched, including a coal exit initiative, a 100% electric vehicle pledge and sustainable management and afforestation plans. Sectors can now be held accountable through budgetary sanctions if they do not meet their targets.
The shift in governance structure in Chile has already resulted in a significant increase in the amount of climate policy work that the government has been able to undertake, enabling policies to develop on short timelines. The national government is developing critical policy instruments over the course of one year from the law’s publication — by June 2023 — including procedural regulations to enact greenhouse gas emissions standards for a range of sources, potentially the basis for an emissions trading program.
Sectoral mitigation and adaptation plans must be ready by June 2025. Regional and municipal governments are each developing climate action plans over the course of three years. The Climate Change Framework Law ties regulatory instruments to Chile’s international commitments, ensuring they will be reviewed and updated periodically as needed. If implementation of current policies proceeds as planned, Chile’s carbon dioxide emissions may have already peaked and may be on a trajectory to meet 2030 targets compatible with a 1.5°C temperature rise in the longer term.
1 The plan describes pathways to net zero and includes national as well as sector-specific carbon budgets, with interim targets of peak emissions in 2025 and an emissions cap for 2030
antonio-garcia-ndz_u1_tFZo-unsplash.jpg Climate Chile Climate National Climate Action net-zero emissions Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 ProjectsCosta Rica’s Pioneering Net-zero Implementation Plan Attracts Investment, Withstands Political Changes
With support from a team of technical experts and international funding, the Costa Rican government took several foundational steps as it committed to a midcentury net-zero emissions target in its 2019 National Decarbonization Plan. The target's scope was clearly defined, covering all greenhouse gases and all sectors, excluding international shipping and aviation. Pathways to reach the target were described using a backcasting approach, which grouped the transition to net zero into three phases: foundations (2018–22), inflection (2023–30) and massive deployment (2031–50). For each phase, the plan described actions needed within each sector as well as critical cross-cutting strategies, including financing, just transition and green tax reform. Emphasis was also placed on strategies and investments that should be avoided. The work provided assurance to government ministers, working under then-president Carlos Alvarado Quesada, that adopting a 2050 target was not delaying responsibility, but rather informing near-term actions and investments. The strategy and specific priority actions allowed the government to maintain and build upon progress in electric vehicle deployment, reduce agricultural emissions and increase the use of composting, among other areas.
Critically, the plan was able to withstand a major political shift when President Rodrigo Chaves took office in May 2022 after running a campaign largely focused on completely changing course from the previous administration. This continuity is due in part to the plan’s success in attracting large investments from the International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development Bank. Because the new administration saw the concrete value of having a strong decarbonization plan — nearly $1 billion in central funding they would not otherwise have had — they began their own prioritization of climate objectives, rather than rejecting the plan outright. Costa Rica demonstrates how a robust implementation plan can withstand such shifts, even in a case where the target was not legally adopted.
It remains to be seen how Costa Rica’s current government will shape its climate agenda. Early priority action areas continue the focus on electric vehicles (in particular, the administration has prioritized operationalizing 1,000 electric buses) and agriculture, with a shift from defining the technical transition pathways to attracting large-scale finance for specific sectors. Banks are signaling their willingness to make low-carbon investments and provide cheaper loans when strong plans are in place.
International investment is one aspect of potential financing, engaging local businesses and investors will also be key politically to make truly transformational change. How to generate these concrete, attractive business opportunities is the next big question for Costa Rica. The Costa Rican government has an opportunity to transform the 2050 National Decarbonization Plan of 2019 into a national investment plan that aligns with its priority areas, calculating costs and estimating needed investments locally and internationally, and making the investment case to local businesses.
cesar-badilla-miranda--WZtZKXtKCw-unsplash.jpg Climate Costa Rica Climate net-zero emissions National Climate Action Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects5 Essential Principles of the Just Transition Work Programme for Climate Action
As the climate crisis ratchets up, so, too, must global efforts to address its root causes and escalating impacts. This means rapidly shifting societies and economies to pathways that are consistent with low-carbon, climate-resilient development.
This urgently needed shift is not without risk. Unless governments put proactive policies in place, a rapid economic transition could create or worsen social inequality, displacement and economic disruptions, including unemployment. While the low-carbon economy ultimately offers an opportunity for net job gains, the International Labour Organization estimates that around 80 million existing jobs could be lost. Stakes are especially high for the countries and communities that still depend on fossil fuels and other emissions-intensive sectors for their livelihoods.
To ensure that vulnerable people are not left behind, all climate action must be underpinned by principles of a just transition. Broadly, this means moving toward a greener world in ways that won’t create or exacerbate inequalities or cause other unintended social and economic harms. It also means taking action to mitigate such harms, creating opportunities that benefit all people and communities and promoting sustainable development.
Driving Equitable Green Development Through the Just Transition Work ProgrammeThe number of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that explicitly mention “just transition” is low but growing. It jumped from 17% (33 NDCs covering 59 countries) in 2022 to 23% (45 NDCs covering 71 countries) in 2023. Fifty-six percent of long-term strategies (LTS) also include references to just transitions. These numbers must increase further to ensure progress toward an equitable green transition across all nations and sectors.
However, key questions remain around what a truly “just” transition looks like. What values should it embody, particularly from the perspective of affected workers, communities and countries? How can discussions on just transitions at the multilateral level be broad enough to support rapid decarbonization and climate-resilient development at a global scale, while still allowing each country to define its unique needs and priorities?
The work programme on just transition pathways (JTWP) was created to help answer these questions. It aims to facilitate countries’ just transitions to a low-emissions and climate-resilient future through actions that also contribute to reducing inequalities both within and between countries. The JTWP will support knowledge-sharing and the development of best climate action practices in line with a just transition. It is intended to encourage conversations between countries and other stakeholders — such as policymakers, NGOs and local communities — to devise more effective ways of realizing just transitions in the socioeconomic and environmental spheres.
The JTWP was established at COP27 in 2022 and its modalities were adopted at COP28 in 2023. But while the COP28 outcome outlines the scope of the work programme in broad strokes, important questions remain about how to further refine and implement it.
Here, we explore five key elements that the JTWP should consider and their implication from the perspective of vulnerable developing countries. This article was written with the ACT2025 consortium, a group of think tanks from vulnerable developing countries working to drive greater climate ambition on the international stage.
1. Ensuring People-centered Climate ActionThe JTWP must, first and foremost, champion “people-centered” transition pathways that put people’s needs at the heart of all climate action. Pathways must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participatory decision-making processes. They must also include social, economic, workforce and other dimensions, ensuring that equity is a key aspect throughout.
Effective people-centered climate action does three things:
- It ensures a just and well-managed transition away from a high-carbon economy, avoiding and/or addressing unintentional negative effects of mitigation interventions or maladaptation.
- Through an inclusive process, it purposefully identifies and unlocks social and economic benefits; for example, by creating quality jobs with decent pay.
- It targets these benefits to further equity; for example, by employing innovative financing to boost energy access through distributed solar power or restoring ecosystems in ways that also raise rural incomes.
Protecting and advancing human rights must be a central consideration in developing climate actions, especially for those who are most marginalized and vulnerable. This can involve putting instruments such as social safety nets, unemployment support and parental leave policies in place to support communities both socially and economically and minimize risks. In addition, local populations need to be actively and deliberately engaged in shaping development agendas. This can help ensure an equitable process that addresses their needs.
In South Africa, for example, the Presidential Climate Coalition (PCC) was created in 2020 to lead the government's work toward a just transition across sectors such as energy, agriculture and tourism. It has enabled a wide range of stakeholder engagement in building the country’s just transition frameworks and aims to help ensure that all stakeholders have input and receive benefits. For instance, the PCC held workshops for people in coal communities that highlighted key areas to focus on when implementing a just transition. These included topics like addressing community health impacts from coal mining and clarifying misconceptions concerning renewable energy. It also worked to enable community engagement in just transition dialogues through accessible language and communication methods and effective knowledge sharing.
The work of the PCC is not over; further efforts are needed to ensure that this process is equitable and truly includes those impacted. However, lessons from these processes, such as the importance of involving a wide range of stakeholders, can help in developing the JTWP.
2. Addressing Global Inequity and Rejecting Oppressive Global SystemsClimate change impedes economic development, employment, agriculture and industry. It also destroys transport and communication systems and other important infrastructure. But despite being a global phenomenon, the impacts of climate change are disproportionately felt by the world’s poorest countries and communities. This exacerbates existing inequality and poverty, with the Global South on the frontline of these disruptions.
Moreover, well-intentioned climate actions can sometimes come with unintended negative effects for vulnerable people. For example, the European Union’s proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) could help reduce the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions by 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. However, studies have shown that CBAM would reduce African exports and diminish the continent's GDP by at least 1.12%, exacerbating existing socioeconomic issues in a highly climate-vulnerable area.
A transition that oppresses those living in poverty, climate-vulnerable communities and other marginalized groups cannot be just; nor can a transition which further undermines the development of vulnerable countries. Countries should view the JTWP as an avenue to discuss and provide climate solutions which enhance social, economic and environmental equity.
To this end, the JTWP must identify and avoid climate actions which could extend or potentially result in a repetition of oppressive systems — from historical and structural inequalities to trade protectionism, distortions, and unilateral taxation systems for developing countries. It should also share guidance on more supportive pathways. For example, the JTWP can draw on elements from the Bridgetown Initiative, such as restructuring unsustainable debt, promoting inclusive international tax systems and reducing barriers that uphold socioeconomic and structural inequalities.
Addressing climate change is a multilateral process; all countries have a role to play as guided by the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). As such, the JTWP should provide a multilateral platform that centers on inclusion and international cooperation. This could be a platform to share and submit learnings, increase transparency and allow countries to build on one another’s best practices. But while the JTWP should be collaborative in nature, rich nations must commit to correcting historical inequalities given that the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries have often contributed the least to the climate crisis. They can do this both by leading the way on decarbonization and by supporting developing countries to do the same.
3. Channeling Unconditional Support from Developed CountriesDeveloping countries urgently need increased support to facilitate climate action and achieve just transitions. This includes international climate finance, technology development and transfer and capacity building. Support must be conducted within the guidelines of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement — articles 9.1 and 9.4 of which state that developed countries will provide financial resources to developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation. Rich nations must demonstrate their accountability by fully delivering on financial agreements in a timely and just manner.
The JTWP should stress the importance and urgency of public finance from developed countries as an enabler for just transitions in developing countries. Finance and resources should be focused on areas such as reskilling, economic diversification, employment access and social protection to ensure that workers are retrained to be able to adapt to the transition. Countries providing targeted finance must also consider broader socioeconomic factors: New green jobs not only require new skillsets but may be in different locations and completely shift how people and communities have functioned in the past.
The work programme should also caution Parties against financial instruments that deepen the indebtedness of vulnerable countries. Instead, it should support the development of a financial and support architecture that promotes shared economic growth and sustainability for a fair transition. New systems should make it easier for poor countries to access climate finance without increasing their debt burdens or discouraging access due to complicated financing structures and requirements.
4. Creating Comprehensive and Flexible Just Transition PathwaysThe JTWP is a collaborative and facilitative platform that should promote an equitable and sustainable future for all countries. Recognizing that every country is experiencing different levels of climate change impacts, as well as different priorities and challenges in addressing them, the work programme should refrain from prescribing solutions. Instead, it should lay out overarching principles for just transitions which countries can use to develop their own national plans in line with the UNFCCC and its guiding principles.
The new work programme must cover the full scope of just transitions by considering all the socioeconomic and environmental repercussions of climate change action. These include labor migration, unemployment, inequitable loss of ecosystem resources and more. Under the JTWP, climate interventions should be designed to support nationally determined transition pathways, including national adaptation plans (NAPs) and nationally determined contributions (NDCs). This can be done without prescribing practices to countries or managing their transitions by supporting locally driven approaches to the transitions.
The work programme should pay particular attention to poor countries that are more vulnerable to the devastation of climate change. It should elevate their needs in a manner that allows them to attain their national priorities and to develop in a climate-compatible fashion aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C. It must also recognize that in this transition, factors such as gender and age can create disproportionate impacts on certain groups. Working to ensure that the JTWP framework acknowledges these disparities and includes all people is what will truly make it just.
5. Building Synergies with Other Global Climate-related WorkstreamsIn UN climate negotiations, it is essential for discussions on just transitions to happen at both technical and political levels. This could potentially include convening an annual high-level event — such as at the COP and G20 summits — where the just energy transition, just resilience, just transition financing and other related topics are discussed by world leaders. These events could inform annual reports and decisions made at COPs and help drive political declarations to enhance international cooperation in climate action.
The JTWP is also intended to complement and build on the contributions of other relevant work streams and fora, including those on mitigation, response measures, adaptation and climate finance. It should actively collaborate with other workstreams under the Paris Agreement and more broadly, such as:
- The Global Stocktake (GST): The JTWP should feed into the GST process so its progress can be tracked and implemented across multiple sectors.
- The Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP): Linking to the MWP can help ensure that elements of equity and justice are built into all mitigation actions toward the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degrees-C temperature goal.
- The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA): The work programme on the GGA can provide inputs into the climate resilience component of the JTWP as it relates to adaptation.
- The Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI): Since there is a strong connection between JTWP and KCI workstreams, the KCI should provide expert input into the just transition work programme.
- Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): Involvement with workshops and other exchanges related to NDCs can help promote a fair and equitable transition by ensuring that just transition considerations are built into countries’ national climate plans.
- Relation to finance: Securing finance for just transition pathways is a core goal of the JTWP. Collaboration with other finance workstreams will be critical to mobilizing and transforming financial systems toward this goal. This can include, for example, linking the JTWP to discussions on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG), international financial institution reform and mobilizing private sector finance.
- National just transition approaches: The work programme can inform ongoing national, regional and international work on just transitions. This includes assessing and providing guidance for country-level policy processes for just energy transitions.
The JTWP also invites international organizations and civil society to submit recommendations that can enrich the discussions about just transitions at the workshops.
Implementing the JTWP in 2024 and BeyondThe just transition work programme must recognize that to fight climate change is to fight inequality in the world. With an overarching framework put in place at COP28, we will now be watching how the work programme carries out its mandate through workshops conducted over the next two years and in decisions made at COP30. Ultimately, countries must recognize that any successful transition will prioritize people and planet together.
This article was originally published in December 2023. It was updated in March 2024 to reflect the latest developments in the just transitions work programme.
HoiAn-flooding.jpg Climate Equity Climate Equity environmental justice COP28 Equity & Governance Type Technical Perspective Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Mohamed Adow Mark Bynoe Fatuma Hussein Keith Nichols Chikondi ThangataSTATEMENT: UK Should Deliver on International Climate Finance Promises
LONDON (February 29, 2024) - The Independent Commission for Aid Impact has published a new assessment of the UK government’s progress towards meeting its signature commitment to spend £11.6 billion GBP on international climate finance by the end of 2026.
Following is a statement from Edward Davey, Head of World Resources Institute Europe’s UK Office:
"The ICAI report on the UK’s international climate finance is vital reading. It recognizes important and valuable progress being made in a number of areas, against a challenging backdrop. But it also demonstrates that there is now a mountain to climb if the UK is to meet its £11.6 billion international climate finance target in full – with 55% of the commitment still to be spent in the last two years of the pledge.
"For reasons of equity and justice, and in order for the UK to play its full part in supporting nations in their hour of need to withstand and address the climate crisis, the UK can and must uphold its finance commitment in full – and with integrity in what counts. The UK’s track record and expertise in the disbursement of effective international climate finance is significant: it has to deliver.
"The report’s priority recommendation that the UK government should soon set out a clear action plan for the timely delivery of the remaining funds is timely and well-judged. Given the upcoming election, this plan should also enjoy cross-party consensus."
United Kingdom climate finance Type Statement Exclude From Blog Feed? 0Complex Supply Chains Are Still a Major Barrier to Ending Deforestation
Almost 90% of the world’s forest loss is driven by the expansion of agriculture, thanks to growing consumer demand for commodities like coffee, cocoa, beef, soy, palm oil and timber. Because of this, governments, businesses and NGOs are increasingly targeting action to reduce deforestation in this sector. Several markets are developing policies that prohibit the sale or importation of products grown on deforested land, while hundreds of consumer goods companies have made zero-deforestation pledges.
Some of these regulations are still in the early stages of development or implementation so their potential positive impact remains to be seen, but existing measures have so far failed to stem the tide of deforestation. One of the major reasons is the persistent lack of traceability and transparency in supply chains.
Why Are Traceability and Transparency in Supply Chains So Challenging?For companies to know whether they are contributing to deforestation, they need to be able to link a commodity or product with information about its origins. But this is no easy feat.
Take the example of a simple chocolate bar: Its key ingredient is cocoa, a raw commodity that can change hands and borders multiple times before it finally reaches a consumer. While most of the world’s cocoa is produced by smallholder farmers in West Africa, it is primarily exported to Europe where it is processed and transformed into chocolate products that then get distributed to retailers all over the world. Connecting the dots between hundreds or even thousands of points along a complex global supply chain is a big task. For instance, a multinational consumer goods company like Unilever sources raw materials from up to 52,000 suppliers.
Even when this information exists, it may not be available to everyone who has a responsibility to root out deforestation. Downstream companies and investors need access to information to make informed decisions about who they buy from or invest in. Governments and civil society need transparent supply chains to track companies’ compliance with policies and pledges.
Tools Are Emerging to Help Companies Trace Their Supply Chains, but They’re Not EnoughTechnology is beginning to illuminate opaque supply chains and change the way companies monitor and manage them. For example, data platforms like Global Forest Watch (GFW) and GFW Pro enable organizations to monitor supplier locations and track nearby deforestation.
Another example is the Trase tool, co-developed by the Stockholm Environment Institute and Global Canopy, that maps the international trade and financing of key commodities associated with tropical deforestation, allowing companies to identify sustainability risks in their supply chains.
Individual companies and governments are also making progress. For example, Nestlé notes that its partnership with satellite-based monitoring tool Starling enabled it to map 97% of its palm oil supply to the mill level. In another example, the government of Ghana is developing a cocoa tracking system that will be able to trace cocoa pods back to the farms they came from.
These are just a few of the many examples covered in WRI’s recent report that show traceability and transparency are achievable despite complex challenges. In many cases, changing voluntary and regulatory requirements have encouraged innovation and solutions.
A smallholder farmer arranges cocoa beans to dry. Most of the world's cacao comes from Africa, where it crosses borders and changes hands several times before ultimately becoming chocolate. Photo by Media Lens King/iStock What’s Needed to Make Supply Chains More Transparent?The report highlights what we can learn from these successful projects to scale up existing efforts, and accelerate both the pace and scope of action. For companies and others to effectively trace deforestation in supply chains market wide, transparency tools and initiatives must meet four key conditions:
1) Alignment across stakeholdersIf individual projects are set up with different objectives and data sets are created with different definitions and metrics, efforts to build collaborative systems or use existing data for different purposes become cumbersome or even infeasible. Therefore, there needs to be alignment among supply chain stakeholders — including governments in commodity-producing and exporting countries, private sector companies and civil society organizations — and collaboration to ensure that data can be shared and used across different traceability systems. This includes the development of consistent, harmonized definitions, standardized data reporting requirements and formats, and data-sharing strategies with ethical, legal, commercial and technical considerations. In addition, a clear framework of rules is required for the collection and reporting of transparent data.
The U.S. government-funded Forest Data Partnership, a consortium led by WRI, aims to address this challenge by harmonizing data from different sources using machine learning to provide supply chain actors with high-quality, validated benchmark land use data. Similarly, the Digital Integration of Agricultural Supply Chains Alliance (DIASCA) is working towards interoperability of traceability systems in global agricultural supply chains by establishing common best practices for overcoming the current challenges of data exchange.
2) A supportive regulatory environmentA supportive regulatory environment is critical for ensuring that data is available and shared among different stakeholders. For example, due diligence requirements and mandatory reporting standards set out by government agencies for companies and financial institutions are powerful tools to increase levels of disclosure, creating broader demand for traceability and transparency, especially where reporting currently remains voluntary. They also help to create a level playing field for companies already disclosing data that may open themselves up to more public scrutiny than those who do not report their progress.
For example, the UK was one of the major economies to make climate disclosures mandatory for publicly listed companies, using standards from the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). While TCFD began as a voluntary set of recommendations for companies to report on climate-related risks, it has since become part of the regulatory framework for mandatory disclosure in some countries. Its guidance for agriculture, food and forest products companies is to provide key metrics related to the implications of land use change and associated greenhouse gas emissions, which helps companies and the banks that fund them prioritize these chronic risks.
3) Broad-based collaborationAs traceability and transparency tools and initiatives proliferate, the risk of duplication increases. For example, several companies could be mapping the same farms. Collaboration is vital to avoid wasting time and investment, especially when different companies often share the same supply base.
It can be challenging for companies to figure out how to collaborate with their competitors. Data confidentiality and commercial sensitivities often hinder data sharing. But it’s essential that companies come together with others in the industry to tackle a shared challenge and coordinate traceability efforts.
For example, private sector actors teamed up with civil society partners to create the Universal Mill List, which mapped close to 2,000 mills across 26 countries, using standardized identifiers to prevent duplication, representing a leap forward in transparency in the palm oil industry.
4) Inclusion of small farmersCollective action is also central to increasing support for vulnerable actors, such as smallholder farmers, and advancing their inclusion in supply chains so they are not left behind in the transition to sustainable commodity production. For example, if companies choose to only source from larger producers capable of meeting stringent traceability requirements to avoid costs, this overlooks a significant opportunity to support smallholders, who produce one-third of the world’s food.
A specific example of how collective action can support smallholders is the Cocoa & Forests Initiative (CFI), where the governments of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire and major cocoa and chocolate companies joined forces to end deforestation and restore forests in these countries. Together, these companies have been working to map smallholder farms, which produce most of the cacao grown in West Africa, to better understand where their cocoa comes from and identify areas at risk of deforestation. The initiative also supports farmers in growing more cocoa on less land — such as by creating agroforestry cocoa plots and distributing cocoa seedlings to farmers. These practices help farmers produce higher yields and increase their incomes by growing other types of crops like wood, fruits and nuts.
Success Requires All Hands on DeckRealizing sustainable, deforestation-free supply chains will require unprecedented collaboration among stakeholders. Each sector has a role to play in advancing traceability and transparency.
- Governments can create a supportive policy environment that encourages companies and smallholders to gather and share information. In commodity-producing countries, governments can create legal requirements for national standards and assurance systems. In Malaysia, for example, the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil standard makes it mandatory for producers to be registered, to follow legal requirements for production, to provide traceability information to buyers and meet minimum environmental standards.
It is also important for governments to provide official public sector data sets on land use, land use change, rural property registration, land titling and trade. Such data is essential for companies to verify if the supply chain actors they source from have clear tenure, but also for government agencies to avoid issuing overlapping land allocations, like concessions in protected areas.
- Civil society can support consistent objectives of traceability and transparency systems in policy responses — by, for example, defining what constitutes credible evidence in reporting. They can provide technical expertise and ensure that suitable safeguards are in place to manage data privacy issues in a way that encourages data sharing. In addition, they can help convene stakeholders to encourage greater alignment.
The Accountability Framework initiative (AFi) is a collaboration between dozens of NGOs to support companies on their supply chain commitments in agriculture and forestry by establishing good practices and common definitions, like what “deforestation-free” means in practice. It provides an international reference that all companies can use, regardless of geography or commodity.
- The private sector can make sure that costs incurred by traceability and transparency are equitably shared, taking measures to address specific challenges facing smallholder farmers. Doing so is important because many smallholders lack access to technology, along with the technical or financial capacity needed to meet monitoring and reporting requirements. Companies could, for example, develop data collection systems that take smallholder interests into account, empowering them with easy access to their own data like production and yield and sale prices.
Engaging in pre-competitive collaboration is also important, especially when different companies are sourcing commodities from the same landscapes. For example, to help end cocoa-driven deforestation in West Africa, WRI joined forces with the World Cocoa Foundation and 19 major cocoa and chocolate companies to create two new data resources. Cocoa sector stakeholders can use the tools to identify high-priority areas in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire and coordinate action to prevent deforestation before it happens. This was an unprecedented collaboration in the industry, where companies agreed to share highly sensitive cocoa plot data in a way that respected companies’ proprietary data and protected farmers’ privacy.
Ultimately, eliminating deforestation in commodity supply chains is a complex issue that requires multi-faceted approaches involving many different supply chain actors. Traceability and transparency are not silver-bullet solutions. But with the right conditions in place and an all-hands-on-deck approach, they can be key to removing barriers to ending deforestation.
supply-deforestation-palm-oil.jpeg Forests Forests deforestation data agriculture forest products corporate sustainability commodities Type Finding Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Related Resources and Data Traceability and Transparency in Supply Chains for Agricultural and Forest Commodities A New Tool Can Help Root Out Deforestation from Complex Supply Chains Ending Tropical Deforestation: The Elusive Impact of the Deforestation-Free Supply Chain Movement Companies Can Now Spot Deforestation in their Palm Oil Supply Chains Before it Happens Projects- Forest Data Partnership
- Global Forest Watch
- Global Forest Watch Pro
- Forest Governance and Policy (FGP)
A New Global Green Accountability Platform Will Enhance Civil Society Involvement in Climate Finance and Action
With funding from the World Bank’s Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA), WRI will lead a consortium that includes Huairou Commission and SouthSouthNorth (SSN) to implement the $4.5 million Green Accountability Platform to provide finance, technical assistance and strategic support to civil society organizations in Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Mexico and Senegal to strengthen civil engagement for effective climate action. These organizations will be selected by the consortium through an open, competitive call for grants that is expected to launch by the second half of April 2024.
Green accountability means that governments have put in place systems and processes that ensure civil society can participate in decisions that shape how climate finance is spent, managed and monitored in their country. It reflects the importance of a rights-based approach to climate action, as well as the instrumental importance of civil society and community voices in ensuring that resulting policies are locally led and respond to local needs and priorities. The five selected countries have all opted into the GPSA and reflect a diversity of geographies, climate finance governance contexts, and civil society coalitions and capacities.
Calls for more transparent and accountable decision making on climate action are not new. While advocates and government champions have made clear progress on several fronts — more proactively open climate data, climate assemblies that better represent the public in decision-making — these types of innovations need to be scaled up through broader political commitment. For instance, WRI found that fewer than 20 countries have established climate budget tagging systems and, in many countries, even a clear definition of climate finance is lacking. Shrinking civic space in several parts of the world means that activists, Indigenous leaders and others face harassment, threats and violence when they speak out against activities that threaten their environment and climate. Weak government transparency and accountability erodes trust in public institutions and limits public participation in decision-making processes.
Without effective mechanisms for transparency and accountability, there is also a heightened risk of corruption and mismanagement of resources earmarked for climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. Thus, fostering transparency and accountability not only strengthens civic engagement but also bolsters the effectiveness of climate finance and legitimacy of climate action. The Green Accountability Platform will help by providing grants, tools, and shared learning and support coalition building for civil society organizations working at the grassroots and national levels. It will also connect with national and global networks working to strengthen climate governance and support green accountability.
Chittagong-Bangladesh.jpg Equity & Governance Climate Equity Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Authors Jesse Worker Rocío CamposIncreased Biofuel Production in the US Midwest May Harm Farmers and the Climate
U.S. production of biofuels has increased fivefold in the past two decades, and nowhere has felt the impact more than the Midwest. While the expansion of biofuels in the region has brought economic benefits to some farmers, it also raises questions about the ultimate sustainability and equity of biofuels as an alternative fuel source in the U.S.
The U.S. currently uses approximately 180 million acres of prime farmland, mostly in Midwest states — including Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin — to produce corn and soy, much of which are used for biofuels. Since 2007, these crops have expanded by close to 7 million acres, most likely due to the federal Renewable Fuel Standard, which sets targets for biofuel production.
Large farm machines are used to harvest corn in the Midwest. The expansion of corn crops in this region to be used for biofuel production increases agricultural emissions and displaces land that could be used for other purposes. Photo by JamesBrey/iStock.Because of the emissions produced by land use change and the process of growing crops and refining biofuels, crop-based biofuels are not an effective tool to curb climate change. Growing corn and soy crops for biofuels displaces land that could be more effectively used to fight climate change or provide community benefits. For example, land devoted to biofuels could instead produce food, host low-carbon energy sources like solar and wind, or be used for restoration of forests or grasslands.
Beyond the climate impact, biofuel expansion also significantly impacts public health through air and water pollution. Plus, the economic benefits of the biofuels industry have been unequally distributed to larger farms, which may exacerbate long-standing inequities among Midwestern farmers.
As Midwestern policymakers and the public assess the future of biofuels in their region, there are four key factors to pay attention to:
1) Biofuels Crops Contribute Disproportionately to Midwestern Agricultural EmissionsThe Midwest is one of the most productive agricultural regions in the world, but as a result, it has an outsized greenhouse gas footprint. According to data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Greenhouse Gas Inventory, the agriculture sector in the Midwest emitted 315 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2020 and agricultural lands sequestered approximately 38 MtCO2e, leading to net emissions of 278 MtCO2e. This makes up roughly 20% of total regional emissions, while nationally, agriculture is responsible for approximately 10% of all emissions. These emissions come from many sources including fertilizer production and use, animal manure management, on-farm energy use and emissions from land use change.
Corn and soybeans dominate the Midwest’s agricultural landscape. These crops are grown on 75% of the region’s arable land; between one-third and three-quarters of these crops are likely used to make biofuels, depending on the state. Because the Midwest produces so much corn and soy for ethanol and biodiesel, the biofuels industry contributes significantly to the region’s agricultural emissions.
Fertilizer production and use is by far the highest contributor to agricultural emissions based on EPA data, emitting roughly 180 MtCO2e in 2020, mostly in the form of nitrous oxide, or about 60% of total Midwestern agricultural emissions. In addition to being a major emissions source, fertilizer use also leads to drinking water contamination, soil degradation and algal blooms in bodies of water like the Gulf of Mexico.
Because corn is a nitrogen-intensive crop, it requires heavy fertilizer application. Fertilizer use increases as corn for ethanol replaces other, less nitrogen-intensive crops. While there are opportunities for farmers to decrease greenhouse gas emissions by adopting practices like targeted fertilizer application, these interventions cannot eliminate emissions. Midwestern legislators hoping to tackle climate change in their state need to consider both current emissions from biofuel production and the likelihood of increased agricultural emissions if biofuels production expands.
2) Biofuel Crops Displace Natural LandsAnother major source of emissions and environmental degradation from biofuels is the conversion of natural lands, like forests and grasslands, to farms for crops such as corn and soy. Data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) show that acres devoted to corn and soy cultivation increased by 17% in the Midwest from 2008-2022, displacing other crops and natural lands. Further, one model estimates that the Renewable Fuel Standard caused 26% more conversion of natural land to cropland nationally than would have occurred without the policy.
A separate study found that 4.2 million acres of land were converted to cropland within 100 miles of biorefineries between 2008 and 2012, which suggests that this cropland expansion was likely caused by biofuel demand. Conversion of land to cropland not only spikes emissions, but also diminishes vital forests and grasslands, encroaches on already dwindling healthy ecosystems and leads to higher levels of water pollution.
3) Biofuels Contribute to Economic InequitiesIncreased biofuels production may also leave small-scale farmers behind as larger, more consolidated farms are used to grow soy and corn. That impact could be felt the most amongst farmers of color.
A young farmer checks on soybean crops. Young farmers have had trouble accessing full benefits from the new Renewable Fuel Standard, despite their role in feeding communities. Photo by DS70/iStock.While the Renewable Fuel Standard contributed an estimated $14.1 billion in profits to the agricultural sector from 2005 to 2015, not all farmers have been able to equally access the profits from U.S. biofuels subsidies.
While Midwestern farmers tend to be white (98%), male (67%) and above 55 years old (61%), this wasn’t always the case. Many Indigenous farmers and non-white farmers who historically occupied land in the Midwest have been pushed out of the agricultural sector due to systemic barriers, violence and discriminatory policies that made it difficult, if not impossible, to access finance and farm assistance.
Of the more than 12,000 farms operated by non-white farmers today, most are primarily small farms. Since corn and soy crops tend to be grown on larger farms, farmers of color with smaller operations may not receive economic benefits that biofuels bring to the Midwest.
Further expansion of biofuels also risks exacerbating the trend of farmland consolidation that is squeezing small, farms out of the market, since corn and soy are typically grown on large monocropping operations. Although biofuels policy does not single-handedly cause cropland consolidation in the Midwest, consolidated farmland growing monocultures tends to replace smaller farms with diversified crops. Midsize farms have historically been the economic backbone of many local communities, and their loss has accelerated economic and social challenges in the rural Midwest.
In an analysis of data from 1978 to 2017, the Union of Concerned Scientists found “large crop farms are getting larger, small crop farms are getting smaller, and midsize crop farms are disappearing.” Over the almost four decades of the study, the total number of farms has decreased as farm size tripled. While cropland consolidation has decreased the number of farmers in all racial groups, the trend has been 2.5 times more severe for Black farmers.
Farmland consolidation also stresses agricultural communities by increasing farmland real estate prices and preventing small-scale farmers from purchasing or renting land. Because farmland continues to increase in value, corporations and wealthy individuals have invested in large swaths of farmland, which they rent to farmers at increasing prices.
Future agricultural policy in the Midwest needs to support all farmers and environmentally-friendly farming systems, including small and medium-sized farms growing diversified crops. Future expansion of corn and soy cultivation could continue to exacerbate land loss for non-white farmers, as well as the loss of diversified farming systems. Policymakers need to assess whether additional support for biofuels may exacerbate, rather than improve challenges facing their constituents.
Racial and Gender Dynamics of U.S. Farmers
While analyzing trends in data is critical to understanding racial dynamics in farming, federal agricultural data is imperfect and may not always reflect the full story. Many farmers lack documented legal ownership of their land because of laws governing how land is passed down through generations, particularly Black and Native American farmers. One study found that Black farmers lost $326 billion worth of land in the 20th century due to discriminatory lending practices and legal difficulties that come with inheriting land that does not have a formal title, also known as heir’s property.
In addition, the majority of people working on U.S. farms are immigrants, with almost half being undocumented. Corn and soy production is highly mechanized, so it’s unlikely that undocumented workers make up a considerable portion of biofuels workers. However, this constitutes a major data gap.
Women are another major group that may not be accurately accounted for. Married white women farmers are more likely to have their husband designated as the primary producer or business owner and therefore may not be represented adequately in federal data.
Farming practices also vary by different groups. Women constitute roughly one-third of farmers, with white women occupying 95% of this share. Women famers grow a variety of crops, but there are racial trends in this subset; for example, compared to white women, women farmers of color tend to grow more vegetables. Black and Asian American and Pacific Island women also are more likely to operate smaller farms and are more likely to grow organic crops, but they are much less likely to be certified organic.
4) Biofuels Contribute to Community Health RisksThe lifecycle of biofuels, from crop production to refining, negatively affects water and air quality for Midwestern communities. For example, increased fertilizer use from expansion of corn and soy cultivation can lead to high concentrations of nitrates in the tap water of heavy agriculture areas. While these communities can see spikes in nitrate levels past the EPA limit of 10 parts per million (ppm), many average around 5 ppm, which still carries long-term health risks like cancer and birth defects. A report from the Environmental Working Group found Midwestern states have a high overlap between poor water quality and agricultural areas. A study in southeast Minnesota correlated agricultural expansion with well contamination, estimating that the conversion of grassland to agriculture from 2007 to 2012 increased the number of wells exceeding 10 ppm nitrate-nitrogen by 45%.
The process of refining biofuels also carries harmful impacts on resources and human health. Midwestern ethanol refineries are major greenhouse gas emitters, collectively releasing 17.4 MTCO2e in 2021. They also contribute air-polluting volatile organic compounds and ground-level ozone, which can cause respiratory issues. Refining ethanol also requires high volumes of water, which is currently drawn from underground aquifers. There is a danger that production of biofuels will lead to a depletion of these aquifers and decreased drought resilience for communities. These concerns show that policymakers should adequately weigh public health dangers related to the entire lifecycle of biofuel cultivation, refining and use.
The Future of Biofuels in the U.S.Biofuels have already had a significant impact on Midwestern environments and communities, yet political support for biofuels remains strong. Policymakers can, however, take steps to reduce the future environmental footprint and human impact of the industry. Trends in emissions, land use change, economic inequities and community health risks are all key dynamics that are often overlooked in biofuels policymaking.
To avoid these negative impacts, it will be necessary to place conservative limits on purpose-grown crops for biofuels. This is true both for biofuels used to power cars and for the expanding sustainable aviation fuel industry, which could drive vast expansion of land devoted to biofuels crops.
Note: For the purposes of this analysis, the Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
corn-soy-biofuel-midwest-farmers.jpg U.S. Climate United States biofuels agriculture U.S. Climate Policy-Lands land use U.S. Climate Policy-Equity Climate Equity environmental justice Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects Authors Angela Scafidi Haley Leslie-Bole
What Is "Loss and Damage" from Climate Change? 8 Key Questions, Answered
The planet has already warmed by approximately 1.1 degrees C (2 degrees F) due to human-induced climate change. Millions of people today are facing the real-life consequences of higher temperatures, rising seas, fiercer storms and unpredictable rainfall.
Rapidly reducing greenhouse gas emissions is essential to limit temperature rise and secure a safer future for us all. So is making major investments to protect communities from severe impacts that will continue to worsen.
Yet, collective efforts to curb emissions and adapt are currently not enough to tackle the speed and scale of climate impacts — meaning that some losses and damages from climate change are inevitable. How countries handle these losses and damages has been a key issue at UN climate negotiations and beyond.
Here, we provide an explainer on the concept of “loss and damage” and what’s needed to address it.
1) What Is Loss and Damage?“Loss and damage” is a general term used in UN climate negotiations to refer to the consequences of climate change that go beyond what people can adapt to; for example, the loss of coastal heritage sites due to rising sea levels or the loss of homes and lives during extreme floods. This also includes situations where adaptation options exist, but a community doesn’t have the resources to access or utilize them.
To date, there is no official definition of loss and damage under the UN.
Loss and damage is harming and will continue to harm vulnerable communities the most, meaning that addressing the issue is an urgent matter of climate justice. But the subject has historically been fraught with contention both inside and outside of UN climate negotiations. In particular, countries have struggled to reach agreement on how much money developed countries should supply to address loss and damage in developing nations, which have contributed the least to the climate crisis but are often hit hardest by its impacts.
2) What Counts as Loss and Damage?Loss and damage can result from extreme weather events like cyclones, droughts and heatwaves, as well as from slow-onset changes such as sea level rise, desertification, glacial retreat, land degradation, ocean acidification and salinization. In some cases, damages may permanently alter places; for example, rising seas encroaching on low-lying islands, or drought shrinking water supplies and turning once-productive farmland into barren land.
Harko, 12 years old, walks across the land with her younger brother in search of water during a drought in Ethiopia. Photo by UNICEF Ethiopia/2016/AyeneDamages from the effects of climate change can be further divided into two categories — economic losses and non-economic losses — though there is overlap between the two.
Economic losses and damages are those affecting resources, goods and services that are commonly traded in markets, such as damage to critical infrastructure and property or supply chain disruptions. This can play out at an international or national scale as well as locally, such as impacts on individual farmers or communities.
In coastal Bangladesh, for example, salt farming is a major source of employment. Yet in recent years, frequent cyclones, tidal surges and heavy rainfall have hampered salt production, eroding the country’s self-sufficiency and forcing it to import salt to manage the market shortfall.
Non-economic losses and damages can be some of the most devastating — such as the incalculable toll of losing family members, the disappearance of cultures and ways of living, or the trauma of being forced to migrate from ancestral homes.
Take the communities in Kosrae, Micronesia, who have lost burial grounds due to coastal erosion caused by sea level rise. Likewise, the loss of sea ice in the Arctic has affected the cultural identity and hunting practices among Inuit communities. While harder to quantify and monetize, non-economic losses have severe and detrimental effects on communities’ well-being.
3) What Is the Difference Between Mitigation, Adaptation and Addressing Loss and Damage?Under the Paris Agreement on climate change, countries recognized the importance of “averting, minimizing and addressing” loss and damage. Loss and damage can be “averted” and “minimized” by curbing greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation) and by taking preemptive action to protect communities from the consequences of climate change (adaptation). Climate adaptation measures include protecting communities from sea level rise by helping them move to higher ground, preparing for extreme weather disasters by investing in early warning systems, protecting food supplies, switching to drought-resistant crops and much more.
Addressing loss and damage is the crucial third pillar of climate action: providing support to people and communities after they have experienced climate-related impacts.
Loss and damage is linked to adaptation and mitigation because it happens when efforts to reduce emissions are not ambitious enough and when adaptation efforts are unsuccessful or impossible to implement. The second installment of the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report, published in February 2022, acknowledges that as the magnitude of climate change increases, so does the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits. It differentiates between “soft” limits — when adaptation options exist but communities don’t have the financial resources needed to pursue them — and “hard” limits, where “there are no reasonable prospects for avoiding intolerable risks.” These limits are particularly acute in vulnerable communities that lack the resources needed to implement effective adaptation options.
Coral reefs offer a good example of where adaptation is likely to reach its limits. The IPCC found that 70%-90% of tropical coral reefs will die by mid-century even if temperature rise is limited to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), with nearly total loss under 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) of warming. This will lead to irreversible losses of biodiversity and have a major impact on coastal communities that eat and sell fish that live along reefs.
While further research is needed to fully understand the limits of climate adaptation, it’s clear that losses and damage are already happening, and many communities lack the resources to deal with them. Climate plans and policies should account for loss and damage alongside mitigation and adaptation.
Damage to buildings caused by Hurricane Irma in Nanny Cay on the British Virgin Island of Tortola. The Caribbean island suffered widespread damage and destruction when Hurricane Irma passed over in 2017. Photo by Russell Watkins/DFID 4) What’s the History of Loss and Damage in UN Climate Negotiations?The issue of loss and damage has been a live — and contentious — one in UN climate negotiations for over three decades.
When the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was first being drafted in 1991, the island nation of Vanuatu (on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States) proposed creating an insurance scheme to provide financial resources to countries impacted by sea level rise. Under its proposal, each country would contribute funds based on their relative contribution to global emissions and their share of the global gross national product. However, the proposal was rejected, and the issue of loss and damage was not mentioned when the text of the Framework Convention was adopted in 1992.
Driving Action on Loss and Damage
ACT2025, a consortium of climate-vulnerable countries, is working to drive greater international climate ambition that meets the needs of developing countries, including on loss and damage. Learn more about ACT2025 and its work here.
Loss and damage first appeared in a negotiated outcome of the UN climate talks in 2007 as part of the Bali Action Plan. Yet it wasn’t until 2013 that the issue gained real traction in these negotiations, when parties formed the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage to avert, minimize and address loss and damage. The Warsaw Mechanism was mandated to share knowledge, strengthen dialogues among stakeholders, and mobilize expertise to enhance action and support for loss and damage. But neither the Warsaw Mechanism nor any other established mechanism delivered funding to help countries manage loss and damage.
In 2015, developing nations successfully pressed to include an article on loss and damage (Article 8) in the Paris Agreement. However, finance related to loss and damage was ignored. In fact, developed countries secured language in the accompanying COP decision explicitly stating that loss and damage “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.”
A large coalition of climate-vulnerable countries advocated at COP26 in 2021 for creating a new finance facility or fund dedicated to loss and damage. But developed nations again rejected their proposal. Instead, countries established a two-year Glasgow Dialogue to discuss possible arrangements for loss and damage funding. They also agreed to fund the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD), which aims to provide developing countries with technical assistance to address loss and damage. Some EU member states pledging more than €30 million ($32 million) towards the network.
At COP27, countries agreed for the first time to put loss and damage funding arrangements on the formal agenda. This culminated in a historic decision to establish a “loss and damage fund,” which governments aimed to operationalize the following year. Countries also resolved key questions around the SNLD’s governance structures, paving the way for its full operationalization in 2023.
On day one of COP28, after months of intense and contentious negotiations, countries set the loss and damage fund in motion and agreed on critical details, like selecting the World Bank as its host. Over the following two weeks, countries pledged almost $700 million to start filling the fund. The Santiago Network on Loss and Damage was also operationalized, with the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction and UN Office for Project Services as its hosts and the U.S. pledging an additional $2.5 million.
This was a landmark moment for loss and damage negotiations — but the work is far from done.
In the lead-up to COP29 in 2024, countries will be looking for confirmation that the World Bank can meet the conditions required to host the loss and damage fund. Some of these conditions include the ability to institute firewalls to ensure the independence and integrity of the fund’s board and secretariat; allowing countries direct access to resources from the fund; and ensuring universal access to all parties of the Paris Agreement, even if they are not members of the World Bank. Countries will also be watching the Board of the Fund for institutional arrangements that ensure the fund can deliver resources at the speed and scale necessary.
Finally, developed nations must put forth much more finance to fill the loss and damage fund. While the $700 million pledged at COP28 is a start, vulnerable countries may face as much as $580 billion in climate-related damages by 2030.
5) Is Loss and Damage an Issue of Liability and Compensation?One reason loss and damage has been so contentious historically is due to developed countries’ concerns that compensating for losses and damages caused by adverse climate impacts may be construed as an admission of legal liability, triggering litigation and compensation claims on a major scale. As such, developed countries fought to include language in the Paris Agreement to prevent them from being legally on the hook to provide compensation.
This concern was addressed in loss and damage funding discussions at COP27 and in the final decision at COP28, which states that “funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage are based on cooperation and facilitation and do not involve liability or compensation.” This provided the assurance that developed countries were looking for to continue negotiations and set the loss and damage fund in motion.
6) What Are Some Possible Sources of Funding for Addressing Loss and Damage?Some developed countries point to humanitarian aid, disaster-risk management and insurance as sources of finance for loss and damage. Other, more innovative sources have also been proposed, such as levies on air travel and shipping, financial transactions taxes, taxes on windfall profits of fossil fuel companies, and other non-public sources. But these can’t function separately. To address the scale and scope of the problem, they all need to be part of the “mosaic of solutions.”
For example, in the wake of devastating floods in 2022, Pakistan needed short-term humanitarian assistance as well as long-term support for rebuilding. Meanwhile, Palau is concerned that tuna are migrating out of its fishing areas as the ocean warms. Without the ability to fish for tuna, some Pacific Island nations could lose income averaging 37% of government revenue. While humanitarian aid would not be poised nor mandated to address this problem, other forms of finance could.
Thai and migrant workers from Laos and Myanmar line up to collect donations after floods, 2011. Photo by ILO/Sai Min ZawThis underscores the need for broader funding arrangements, including the dedicated loss and damage fund, which can coordinate and align various types of funding from both within and outside of the UNFCCC to adequately address loss and damage. The new fund will facilitate coordination with a wide variety of funding arrangements through multilateral development banks, relevant UN agencies, multilateral climate funds, the International Office of Migration, the Santiago Network and others.
Outside of the UNFCCC, there have been additional important developments for financing loss and damage. These include the Climate Vulnerable Forum and Vulnerable Twenty (V20) Group’s crowd-sourced loss and damage fund and the G7 and V20’s Global Shield Against Climate Risks initiative, which aims to enhance existing financial structures on climate risk and loss and damage finance.
7) What Activities Could Finance for Loss and Damage Support?Action to address loss and damage could span a range of activities and should be shaped by the communities experiencing climate change impacts. Examples include weather-indexed crop insurance for farmers or proactively setting aside funds to rebuild critical infrastructure when disaster strikes.
It could also entail providing immediate humanitarian assistance after an extreme weather event; offering relief and rehabilitation to victims through provision of basic amenities; enabling social protection systems to provide emergency cash transfers to the poor; and enhancing microcredit institutions to provide financing for livelihood restoration.
Loss and damage funding could also help people rebuild when their homes are destroyed. For example, while early warning systems in Bangladesh have helped radically reduce fatalities from extreme weather events, people leave the storm shelters to find their homes and livelihoods destroyed, and have thus unquestionably experienced loss and damage.
Finally, when necessary, funding for loss and damage can assist with migration and relocation of people who are permanently displaced, and/or help diversify skills if their original livelihoods are no longer available.
8) What Needs to Happen Next to Address Loss and Damage?Climate impacts are already causing widespread disruptions and are only poised to worsen, even with ambitious action on emissions reductions and adaptation. The need for loss and damage solutions — most notably, finance to enable them — is more urgent than ever before.
With the loss and damage fund now in motion, the international community will have to work diligently to finalize the details of new funding arrangements and to mobilize finance at scale. Developing countries and communities on the front lines of climate impacts are counting on them.
This article was originally published in April 2022. It was last updated in February 2024 to reflect the latest state of play for loss and damage in UN climate negotiations.
loss-and-damage-questions-explainer.jpg Climate climate impacts climate policy Climate Resilience climatewatch-pinned COP28 Featured Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects Authors Preety Bhandari Nate Warszawski Deirdre Cogan Rhys GerholdtWhat We Know About Deep-sea Mining — And What We Don’t
In the race to cut greenhouse gas emissions and rein in climate change, demand for critical minerals is surging. Materials such as lithium, cobalt and graphite are essential components of EV batteries, wind turbines, solar panels and other low-carbon technologies increasingly powering the world’s energy systems. Mining for these materials on land is already underway, but with demand surging, some are now looking to tap the seafloor for its millions of square kilometers of metal ores.
Indeed, some nations are already applying to the UN’s International Seabed Authority (ISA) for permits to explore deep-sea mining in international waters, where the bulk of the ocean’s critical minerals are found. But despite years of research, little is still known about the deep ocean. Many fear that extracting minerals from it could pose grave consequences for both marine life and planetary health.
After failing to reach an agreement in July 2023, the ISA now has until 2025 to finalize regulations that will dictate whether and how countries could pursue deep-sea mining in international waters. Formal discussions about its potential environmental impacts will kick off in 2024 and could help inform ISA’s decision. What will happen in the meantime remains unclear.
With the future of deep-sea mining still under debate, here’s what we know so far about the proposed practice and its impacts — and what we don’t:
1) What Is Deep-sea Mining and How Would It Be Done?Deep-sea mining aims to retrieve valuable mineral deposits found on the ocean’s floor, hundreds or even thousands of meters below its surface. Alongside a diverse array of marine life at these depths are significant reserves of copper, cobalt, nickel, zinc, silver, gold and rare earth elements — materials that are essential to building zero-carbon energy components and other technologies but can be difficult to source.
In the deep sea, these minerals are contained within slow-forming, potato-sized polymetallic nodules, as well as in polymetallic sulphides (large deposits made up of sulphur compounds and other metals that form around hydrothermal vents) and metal-rich crusts on underwater mountains (seamounts). While there has been commercial interest in these minerals for decades, recent advancements in technology have made it possible to mine these areas by sending vehicles down to harvest mineral deposits from the seafloor.
Mineral nodules on the seafloor in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, a key area of interest for deep-sea mining. Photo by ROV KIEL 6000/GEOMARIn the case of polymetallic nodules — which are currently the primary focus for deep-sea mining — mining vehicles would collect mineral deposits from the surface of the seabed, not unlike a tractor plowing a field, along with the top layers of sediment. The materials collected would then be piped up to a surface vessel for processing, and any waste, such as sediments and other organic materials, would be pumped back into the water column.
2) What’s the Current Status of Deep-sea Mining?While exploratory mining to test equipment has occurred at a small scale, deep-sea mining has not yet been undertaken commercially. But some national governments and mining companies plan to begin as soon as possible, which could be within the next few years. What happens next will largely hinge on the ISA and how it decides to regulate deep-sea mining.
In 2021, the Pacific Island nation of Nauru notified the ISA of its plans to begin mining in international waters, triggering a contentious provision in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) known as the “two-year rule.” The rule requires that, starting two years after the date of this notification, the ISA must "consider" and "provisionally approve" applications to mine — regardless of whether a final set of regulations has been agreed on. The two-year period elapsed in July 2023 and ISA’s ensuing meeting ended with no final rule in place. Now, its Council is working with a view to adopt regulations by 2025.
The ISA Assembly (comprised of all 168 members) will meet in 2024 and will likely discuss the potential impacts of seabed mining on the marine environment for the first time. Some hope these discussions will lead to a “precautionary pause” on mining activities while further research is conducted, although whether this will occur — and what could happen in the meantime — remains unclear.
While the ISA has two more years to establish a code for international waters, countries could still go ahead with deep-sea mining projects in their own domestically controlled waters, known as “exclusive economic zones” (EEZs).
In January 2024, Norway initiated a process to open its own waters for exploration of deep-sea mineral resources, likely starting in the early 2030s. Other countries may follow suit, though in practice, many will be constrained by a lack of available funding and technical ability. There is also a great diversity of opinion on seabed mining among nation states. Some, such as Norway and Nauru, are leading the charge for exploration and extraction; others, such as Germany and Canada, as well as the European Parliament, have called for national and regional moratoria.
In addition, the bulk of the most attractive mineral deposits are found not in countries' EEZs but on vast seafloor abyssal plains in international waters. One area of particular interest is the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in the Pacific Ocean. This mineral-rich region already hosts exploration contracts for 17 deep-sea mining contractors, with their combined exploration areas covering approximately 1 million square kilometers (about the same area as Ethiopia).
3) What Are the Potential Benefits of Deep-sea Mining?Proponents of deep-sea mining argue that it can help meet the world’s pressing need for critical minerals, which will likely only continue to grow as countries scale their decarbonization efforts. Estimates suggest that global demand for some such minerals could rise by as much as 400%-600% in the coming decades as the world increases its reliance on wind and solar power, electric vehicles, batteries and other zero-carbon technologies. Several studies have concluded that there is no shortage of mineral resources on land, but the world still faces significant hurdles in locating viable reserves and quickly scaling up mining and processing operations.
Some also view deep-sea mining as an alternative pathway that can circumvent certain risks associated with mining activities on land. Since extraction activities would occur exclusively at sea, deep-sea mining is unlikely to be associated with environmental hazards such as deforestation and freshwater pollution that can impact communities neighboring mines on land.
Similarly, the difficulty in accessing deep-sea mineral deposits for exploitation means that artisanal (small-scale) mining operations would be impossible and strong regulation of labor conditions may be feasible. This could potentially avoid the human rights abuses associated with some terrestrial mining operations. However, experiences of labor abuse in distant-water fishing operations show this outcome is not guaranteed.
4) What Are the Risks of Deep-sea Mining?While the deep sea was once thought to be devoid of life — too dark, cold and starved of food for anything to survive — we now know that it is the largest habitable space on the planet and home to a dazzling array of life. To date, tens of thousands of species have been found in the deep ocean, with estimates that there could be millions more. In the Clarion-Clipperton Zone alone, a key area of interest for deep-sea mining, researchers have recently discovered over 5,000 species that were entirely new to science.
A starfish in a field of manganese nodules on the seafloor in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. Thousands of previously unknown deep-sea species have already been discovered in this area, which some seek to mine for its mineral resources. Photo by ROV-Team/GEOMARWith exploration and testing still in the early stages, further research is required to determine the possible ecological impacts of deep-sea mining. But the science to date paints a concerning picture.
- Direct harm to marine life: There is a high likelihood that less mobile deep-sea organisms would be killed through direct contact with heavy mining equipment deployed on the seabed, and that organisms would be smothered and suffocated by the sediment plumes these machines are likely to create. Warm mining wastewater could also kill marine life through overheating and poisoning.
- Long-term species and ecosystem disruption: Mining activities could impair the feeding and reproduction of deep-sea species through the creation of intense noise and light pollution in a naturally dark and silent environment. For example, the sound pollution from these activities could negatively impact large mega-fauna like whales, posing further risk to populations already strained by climate change and other human activities. Because many deep-sea species are rare, long-lived and slow to reproduce, and because polymetallic nodules (which may take millions of years to develop to a harvestable size) are an important habitat for deep-sea species, scientists are fairly certain that some species would face extinction from habitat removal due to mining, and that these ecosystems would require extremely long time periods to recover, if ever.
- Possible impacts on fishing and food security: It’s not just the seafloor that’s at risk. Under current designs, waste discharge from mining vessels could spread over large distances, potentially kilometers away from the areas being mined. This may pose a threat to open ocean fish and invertebrates which are crucial to international fisheries — such as tuna stocks that help drive the economies of many small island developing states in the Pacific, including Kiribati, Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands. Effects of this mining waste could include suffocation, damaged respiratory and feeding structures, and disrupted visual communication within and amongst species, alongside changes in the oxygen content, pH, temperature and toxicity of seawater. However, more research is needed on the characteristics of the discharge plumes themselves and the tolerance of ocean species to fully understand these impacts.
- Economic and social risks: While extraction would occur offshore, the deep-sea mining industry would still need shoreline facilities, whether for processing or transshipment of material. This would require land acquisition and development, which has historically driven habitat loss affecting coastal communities dependent on marine resources the most. And, though the UN has designated high-seas minerals “the common heritage of [hu]mankind” and declared that any mineral extraction should benefit all nations, the current regulatory regime of the ISA appears to promote the flow of mining profits to developed states, or to shareholders of mining companies, rather than being inclusive of developing nations.
- Potential climate impacts: The ocean is the world’s largest carbon sink, absorbing around 25% of all carbon dioxide emissions. Microscopic organisms play a critical role in this climate-regulating system, helping to sequester carbon in the deep sea and reduce emissions of other planet-warming gases, such as methane, from seabed sediments. The loss of deep-sea biodiversity following mining activity may impact the ocean’s carbon cycle and reduce its ability to help mitigate global temperature rise.
The global supply of critical minerals and rare earth elements must grow in the coming years, and quickly. But there is no easy answer to meeting this need, given the immature state and potential dangers of deep-sea mining and the well-understood harms associated with terrestrial mining. While mineral reserves on land appear sufficient to meet global needs, the world must address how to responsibly scale up mining and processing operations in a way that minimizes environmental and social risks.
Within the next 15-20 years, mineral recycling could become a viable alternative to mining for a large portion of material requirements. The World Bank estimates that if recycling rates for end-of-life batteries increase significantly by 2050, it could decrease the need for newly mined minerals by around one-quarter for copper, nickel and lithium and by about 15% for cobalt. However, in the short term (by 2030), there will not be enough of these minerals in circulation to make recycling a feasible approach.
Better recycling practices in established waste streams, such as from electronics and electrical equipment, can help alleviate some short-term supply pressure while preparing the secondary supply chain to handle a large volume of end-of-life zero-carbon energy products in the future. There is also a range of research efforts underway to obtain the necessary minerals without mining virgin land, including recovery from coal waste or hard rock mine tailings.
Finally, as battery technologies continue to evolve, it is possible that deep-sea mineral deposits will lose their attraction as alternative technologies not reliant on such minerals become more common. For instance, there is a growing shift away from nickel manganese cobalt oxides (NMC) batteries towards lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, with LFP batteries gaining significant market share from 2015 to 2022; their key materials, lithium and iron, are not targets of deep-sea mining. Emerging technologies such as sodium-ion batteries also have the potential to alter the EV battery market by replacing lithium and cobalt with cheaper and more abundant options.
With Serious Questions Still Unanswered, What Comes Next?In developing regulations for deep-sea mining, the ISA and other stakeholders have a rare opportunity to take a breath before taking the plunge. Rather than extracting resources first and addressing the consequences later, this is a chance to step back and consider the environmental and social implications of deep-sea mining before any activity gets underway. Any decision made should be rooted in evidence robust enough to ensure that no serious harm is done to people, nature or the climate.
In order to continue with the possibility of deep-sea mining, key questions and knowledge gaps should be addressed by the ISA, the mining industry, scientists and national governments:
- What is the potential magnitude and extent (both in space and time) of deep-sea mining impacts on marine species and environments, and what are the likely ecological consequences?
- What are the potential social and economic impacts of deep-sea mining? Is it possible for the industry to be advanced in a way that meets the UNCLOS goal of fostering sustainable economic development, international cooperation and equitable trade growth for all countries?
- How can a circular mineral economy be further developed to lessen the need for environmentally intrusive practices? More research must be conducted into land-based and urban mining practices to improve their efficiency, as well as into improving product design to reduce demand for and increase recycling of critical minerals.
- What are the possible positive and negative implications of deep-sea mining in achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals, as well as for furthering research into deep-sea environments?
- What regulations could be developed to ensure that the financial benefits from deep-sea mining operations, should they occur, are equitably distributed among nations?
Finally, for the exploration of deep-sea mineral resources to continue, regulations should be drafted in full and in transparent collaboration with interested parties and key stakeholders, including ISA members, mining corporations and scientists. These regulations should be backed by science and other forms of knowledge, be enforceable, and offer effective protection for delicate marine environments from the impacts of mining.
This article was originally published in July 2023. It was last updated in February 2024 to reflect developments in national deep-sea mining policy.
deep-sea-mining-vessel Ocean Ocean climate change Clean Energy Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects Authors Oliver Ashford Jonathan Baines Melissa Barbanell Ke WangAfrican Energy Dialogues Brings Together Voices on Africa's Energy Transitions
In Sub-Saharan Africa, 567 million people lack access to electricity — that makes up 80% of the global population facing this issue. On top of these struggles, Africa is also experiencing some of the worst impacts of climate change, with rising temperatures and extreme weather threatening human health, food and water security.
At the same time, Africa has an abundance of resources, and with the right policies, financing and planning, it has the potential to provide clean energy and economic development. But very few African countries currently have plans in place to use these resources to transition to a reliable, clean energy system. And in many cases, there is little country-specific research to inform development.
New research from WRI established that gaps in research and in coordination are stifling energy transitions in African countries, sparking WRI’s partnership with other major institutions — the African Energy Commission (AFREC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and Sustainable Energy for All (SEforAll) — to create a platform for developing, sharing and implementing country-level energy transition plans in Africa. Launched at the 2023 UN climate summit (COP28) in Dubai, African Energy Dialogues (AED) is raising the visibility and increasing the influence of African perspectives in the global discourse about African energy transitions. Its purpose is to create actionable recommendations on broadening clean energy use across the continent.
The launch event opened with a keynote address from respected author and economist Dr. Carlos Lopes, who shared his views on the important role AED can play. According to Dr. Lopes, the AED has a unique opportunity to address the diverse challenges of African energy transitions: Tackling energy access as a priority, the role of renewable and non-renewable energy, the role of Africa in the new global economy, and strategies to ensure a just transition.
Lopes said, “The most important message is to be clear that we can no longer discuss development without climate, and we can no longer discuss climate without development. We have to stop seeing these competing with one another."
Dr. Lopes noted that Africa’s economies have developed largely based on Official Development Assistance (ODA) — but that ODA funding has been reducing with time. There is a need to reduce reliance on ODA and retain economic benefit of domestic investments within African countries. Through its Investment and Finance Working Group, AED will develop and share a roadmap of how African countries can move beyond ODA and increase domestic investments in the energy sector, based on real return on investment and a strong economic case.
The African Energy Commission (AFREC)’s Head of Policy and Strategy, Yagouba Traore, called on AED to provide a space for African countries to share information and experience, as well as a platform to amplify African narratives, positions and agendas on the energy transition and importantly, energy access.
Traore said, “We need to work together to mobilize the necessary resources to develop the energy sector. We believe a platform like this can really provide a way to fast track all the elements.” He added, “We support it and invite all stakeholders to join us so we can provide energy and clean cooking fuels and technology to those who don't have them.”
Linus Mofor, Senior Environmental Affairs Officer at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), also urged those involved in Africa’s energy transition to be part of the AED. He emphasized the importance of platforms like AED to take ownership of Africa’s transition.
“There has always been a very patronizing approach to Africa. When it comes to the energy transition, Africa will decide, it will do it in its own way and consider all options,” Mofor said.
Mofor also noted that the work of AED can provide evidence to support African countries in charting a path that draws on the African Common Position on Energy Access and Transition and also takes into account African countries’ individual circumstances.
Lanre Shasore, Senior Adviser, Energy Transition Planning, Africa at SEforAll echoed the call for African voices to lead the discussion about their own energy transitions. She described Africa’s journey not as a transition story, but as a growth story and raised a key question for AED: What does a net zero world mean for economies like those in Africa? Shasore also urged AED to provide a platform for nuanced conversation on energy transitions, led by African voices.
Rebekah Shirley, WRI Africa’s Deputy Director agreed that through initiatives like AED, “We’re not only singing from the same hymn book, we’re writing our own hymn.”
Looking ahead, AED will form working groups and task forces on energy transition topics (including investment and finance, enabling policies and regulation, and technologies and infrastructure), support individual countries to develop energy transition pathways, share knowledge and best practice to improve understanding of African countries’ energy systems, and elevate African perspectives in the global debates on energy transitions. AED is actively seeking participation from individuals and organizations based in all African countries and all areas of expertise, including research, policy energy planning, infrastructure, finance and investment.
To find out how to get involved, visit www.africanenergydialogues.org or contact the team.
african-energy-dialogues-town.jpeg Energy Africa Energy Clean Energy renewable energy Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Related Resources and Data A Path Across the Rift: Informing African Energy Transitions by Unearthing Critical Questions and Data Needs Projects Authors Mary W. Githinji Sarah GeorgeWhat Is the Paris Agreement’s Article 2.1(c) on Climate Finance, and Why Does it Matter? Key Questions, Answered
Recent studies indicate that the world will need $10 trillion annually between 2030 and 2050 to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. That’s a lot — but the world has the money.
As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) explains, ”there is sufficient global capital to close the global investment gaps … but there are barriers to redirecting capital to climate action.” The challenge, then, is not necessarily raising additional finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation, but how to align all the world’s capital towards climate action.
Article 2.1(c) of the international Paris Agreement on climate change aims to do just that by “making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient development.” However, the language of Article 2.1(c) is vague on what exactly it entails. Eight years after virtually all countries signed the Paris Agreement, they’re still at odds over the scope of Article 2.1(c) and how it should be implemented.
Here, we explain what Article 2.1(c) is, how it interacts with other finance mandates, and what’s needed to put it into action.
What Does Article 2.1(c) Do?The heart of the Paris Agreement on climate change is Article 2, which sets the objectives of the agreement. Article 2.1(a) urges a global response to hold the increase in global average temperature to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) to reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Article 2.1(b) outlines the need to adapt to adverse impacts of climate change, build resilience and pursue low-greenhouse gas development. Article 2.1(c) points out that we need to make finance flows consistent with these objectives if we’re ever going to attain them. Finally, Article 2.2 outlines the context these articles should be pursued under, including the principles of equity, common-but-differentiated responsibility, and respective capabilities and national circumstances.
2.1(c) is a holistic goal. That means it covers both mitigation and adaptation, potentially encompassing domestic and international finance flows. It requires not just scaling up the good finance — for example, climate resilience bonds and financing for new renewable energy projects — but also scaling down funding to carbon-intensive activities, like new coal plants or diesel truck fleets. And it doesn’t stop with government spending. Depending on how it’s interpreted, it could also encompass the private sector, including financial institutions, businesses, corporations and investors.
In short, financial systems broadly must align with the pursuit of sustainable development and international climate goals. This means that all types of investments and financing activities — all investors and actors in the real economy, stock as well as flows — should be “consistent” with achieving the world’s climate goals.
2.1(c) will require economic and financial reform. The tools (e.g., policies and economic and financial instruments) for getting there will be many and varied. Innovative policies and financial instruments will surely play a role, such as green procurement (where companies and governments would be required to decarbonize supply chains) and climate-related bonds to integrate climate priorities into economic development plans.
And in order to ensure equity, alignment of financial flows will have to be customized to each country’s economic, financial and social contexts. This especially includes developing countries’ pursuit of sustainable development, poverty eradication and a just transition.
What Progress Has Been Made Toward Achieving Article 2.1(c)?Though a common understanding of 2.1(c) has yet to be agreed upon by Paris Agreement signatories, efforts inside and outside the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are providing glimpses of what alignment could look like.
Efforts Within UNFCCCThe UN’s Global Stocktake, which concluded at the recent UN Climate summit (COP28), assessed progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement for the first time, including Article 2.1(c). In its key findings released in a Synthesis Report in September 2023, it recognized that financial flows include “international and domestic, public and private.”
Negotiators established the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on Article 2.1(c) at COP27 in 2022, where countries, organizations and other stakeholders can exchange views and enhance understanding of the scope of 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which focuses on developed countries’ financial responsibilities). As a result of the dialogue, the secretariat prepared a report about their deliberations. At COP28, negotiators decided to extend the dialogue with at least two sessions, one in 2024 and one in 2025, followed by a report by the co-chairs about the deliberations.
The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), established during COP16, has two tasks related to Article 2.1(c): mapping information that contributes to the implementation of Article 2.1(c) and preparing a synthesis report (published in November 2023) analyzing how to operationalize it. The SCF provided a first report at COP27 and an updated report at COP28 for countries’ consideration.
Efforts Outside UNFCCCStakeholders like investors and corporations have developed frameworks to identify progress in aligning financing per Article 2.1(c). For example, WRI developed a framework and identified tools governments already have at their disposal to shift and mobilize finance. Tools are available in four categories: financial policies and regulations, fiscal policy levers, public finance and information instruments.
Investors, corporations and financial institutions have also shown some progress on Article 2.1(c) alignment.
Paying for the Paris Agreement Resource Hub
WRI recently launched a resource hub highlighting different tools to make progress towards 2.1(c). This platform includes multimedia modules on 16 tools for aligning and increasing public and private finance for climate goals, including public-private partnerships, green procurement standards, mandatory climate risk disclosure and more.
Some are mainstreaming climate risk in their operations by applying risk management approaches, including disclosure frameworks to assess physical (e.g., fires and floods) and transitional (e.g., regulatory and technologies) risks. The theory of change is that disclosing information on climate-related risks may lead to investors deciding to shift their investments, contributing to alignment. To this end, corporations are applying the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) frameworks to their own risk disclosures. Some central banks have incorporated climate-related risks into their operations.
Additionally, investors with the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) have developed guidelines for financial institutions to align their business and operations with the goal of achieving net-zero emissions. Financial institutions including asset owners and managers, commercial banks and insurers have made commitments to back sustainable finance and phase out coal. Multilateral development banks have rolled out principles and a joint methodology to align their operations — including both direct investment and policy-based lending — to the goals of the Paris Agreement.
What Challenges Remain to Operationalize Article 2.1(c)?Despite incremental progress, understanding the place of 2.1(c) in the overall climate negotiations, defining key terms like “financial flows” and “consistent,” and addressing concerns about countries’ sovereignty all pose challenges for the international finance community to move forward.
Defining ‘Consistency of Financial Flows’One of the key challenges to operationalizing Article 2.1(c) is that countries are using different terms and concepts to interpret the word “consistency.” These include directing, orienting, aligning, shifting, steering, scaling up, scaling down and more. Some countries argue that “consistency of financial flows” is about directing finance to green, sustainable and/or climate-related activities, regardless of the financial instruments through which such flows are channeled. The IPCC has defined it more broadly as looking at all investments, whether or not they contribute to climate objectives, including those investments that play a transition role.
However, “consistency” will require some conversation about what not to do, as well. At the very least, countries need to come to a common understanding on how to scale down misaligned investments (like financing fossil fuels) and the impact this may have on countries’ domestic policies and national development.
Concerns About Unintended ConsequencesCountries have different development pathways, needs and priorities. Policies and instruments to align their financial flows will need to account for this diversity. However, because 2.1(c) is a global effort, questions will arise about standards for action and whether similar policies and regulations need to be applied in all countries. For example, if one developing country does not reform a specific set of policies, will it no longer be eligible to access climate finance? Will there be trade restrictions imposed on specific products?
The Relationship of Article 2.1(c) to Other Global Finance GoalsArticle 2.1(c) is just one goal within the Paris Agreement for addressing climate change. To effectively operationalize it, it must be considered within the context of the whole agreement — especially its other finance goals.
For example, negotiators and other stakeholders like research organizations and academia are examining the complementarity of Article 2.1(c) and the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) that must be established by COP29 in 2024. NCQG will set a new finance objective that goes beyond developed nations’ current goal of providing a collective $100 billion in climate finance annually. However, while Article 2.1(c) refers to allfinancial flows for countries that signed the Paris Agreement, the NCQG is specific to finance support to developing countries
Importantly, the mandate to adopt NCQG states that the new goal must take into account developing countries’ needs and priorities. Developing countries have reiterated their concern that Article 2.1(c) discussions could draw the NCQG conversations away from this focus and instead towards domestic policy and finance flow shifts, or include conditionalities or barriers to access financial support.
It's important that negotiators take these concerns seriously as they consider how to move forward, particularly in the context of who contributes to the NCQG and efforts to maintain access to climate finance.
What to Watch at Future COPsArticle 2.1(c) was addressed on several fronts at COP28 in Dubai, including as part of the Global Stocktake, in reports prepared by the SCF, and in outcomes of the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue.
Driving Action on Finance
ACT2025, a consortium formed to ensure that voices from climate-vulnerable countries are heard and mobilized in climate negotiations, is working to drive greater climate ambition that meet the needs of developing countries, including on climate finance.
Learn more about ACT2025 here.
In addition, developed countries have suggested an agenda item focused on Article 2.1 (c), as well as a dedicated work program within the UNFCCC. Developing countries, however, expressed skepticism about this approach, on the basis that a focus on 2.1(c) could “lead to developed countries shying away from their commitments and obligations” to provide financial support to vulnerable nations. This concern was also expressed at COP27.
There will be no way to meet global climate goals if countries can’t agree on how to steer finance toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient world. Investment is both the fuel and the steering wheel for arriving where we need to go. Article 2.1(c) will be complicated to operationalize, but in its very ambition, it provides a vision for the road forward. By COP30 in 2025, it will be crucial to have both a framework and a roadmap for operationalization.
This article was originally published on Nov. 22, 2023. It was updated on Feb. 15, 2024 to reflect the progress made at COP28.
restoring_mangroves_east_africa (1).jpg Finance climate finance Paris Agreement Paying for Paris COP28 Climate International Climate Action Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects Authors Natalia AlayzaHow Cacao Can Do So Much More Than Make Chocolate
Creating chocolate has the potential to do so much more than be a Valentine’s treat or an end-of-meal indulgence.
Approximately 75% of the cacao pod is discarded during the cultivation, harvesting and consumption of cocoa beans. However, if parts like the husk, pulp and bean shell were collected and managed properly, these byproducts could help raise farmers’ incomes, revitalize degraded landscapes, provide food and even produce clean energy.
What’s the difference between cocoa and cacao?The two terms can often be confused, but there's a distinction:
Cocoa refers to the value chain, farmers and beans.
Cacao refers to the fruit (pod), trees and byproducts.
Rethinking the Cocoa ProcessCocoa production is big business for many: In 2021, its global trade value was $9.59 billion. It’s a high-value cash crop and an important export throughout the “Cacao Belt” (tropical production regions near the equator, such as countries Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Ecuador.)
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana in West Africa are the world’s largest cocoa producers, together contributing over 60% of global cocoa production volume. Cocoa farming employs nearly 600,000 farmers in Côte d'Ivoire, ultimately supporting nearly a quarter of the country’s population, or 6 million people. In Ghana it employs more than 10% of the total population, or 3.2 million farmers and workers.
Yet smallholder farmers who make up most cacao producers live on an estimated $2 a day. Moreover, the cocoa industry produces approximately 700,000 tons of waste annually and is a highly inefficient burden on land in its current state. Only the beans are harvested to produce cocoa mass, butter, powder and chocolate. Most of the cacao pod is not utilized and is left to decay on the ground, which damages fertile soil as it degrades. This material, if properly salvaged, can be harnessed for productive purposes.
The cocoa value chain has driven deforestation in nearly every country where cacao is produced, as rainforests are cut down to make way for monoculture plantations. In Côte d'Ivoire, it is estimated that 40% of cacao comes from protected areas. Increasing global demand for chocolate, coupled with decreasing cocoa prices, has put pressure on farmers to continue to clear land to plant cocoa — as opposed to using agroforestry systems, in which cacao is planted under shade trees, increasing carbon capture and biodiversity conservation. Environmental campaigners say that if deforestation continues unhindered, Côte d'Ivoire risks losing all its forest cover by 2034.
In Cauca, Colombia, a 98-year-old farmer separates the inner cacao pods from the bean shells. Harvesting cocoa can produce quite a bit of waste which are almost always discarded at the source. Photo by Jan Sochor/Alamy Stock PhotoIntroducing the practices of a circular economy for cocoa – in which all the organic material currently lost or wasted throughout the production chain is utilized – will not only provide environmental benefits but its byproducts can bring more revenue to the farmers.
Getting the Most Out of CocoaThe discarded organic material from cocoa production holds significant potential to be transformed into various products with valuable economic and environmental benefits.
Cacao pod husks, for example, can be repurposed as an alternative animal feed source (once processed to remove a harmful toxin), providing a sustainable and nutritious option for livestock. Additionally, it can be converted to biochar, which then forms a potent compost. Compost made from cacao pod husks can help improve soil quality by adding organic matter and enhancing soil structure, promoting healthier crop growth.
White sticky pulp surrounds the beans inside of a large cacao pod. Much of this material that is used for waste can instead be used to create byproducts or be used to benefit the environment. ampueroleonardo/iStockPod husks can also be used as biomass for electricity production, offering a renewable energy source and reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Research has been conducted on using cacao pod husks to generate electrical energy in Uganda, which faces electric power supply obstacles, predominately in rural areas. The research concluded that using agricultural waste for energy generation is typically most suitable in rural farming areas, where pollution-free raw materials are readily available in large quantities. The potential to scale this innovation is significant within cocoa-producing countries and could help improve access to electricity.
As cocoa farmers know well, cacao pulp extracted from cacao pods during fermentation makes for a delicious, sweet drink. Rich in nutrients, cacao pulp can be used in beverage and food production. The pulp has been commercialized with various companies specializing in cacao pulp drinks.
Cacao bean shells, another byproduct of cocoa processing, also have potential productive uses. These shells can be ground into cocoa flour for use in cooking and baking. Cocoa flour is rich in theobromine, dietary fiber, minerals, vitamins and antioxidants, which make it a healthy, gluten-free option to traditional flour.
Bean shells can also be used as mulch in gardening and landscaping, helping to suppress weeds and retain soil moisture. Moreover, bean shell biochar can be used as a natural fertilizer, improving soil health and promoting sustainable farming practices.
The BenefitsIf made economically viable, repurposing cocoa byproducts can bring clear benefits to smallholder farmers, nature and the climate.
By finding profitable uses for byproducts such as husks, pulp, and shells, farmers can generate additional income streams, thereby improving their livelihoods and financial stability. This economic empowerment can lead to increased resilience and autonomy within cocoa-producing communities, reducing reliance on volatile commodity markets.
Discarded cacao pods on the forest floor. Leaving the pods behind after harvesting the beans can deplete nutrients from the soil. Kakou Ralph Arthur Ruben/iStockNature will also benefit. Removing discarded pods from the ground, preserves ground soil fertility and allows farmers to help minimize soil acidification and nutrient depletion, promoting healthier soil ecosystems. This, in turn, promotes higher yields on the cocoa plants, so farmers don’t need to clear additional land or forests to plant more crops. This leads to increased biodiversity and ecosystem resilience.
Additionally, by using byproducts as alternatives to chemical fertilizers and pesticides, farmers can reduce their environmental footprint and promote sustainable agricultural practices.
Repurposing cocoa byproducts can also contribute to climate change mitigation efforts. By reducing emissions associated with waste decomposition and deforestation, circular practices can help mitigate the impacts of climate change on cocoa-producing regions.
The BarriersDespite the many benefits of reusing cocoa byproducts, there are significant barriers to its widespread adoption and scalability within the cocoa industry.
One major challenge is the lack of infrastructure and access to technology for collecting and processing cocoa waste. Many cocoa-producing regions lack the necessary facilities and equipment for efficiently collecting, storing, and processing waste products such as the pod husks, pulp, and shells. Poor infrastructure and high costs mean farmers may struggle to extract value from waste materials and incorporate them into their production systems.
Financial barriers also hinder the scaling up of circular initiatives. Smallholder farmers often lack the resources needed to invest in the necessary equipment, such as to produce biochar. Additionally, the uncertain viability of circular projects deters investors from providing the necessary funding and support.
Another challenge lies in integrating circular practices into existing cocoa supply chains. The cocoa industry is characterized by long and fragmented value chains, with multiple stakeholders involved in production, processing and distribution. Coordinating efforts to productively reuse cocoa byproducts and incorporate them into existing supply chains requires collaboration and cooperation that may be difficult to achieve.
Promising InitiativesDespite these barriers, several inspiring projects and initiatives are underway to build a circular ecosystem for cocoa and promote sustainable practices within the industry.
One notable initiative is the Circular Economy Cocoa: From Bean to Bar project, led by organizations such as Helvetas Vietnam and funded by the European Union. This project aims to transition Vietnam’s cocoa and chocolate subsector by introducing regenerative and circular economy practices such as resource efficiency. By establishing circular economy business models for companies early in the product life cycle, the project seeks to create an ecosystem that supports closed-loop and circular production, providing an example for others to follow and informing supportive policies. The project is currently working with 3,500 cocoa farmers and 500 farm employees and other cocoa-related businesses.
Another promising project is the Côte d'Ivoire Biomass Electricity Production, a 73.6MW biomass power plant under development in the ‘Sud-Bandama’ region of Côte d’Ivoire, using cacao pod waste. This region has 1.8 million tons of unused pods. Using 400,000 tons of pods per year, the power plant will provide around 500 GWh of reliable, clean energy to the nearby grid all year.
Companies like KOA meanwhile, are capitalizing on the potential of cacao pulp drinks. Founded in Ghana, the company uses a decentralized collection method to buy cacao pulp from farmers and processes the otherwise discarded pulp into profitable products that feed back to the farmer. KOA offers training to small-scale farmers by equipping them with the knowledge and methods to process previously discarded cacao pulp and has served more than 2,200 Ghanaian farmers.
This article is part of WRI's work on minimizing food loss and waste. It was written by authors from the Platform for Accelerating the Circular Economy (PACE) supported by research from Resonance Global. PACE, a WRI initiative, is actively collaborating with stakeholders from various fields, such as policy, investment and innovation, to facilitate the transition towards circular food production within the cocoa industry. By engaging with governments, businesses, research institutions, and civil society organizations, PACE aims to equip stakeholders with existing research on cocoa byproducts and facilitate connections to achieve systems change.
cocoa-bean-harvest-ghana.jpg Food Loss and Waste circular economy Food Business natural resources Type Explainer Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects Authors Laura Ombelet Laurie Lewis Kathleen Kelly Anna GorbushinaResearch, Technology and Policy Combine to Protect Madagascar’s Forests
National park rangers in Madagascar are curbing deforestation by using WRI’s Forest Watcher app. WRI also played a pivotal role in designating the Andrefana Dry Forest as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
The ChallengeMadagascar’s forests hold some of the world’s most remarkable biodiversity. The island boasts lemurs, chameleons, tortoises and tree species found nowhere else on Earth. Communities rely on the country’s forests for food, medicines and the invaluable services they provide, such as preventing erosion and stopping silt from flowing into downstream rice paddies.
Yet Madagascar’s forests face growing threats from slash-and-burn agriculture, climate change, resource extraction and more. Even the country’s 6.9 million hectares of protected areas are experiencing deforestation.
WRI’s RoleWRI used research, technology and community engagement to reduce deforestation and conserve Madagascar’s forests.
Beginning in 2019, WRI trained park rangers, community members, government agencies, conservation organizations and others in using our Global Forest Watch Forest Watcher app. The technology allows users to receive satellite-based alerts of nearby deforestation and fires, download the points onto a map, and access the data offline to investigate activity in the field. With this near-real time information, park rangers and others can quickly navigate to areas where trees are being burned or cut down and swiftly intervene. The tool made forest patrols more efficient and transparent, with use expanding from three pilot sites to 24 areas managed by Madagascar National Parks.
At the same time, WRI conducted extensive research on the biogeography, importance and vulnerability of the Andrefana Dry Forests, analysis that was central in seeking a World Heritage Site designation for the region. WRI’s role involved compiling and analyzing data; mapping and identifying sites that would benefit from UN protections; writing the dossier for nomination; and collaborating with stakeholders to build support, including with government officials, park managers and local communities.
The OutcomeUse of the Forest Watcher app throughout Madagascar’s National Parks dramatically improved forest monitoring, allowing for swifter responses to deforestation. For example, in the Kirindy Mité National Park, the number of fire points dropped from 33 in 2020 to 3 in 2022 thanks in large part to park rangers’ use of the Forest Watcher app.
WRI’s project also actively engaged women from local communities in patrolling forests, breaking down traditional gender barriers.
And in September 2023, UNESCO officially designated the Andrefana Dry Forests as a legally protected World Heritage Site. The recognition highlights the essential role these dry forests play as guardians of evolution, emphasizing the need for their conservation.
WRI’s activities in Madagascar showcase the power of combining community engagement, technology, research and policy to protect critical forest ecosystems.
madagascar-forest-monitoring.jpeg Forests Madagascar Top Outcome: 2023 Forests conservation deforestation Type 2023 Top Outcome Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 ProjectsIndian Cities Pioneer Nature-based Solutions and Inspire National Climate Action
WRI worked closely with local governments, community organizations and others to develop 30 nature-based projects throughout the Indian cities of Kochi, Mumbai and Jaipur. The projects inspired a national forum dedicated to urban nature-based solutions.
The ChallengeIndian cities and their residents are at the forefront of multiple climate risks. For example, Kochi and Mumbai are simultaneously struggling with urban flooding, extreme heat and water shortages. Low-income neighborhoods bear the brunt of these hazards. Mumbai's Dharavi neighborhood is almost 6 degrees C (10.8 degrees F) hotter than its more affluent neighbors.
Nature-based solutions, like protecting wetlands or adding urban trees and green spaces, can be effective ways of reducing these risks. But cities have been slow to adopt nature-based approaches due to lack of awareness, limited documented evidence of their effectiveness and their long timelines.
WRI’s RoleWRI worked closely with local governments, community organizations and others to apply nature-based solutions that make Indian cities more resilient to climate change.
WRI used spatial assessments to map and identify climate-vulnerable locations with potential for nature-based solutions, selecting Mumbai, Kochi and Jaipur. WRI then worked with local vendors in each city to implement a range of projects — including urban and rooftop farming, water-body restoration, tree planting, stream rejuvenation, wastewater treatment and more.
WRI ensured the participation of community organizations and local governments, engaging them in consultation, design and mapping projects. WRI also provided technical expertise to city governments to not just implement nature-based projects, but also ensure their continued maintenance.
The OutcomeThanks to WRI’s analysis, engagement and technical expertise, Mumbai, Jaipur and Kochi have implemented more than 30 nature-based projects over the past three years.
For example, at Jaipur Central Jail, WRI and local partners trained inmates in creating an urban farm on prison grounds. The fresh, organic produce is served to over 1,000 inmates and prison officials, while the farm itself helps cool the property. In Mumbai, a school-based urban gardening project offers students hands-on curriculum on plant care and the importance of local green spaces. The project is now being scaled across 250 public schools around the city, and will ultimately improve food security for an estimated 72,000 students.
Outcomes seen in these cities then led to India’s first national-level forum on urban nature-based solutions. Entrepreneurs, private investors, research organizations, civil society, academia, technical experts, government agencies and policy makers regularly convene to share best practices and experiences implementing nature-based solutions in their cities. WRI India is documenting success stories to raise awareness and provide a roadmap for others. The aim is to help scale nature-based solutions throughout Indian cities and around the world.
nature-based-solutions-india.jpeg Climate India Top Outcome: 2023 Climate nature-based solutions National Climate Action floods climate change Freshwater Type 2023 Top Outcome Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 ProjectsIndonesia’s Indigenous and Community Groups Secure Legal Rights to Forests
WRI Indonesia helped secure “mukim customary forest” designations for more than 22,000 hectares of land, establishing legal land rights for more than 50,000 people from Indigenous and local communities.
The ChallengeMany of Indonesia’s Indigenous peoples and local communities are dependent on forests for their livelihoods, resources and cultural traditions. It’s the reason they’re such good environmental stewards, sustainably managing their landscapes for generations. Yet they often lack ownership or even legal rights to use the forests they inhabit. This leaves forests vulnerable to exploitation from miners, logging companies and other outside interests.
For six years, local governments and organizations representing Indigenous people and communities in Aceh Province, Indonesia have submitted forest recognition proposals to Indonesia’s Ministry of Environment and Forestry. Yet they’ve been largely rejected due to unclear policies between Aceh’s different jurisdictions.
WRI’s RoleThrough research, funding and communication, WRI Indonesia helped secure communities’ land rights in eight mukims, or specific areas managed by traditional communities, in Aceh Province.
WRI fostered a collaborative process among provincial and regency governments, journalists, academics (including the Research Center for Law, Islam and Customary Study at Syiah Kuala University) and indigenous community networks (including Aceh’s customary community network, Jaringan Komunitas Masyarakat Adat Aceh). Together, these groups identified issues and bottlenecks in Aceh’s social forest recognition program.
WRI also provided financial support for research on a mukim customary forest model and worked with various media channels to publicize the findings. WRI Indonesia supported key stakeholders in Aceh to directly present and discuss the model to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. The multi-party approach, with assurances from WRI that the research and recommendations were neutral and scientifically grounded, were effective at influencing policymakers.
The OutcomeThrough what became known as the “Mukim Customary Forest Model,” eight customary forests were designated in Aceh, Indonesia in 2023, spanning an area of more than 20,000 hectares. This legal designation secures land rights for more than 50,000 people from Indigenous and local communities. These forests, and the model overall, were endorsed by Indonesia’s Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
Eight additional proposals are undergoing further reviews. If approved, the total customary forest designation will expand to 56,988 hectares.
The “Mukim Customary Forest Model” has great potential to be scaled up to the 784 mukims in Aceh, as well as throughout Indonesia and other forested countries.
indonesia-indigenous-legal-rights-forests.jpeg Equity & Governance Top Outcome: 2023 Equity & Governance Indigenous Peoples & Local Communities Forests conservation Type 2023 Top Outcome Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 ProjectsIndia Rolls Out 10,000 Electric Buses in Dozens of Cities
WRI India supported India’s Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs in developing the PM e-Bus Sewa Scheme, which will bring 10,000 electric buses to underserved cities around the country.
The ChallengeMany Indians lack access to affordable, safe and reliable public transport — a huge barrier to reaching jobs, healthcare, education and other opportunities. Where public buses are available, they’re typically fueled by diesel, which produces noxious chemicals and spurs climate change.
The transport sector is the third-highest CO2-emitting sector in India, with road transport accounting for more than 90% of these emissions. Moving citizens away from car travel while expanding access to low-carbon public transit is essential for meeting the country’s commitment to reach net-zero emissions by 2070.
WRI’s RoleExperts from WRI India were embedded within India's Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) for two-and-a-half years. There, they employed research, engagement and technical assistance to help the government develop and implement a national plan for electric buses (e-buses).
WRI experts used research to make the case for clean, electric buses in underserved cities and determined the quantity of buses needed to support deployment in 169 cities. They then provided technical assistance to procure e-buses and locked in financial support for cities to develop or update their infrastructure.
WRI staff also worked with ministry officials to create a National Intelligent Transport Management System (ITMS) Platform. This technology will allow for the uniform management of e-buses across dozens of cities.
The OutcomeIn August 2023, India’s national government announced the PM eBus Sewa Scheme, providing $2.4 billion to deploy and operate 10,000 e-buses across up to 169 eligible cities. Buses will begin hitting the roads in 2024, with deployments completed by 2026.
More than 170 million residents are expected to benefit. In addition to reducing emissions and improving air quality, the e-bus initiative will also dramatically expand access to clean, reliable public transport. Of the cities eligible to receive e-buses, half currently lack any organized bus transport. Almost half of projected riders will be women, who historically have struggled to access jobs, education and other opportunities due to limited vehicle ownership. And at least 25% of the e-buses delivered will be accessible to passengers with disabilities.
india-electric-bus.jpeg Cities Top Outcome: 2023 Electric Mobility transportation public transit electric mobility Cities Type 2023 Top Outcome Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects