What Is 'Loss and Damage' from Climate Change? 8 Key Questions, Answered helen.morgan@wri.org Mon, 05/05/2025 - 15:00

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The planet has already warmed by about 1.3 degrees C (2.3 degrees F) and, in 2024, it temporarily surpassed the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees C threshold for the first time — an alarming milestone driven by human-induced climate change. Millions of people today are facing the real-life consequences of higher temperatures, rising seas, fiercer storms and unpredictable rainfall. 

Rapidly reducing greenhouse gas emissions is essential to limit temperature rise and secure a safer future for us all. So is making major investments to protect communities from severe impacts that will continue to worsen. 

Yet collective efforts to curb emissions and adapt are currently not enough to tackle the speed and scale of climate impacts. Even if we rein in warming in the long term, we’re already seeing daily reminders of the risks a warmer world brings, from increased wildfires to extreme flooding — meaning some losses and damages from climate change are inevitable. How countries handle these losses and damages has been a key issue at the UN climate negotiations and beyond. 

Here we provide an explainer on the concept of “loss and damage” and what’s needed to address it. 

1) What Is Loss and Damage?

While there is no official definition of loss and damage under the UN, the term is used in international climate negotiations to refer to the consequences of climate change that go beyond what people can adapt to — for example, the loss of coastal heritage sites due to rising sea levels or the loss of homes and lives during extreme floods. This also includes situations where adaptation options exist but a community doesn’t have the resources to access or utilize them. 

Loss and damage is harming and will continue to harm vulnerable communities the most, meaning addressing the issue is an urgent matter of climate justice. But the subject has historically been fraught with contention both inside and outside of UN climate negotiations. In particular, countries have struggled to reach agreement on how much money developed countries should supply to address loss and damage in developing nations, which have contributed the least to the climate crisis but are often hit hardest by its impacts. While an international loss and damage fund was established in 2022 to begin addressing this need, long-term financing commitments remain unsolved. 

2) What Counts as Loss and Damage?

Loss and damage can result from extreme weather events like cyclones, droughts and heat waves, as well as from slow-onset changes such as sea level rise, desertification, glacial retreat, land degradation, ocean acidification and salinization. In some cases, damages may permanently alter places — for example, rising seas encroaching on low-lying islands, drought shrinking water supplies and once-productive farmland turning into barren land. 

Harko, 12 years old, walks across the land with her younger brother in search of water during a drought in Ethiopia. Photo by UNICEF Ethiopia/2016/Ayene

Damages from the effects of climate change can be further divided into two categories — economic and non-economic — though there is overlap between the two. 

Economic losses and damages are those affecting resources, goods and services that are commonly traded in markets, such as damage to critical infrastructure and property or supply chain disruptions. This can play out at an international or national scale as well as locally, such as impacts on individual farmers or communities. 

In coastal Bangladesh, for example, salt farming is a major source of employment. Yet in recent years, frequent cyclones, tidal surges and heavy rainfall have hampered salt production, eroding the country’s self-sufficiency and forcing it to import salt to manage the market shortfall. 

Non-economic losses and damages can be some of the most devastating, such as the incalculable toll of losing family members, the disappearance of cultures and ways of living or the trauma of being forced to migrate from ancestral homes. 

Take the communities in Kosrae, Micronesia, who have lost burial grounds due to coastal erosion caused by sea level rise. Likewise, the loss of sea ice in the Arctic has affected the cultural identity and hunting practices among Inuit communities. While harder to quantify and monetize, non-economic losses have severe and detrimental effects on communities’ well-being. 

3) What Is the Difference Between Mitigation, Adaptation and Addressing Loss and Damage?

Under the Paris Agreement, countries recognized the importance of “averting, minimizing and addressing” loss and damage. These approaches are closely linked to the three pillars of climate action: mitigation, adaptation and addressing loss and damage. 

Loss and damage can be averted by curbing greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation) and minimized by taking preemptive action to protect communities from the consequences of climate change (adaptation). Climate adaptation actions include protecting communities from sea level rise by helping them move to higher ground, preparing for extreme weather disasters by investing in early warning systems, protecting food supplies, switching to drought-resistant crops and much more. 

But not all impacts can be prevented or adapted to. This is where the third pillar — addressing loss and damage — comes in. It focuses on addressing issues such as displacement, destruction of livelihoods and cultural loss. 

Loss and damage is linked to adaptation and mitigation because it happens when efforts to reduce emissions are not ambitious enough and when adaptation efforts are unsuccessful or impossible to implement. Research from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) acknowledges that as the magnitude of climate change increases, so does the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits. It differentiates between “soft” limits — when adaptation options exist but communities don’t have the resources needed to pursue them — and “hard” limits, where “there are no reasonable prospects for avoiding intolerable risks.” These limits are particularly acute in vulnerable communities that lack the resources needed to implement effective adaptation options. 

Coral reefs offer a good example of where adaptation is likely to reach its limits. The IPCC found that 70% to 90% of tropical coral reefs will die by mid-century even if temperature rise is limited to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), with nearly total loss with 2 degrees C (3.6 degrees F) of warming. This will lead to irreversible losses of biodiversity and have major social and financial impacts on coastal communities that eat and sell reef-dwelling fish. 

While further research is needed to fully understand the limits of climate adaptation, it’s clear that losses and damage are already happening and many communities lack the resources to deal with them. Climate plans and policies should account for loss and damage alongside mitigation and adaptation, and ensure adequate funding and support are made available. 

Damage to buildings caused by Hurricane Irma in Nanny Cay on the British Virgin Island of Tortola. The Caribbean island suffered widespread damage and destruction when Hurricane Irma passed over in 2017. Photo by Russell Watkins/DFID 4) What’s the History of Loss and Damage in UN Climate Negotiations?

The issue of loss and damage has been a lively one in UN climate negotiations for over three decades. 

It began in 1991, when Vanuatu and other small island states proposed a scheme to provide financial resources to countries impacted by sea level rise. Under its proposal, each country would contribute funds based on its relative contribution to global emissions and share of the global gross national product. The idea was rejected and left out of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted in 1992. 

Driving Action on Loss and Damage

ACT2025 is a consortium that aims to elevate the voices of climate-vulnerable countries on issues such as loss and damage at UN climate negotiations. Learn more about ACT2025.

The issue of loss and damage didn’t formally enter climate negotiations until 2007 (as part of the Bali Action Plan) and only gained real traction in 2013, when the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM) was established. But neither the WIM nor any other established mechanism delivered funding to help countries manage loss and damage. 

In 2015, developing countries successfully secured an article on loss and damage (Article 8) in the Paris Agreement. However, finance related to loss and damage was ignored. Not only that, but developed countries ensured that the decision text of the accompanying UN climate summit (COP21) included language ruling out lability or compensation claims associated with loss and damage. At the UN climate summit in 2021 (COP26), climate-vulnerable nations again pushed for a loss and damage fund but were rejected once more. Instead, negotiators launched a two-year Glasgow Dialogue to explore possible loss and damage arrangements. They also agreed to fund the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD), established in 2019 to provide technical assistance to those impacted by loss and damage. 

In 2022, countries finally agreed to create a new loss and damage fund. The following year, it was operationalized as the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), with almost $700 million in initial pledges to fill the fund. The SNLD was also formally operationalized that year. 

It was a landmark moment for loss and damage negotiations — but the work was far from done. 

Since 2023, efforts have continued to operationalize the FRLD — the Philippines was confirmed as the host country, an executive director was appointed and the World Bank successfully met the conditions required to host the FRLD. Meanwhile, the SNLD is mobilizing its first round of technical assistance, following Vanuatu’s request to develop a long-term program to address loss and damage impacts. Since the 2024 UN climate summit (COP29), additional pledges to the FRLD came from Australia, Austria, Luxembourg, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden and others. As of April 2025, pledges to the FRLD total $768.4 million. 

It is also worth noting that, at COP29, the new climate finance goal was adopted but did not include a subgoal for loss and damage. While it acknowledged the widening gap in addressing the growing scale and frequency of loss and damage impacts, it did not include details on how much developed countries would be expected to contribute. Countries also failed to finalize the third five-year review of the WIM — now deferred to the UN climate summit in November 2025. 

While the $768.4 million pledged to date is a start, it falls far short of the up to $580 billion that vulnerable countries may require for climate-related damages by 2030. 

WRI’s experts are closely following the UN climate talks. Watch our Resource Hub for new articles, research, webinars and more.

5) Is Loss and Damage an Issue of Liability and Compensation?

One reason loss and damage has been so contentious historically is due to developed countries’ concerns that compensating for losses and damages caused by adverse climate impacts may be construed as an admission of legal liability, triggering litigation and compensation claims on a major scale. As such, developed countries fought to include language in the Paris Agreement to prevent them from being legally on the hook to provide compensation. 

This concern was addressed in loss and damage funding discussions at the 2022 UN climate summit (COP27) and in the final decision the following year at COP28, which states that “funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage are based on cooperation and facilitation and do not involve liability or compensation.” This provided the assurance that developed countries were looking for to continue negotiations and set the loss and damage fund in motion. 

6) What Are Some Possible Sources of Funding for Addressing Loss and Damage?

A range of funding sources, including public and private, will be needed to address the scale and scope of loss and damage from climate change. But these sources cannot function separately. They all need to work together as part of a broader “mosaic of solutions”. 

Beyond the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), some developed countries point to humanitarian aid, disaster-risk management and insurance as sources of finance for loss and damage. Other more innovative sources have also been proposed, such as levies on air travel and shipping, financial transactions taxes, taxes on windfall profits of fossil fuel companies and other non-public sources.

Examples from across the world show why this funding mix is necessary. In the wake of the devastating floods in 2022, Pakistan needed short-term humanitarian assistance as well as long-term support for rebuilding. Meanwhile, Palau is concerned that tuna are migrating out of its fishing areas as the ocean warms. Without the ability to fish for tuna, some Pacific Island nations could lose income averaging 37% of government revenue. While humanitarian aid would not be poised nor mandated to address this problem, other forms of finance could. 

Thai and migrant workers from Laos and Myanmar line up to collect donations after floods, 2011. Photo by ILO/Sai Min Zaw

This underscores the need for broader funding arrangements, including the dedicated loss and damage fund, which can coordinate and align various types of funding from both within and outside of the UNFCCC to adequately address loss and damage. The fund could facilitate coordination with a wide variety of funding arrangements through multilateral development banks, relevant UN agencies, multilateral climate funds, the Santiago Network and others. 

Outside of the UNFCCC, there have been additional important developments for financing loss and damage. These include the Climate Vulnerable Forum and Vulnerable Twenty (V20) Group’s crowd-sourced loss and damage fund and the G7 and V20’s Global Shield Against Climate Risks initiative, which aims to enhance existing financial structures on climate risk and loss and damage finance. 

7) What Activities Could Finance for Loss and Damage Support?

Action to address loss and damage could span a range of activities and should be shaped by the needs and priorities of the communities most affected by climate change impacts. For example, this could include weather-indexed crop insurance for farmers or proactively setting aside funds to rebuild critical infrastructure when disaster strikes. 

It could also entail providing immediate humanitarian assistance after an extreme weather event, offering relief and rehabilitation to victims through provision of basic amenities, enabling social protection systems to provide emergency cash transfers to the poor and enhancing microcredit institutions to provide financing for livelihood restoration. 

Loss and damage funding could also help people rebuild when their homes are destroyed. For example, while early warning systems in Bangladesh have helped radically reduce fatalities from extreme weather events, people leave the storm shelters to find their homes and livelihoods destroyed and have therefore unquestionably experienced loss and damage. 

Finally, when necessary, funding for loss and damage can assist with migration and relocation of people who are permanently displaced and help diversify skills if their original livelihoods are no longer available. 

8) What Needs to Happen Next to Address Loss and Damage?

Climate impacts are already causing widespread disruptions and are only poised to worsen, even with ambitious action on emissions reductions and adaptation. The need for loss and damage solutions — and finance to enable them — is more urgent than ever before. 

With the loss and damage fund now in motion, the international community will have to work diligently to finalize the details of new funding arrangements and to mobilize finance at scale. Attention will also turn to the board of the FRLD to ensure institutional structures are in place to deliver resources with the necessary speed and scale. 

As countries prepare for the 2025 UN climate summit (COP30), the world will be looking for clear signals on loss and damage from countries’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs). This could include information outlining loss and damage response plans, developing countries’ needs and commitments from developed countries to contribute to loss and damage finance. Moreover, additional commitments to the FRLD — as well as financial support for the broader global international arrangements for addressing loss and damage, including the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and the Santiago Network (SNLD) — will be critical to building momentum as the world enters the second half of this critical decade.  

Developing countries and communities on the front lines of climate impacts are counting on the world to deliver. 

This article was originally published in April 2022. It was last updated in May 2025, to reflect the latest state of play for loss and damage in UN climate negotiations.

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Grasslands Are Some of Earth’s Most Underrated Ecosystems margaret.overh… Fri, 05/02/2025 - 08:00

Earth is home to a spectacular array of ecosystems, each with their own unique characteristics and benefits. Yet not all of them receive equal attention: Grasslands, for one, are often overlooked — despite their importance.

The world's grasslands are arguably the single most extensive land cover on Earth's ice-free land surface. Grasslands or "grassy ecosystems" — used here to encompass natural and semi-natural savannas, open shrubland and tundra (but excluding cultivated pastures) — are also incredibly diverse. They range from the Great Plains of North American and the Pampas of South America to the Eurasian Steppes and East African savannas (such as the Serengeti and Maasai Mara).

These ecosystems are critical for a wide range of plants and animals and for mitigating climate change. They also offer sustenance, income, cultural identity and essential ecosystem services, such as pollination and water regulation, to populations around the globe. Over a billion people directly depend on grasslands for their food and livelihoods, many of them Indigenous groups and other local communities.

Yet despite all this, grasslands receive disproportionately little protection, funding and attention in global conservation and climate agendas. Only 4.6% of temperate grasslands are protected, compared to 18% of forests and around 16% of wetlands. And close to half of all grasslands may have already been converted to uses, such as agriculture or development. As a result, they are among the most at-risk biomes on Earth.

The good news is that a growing body of research is shedding light on grasslands' many benefits, making the case for increased investment and protection. Here are five key reasons why they deserve more attention:

1) Grasslands Play a Vital Role in Mitigating Climate Change

One of the most underrecognized benefits of grasslands is their vital role in mitigating climate change. Although they store less carbon per unit area than forests, the sheer expanse of grasslands globally means they are a major storehouse, accounting for up to 34% of the world's terrestrial carbon. Forests, by comparison, account for about 39%.

Ninety percent of this carbon is stored underground, where the diversity of grassland plants helps increase the amount of organic carbon stored in roots and soils. Because of this, and because many grasslands plants have deep and resilient root systems, their carbon stores may be more stable than those in forests, better able to withstand environmental stressors like drought and fires. When fires do sweep through, belowground carbon remains mostly intact. But carbon stored above ground is mostly lost when vegetation burns.

In fact, emerging research shows that a significant portion of grasslands' soil carbon is stored in deeper subsoil layers than are typically measured in the field. This means the amount they hold may be greater than currently estimated.

Various strategies could help grasslands store even more carbon. For example, silvopasture (deliberately integrating trees into pasturelands) has shown particular promise. In tropical regions, silvopasture consistently improves carbon sequestration — often in pastures with degraded soils or low existing productivity.

Grasslands also help regulate temperatures thanks to their high "albedo," meaning they reflect solar radiation and contribute to local cooling. Recent research highlights that light-colored grassy vegetation in South Africa reflects more radiation compared to areas with shrubs. As woody plants encroach into these ecosystems, they absorb more solar radiation, diminishing this cooling effect. This highlights the importance of maintaining open grasslands, where appropriate, as a nature-based climate solution.

2) Grasslands Are Crucial Habitats for Many Plants and Animals

Grasslands support an extraordinary variety of life. Many are considered biodiversity hotspots, with grassland, shrubland and savanna accounting for nearly a third (6.8 million square kilometers) of Key Biodiversity Areas globally. Indeed, some temperate grasslands host nearly 90 species per square meter, making them among the most species-rich ecosystems on the planet.

Grasslands are home to many of the world's iconic large mammals — from bison in the Northern Great Plains of the U.S. and Canada; to elephants, giraffes, hippos and lions in the African savanna; to the last remaining wild horses in the Eurasian Steppes. Many grassland birds, such as the greater sage-grouse and eastern meadowlark, rely on these open landscapes for breeding and nesting. Beyond large mammals and birds, grasslands also support critical species of reptiles, amphibians, and small mammals like prairie voles.

African elephants in Kenya's Amboseli National Park. Photo by Ray in Manila/Flickr

Many plants and animals that live in these ecosystems are grassland specialists and are endemic to specific regions and grassland types, meaning they're only found in that one habitat. Due to their limited range and ongoing habitat loss, these species are increasingly becoming rare or endangered. For example, the plains-wanderer — a small ground-dwelling bird native to eastern Australia, which is so evolutionarily distinct that it has its own taxonomic family — is considered critically endangered due to the widespread conversion of the native grasslands it requires for foraging and roosting to cropland.

The plains-wanderer, a unique bird endemic to the grasslands of eastern Australia. Photo by Dominic Sherony/Flickr 3) Grasslands Provide Essential Ecosystem Services

In addition to their climate and biodiversity benefits, grasslands — including well-managed grazing areas — provide ecosystem services that benefit people worldwide. For one, they support habitat for pollinators such as native bees and butterflies that enhance crop yields on nearby farmland. It's estimated that as much as 35% of the world's food crops depend on animal pollinators, making healthy grasslands essential for sustaining agricultural productivity.

Belowground, the roots, microbes and fungi in grassland ecosystems help decompose and release nutrients, resulting in more resilient, productive landscapes that sustain both people and wildlife. Deep-rooted native grasses also anchor and strengthen the soil, helping to reduce erosion and keep landscapes intact. Over the last 150 years, nearly half of the world's topsoil has been lost, in part due to conversion and poor management of grasslands.

These underground systems are also critical for regulating water. They enable rainwater to penetrate into the soil and recharge groundwater stores, helping plants, animals and nearby people to weather dry spells. Grasslands absorb surplus rain during periods of heavy rainfall, regulating water discharge into streams and rivers and helping to buffer against floods. And their underground ecosystems naturally purify water by filtering out pollutants and excess nutrients.

4) Over 1 Billion People Rely on Grasslands for Their Food and Livelihoods

Grasslands are a key source of livelihoods and food security for pastoralists, smallholder farmers and Indigenous communities. They contribute approximately US$20.8 trillion in economic value each year through livestock production and other economic services, which is higher than the GDP of every nation except the U.S. and China. Livestock farmed on grass and pasturelands are also an important animal protein source in many developing countries — especially in regions where other options, such as fish, are limited.

These benefits are particularly vital for marginalized groups. An estimated 1 billion people, the majority of whom live under the poverty line, depend on grazing livestock for subsistence and income. In underdeveloped regions like sub-Saharan Africa, grassland- and savanna-based pastoralism and extensive livestock production contribute to 5%-25% of some countries' GDP.1

A Maasai herdsman driving his livestock across the savannah in Kenya's Naboisho Conservancy. Grassland-grazed livestock are a critical source of food and income, particularly in underdeveloped regions. Photo by Stuart Black/Alamy Stock Photo 5) Communities Around the Globe Have Deep Cultural Ties to Grasslands

Beyond providing food and livelihoods, grasslands hold great cultural, historical and spiritual importance, particularly for Indigenous Peoples and local communities whose cultural identities are enmeshed with the land.

Many traditions and Indigenous land management practices developed around ecological cycles associated with grazing lands. For example, Aboriginal Australians have practiced "fire-stick farming" for thousands of years. This method uses controlled fires to reduce fuel loads and prevent larger blazes, while also creating vegetation mosaics that promote biodiversity and improve the land's productivity.

The Afar people, pastoralists in East Africa, have the "Edo" tradition. Scouts use Indigenous knowledge of factors overlooked by conventional assessments — such as soil color and the presence of certain plants and animals — to evaluate potential grazing areas. They consider factors like water sources, vegetation, pests and social dynamics to ensure the land is used sustainably.

In the U.S. and Canada, human life in the prairies dates back 10,000 years, to when the Indigenous A'aninin, Assiniboine, Cree, Sioux and Blackfoot linked their travel through the grasslands with the migration of bison. Bison still hold a sacred status in the culture of the Sicangu Oyate and other Indigenous North American communities, inspiring traditional ceremonies, dances and songs that are passed down through generations.

Buck Spotted Tail of the Sicangu Lakota Oyate (a band of the Lakota people) performing a Grass Dance in Badlands National Park, U.S. The Sicangu Oyate have deep cultural ties to North America's grasslands and the bison that roam them. Photo by Greg Vaughn/Alamy Stock Photo

These and other cultural practices, such as camel praise poetry in East Africa — which depicts grassland and rangeland fauna and flora in colorful oral poems — indicate how deeply these ecosystems are linked not just with livelihoods, but with traditional knowledge and spiritual cosmology.

But these cultures don't just depend on grassland ecosystems; they also play a crucial role in their protection. Native American Nations, together with ranching and farming families, own and oversee 85% of the remaining intact Northern Great Plains grassland. These communities are stewards of their ancestral lands, with crucial knowledge about sustainable land use and ecosystem management.

It's Time We Recognize and Protect Grasslands' Importance

Despite their incredible benefits, grasslands are undervalued — and under threat. They are one of the most at-risk biomes due to significant loss, inadequate protection, and inappropriate or absent management.

Indeed, half the world's grasslands have already suffered some degree of degradation, whether due to agricultural expansion, development and urbanization, invasive species, overgrazing or species replacement. Shifting temperatures and weather patterns driven by climate change only exacerbate this decline.

This is already affecting wildlife habitat and endangering species — as well as releasing carbon stores that further accelerate climate change. In fact, grassland conversion could cause up to 4.25 gigatons of emissions globally by 2050, equivalent to India's annual greenhouse gas emissions. As the health of the grasslands suffers, so, too, does the wellbeing of their human inhabitants. Many will face mounting vulnerability as their livelihoods and food security are threatened.

Grasslands have largely been overlooked in global conservation and climate commitments so far. But they are beginning to receive more attention: Research is shedding light on grasslands' many benefits, and 2026 will be the UN International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists. Now, this growing awareness must translate to action. We urgently need governments, investors and businesses to align policies and commitments with protecting grasslands. This can help maximize their potential to curb climate change, safeguard biodiversity and contribute to sustainable development.

To support these actions, more information is needed about the threats to grasslands and how they are changing. Upcoming research from Land & Carbon Lab's Global Pasture Watch research consortium will help fill this gap by providing critical new research about the state of grasslands. 

Learn what the latest data can show us about grasslands and follow our research.

 

1 Based on author's calculations. Sources: Sudan  | Ethiopia | Kenya | Mali | Uganda | Nigeria

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How to Create Long-Term Demand for Carbon Removal in the US alicia.cypress… Thu, 05/01/2025 - 14:45

The United States has emerged as a leader in developing innovative ways to remove and store carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere — using approaches that rely on chemicals, rocks, the ocean and biomass. Known as carbon dioxide removal (CDR), these efforts help remove the excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that are already contributing to rising temperatures and extreme weather events.

CDR can help mitigate damaging climate impacts if it’s paired with deep and rapid emissions reductions across all sectors. While development and deployment of CDR technologies and approaches have seen remarkable progress over the past five years through efforts in the public and private sectors, neither the U.S. nor the global community is on track to scale CDR to the level that’s needed to reach climate goals. New policy approaches need to be considered to close this gap.

Discussions in the European Union and the United Kingdom are exploring options for incorporating carbon removal into emissions trading systems. And state-level legislation was introduced (but not passed) in the U.S. to require emitters to purchase increasing levels of CDR. Although these kinds of regulatory policies would face significant political challenges at the federal level in the U.S., there are steps that can be taken now, like better defining what counts as “high-quality” carbon removal, that can pave the way for any potential future regulatory policy.   

Why Is a New Policy Approach Needed to Drive CDR Demand?

Climate modeling estimates indicate that CDR approaches will need to remove roughly 1 billion metric tons (1 gigaton) of carbon dioxide each year by 2050 for the U.S. to reach net zero. Currently, just over 1 million metric tons of durable CDR is being removed annually across all countries in the world. Once net zero is achieved, CDR will be instrumental to achieving net-negative emissions, where the global community is removing more emissions than what’s being added to the atmosphere.

Achieving gigaton scale of CDR in the United States will be challenging. Unlike other clean technologies, CDR is not a consumer product or service, such as electric vehicles or solar PV, which reduce emissions while providing something people need. However, many CDR approaches can generate economic benefits. For instance, some carbon mineralization approaches can be used to extract rare and valuable minerals or reclaim useful chemicals in mining waste. In other cases, CDR can help increase crop yields, reduce fuel for forest fires and provide jobs. Yet, these benefits alone are generally not enough to drive sufficient levels of investment to scale CDR to the level that’s needed.

Some companies have voluntarily purchased carbon removal credits, which has created a limited market for CDR projects. Global voluntary purchases have grown from 0.6 million metric tons CO2 (MtCO2) removal in 2022 to 7.8 MtCO2 in 2024. Although the voluntary market’s demand for CDR is projected to grow, with some estimates highlighting potential global demand of up to 870 MtCO2 by 2040, this would still be insufficient to achieve the scale of CDR needed to reach global climate goals.

Government incentives and procurement could also play a larger role, but the U.S. government is unlikely to directly purchase a gigaton of CDR each year (assuming an ambitious $100 per metric ton of CO2 (tCO2), it would cost $100 billion annually). Creating long-term, consistent demand for CDR may depend on regulation or compliance mechanisms that compel emitters to purchase CDR, alongside their emissions reduction efforts, as part of a portfolio of policies to scale CDR. Such an approach can also provide a level of accountability for emitters to begin addressing the climate impacts of their pollution.

What Are Current and Proposed CDR Policies?

U.S. policy support for CDR, whether for research and development, deployment support or to help create demand, has increased from virtually nothing to billions of dollars in public support over the past five years. Some key funding in the United States includes:

Focus of SupportType of SupportAmountResearch and development Annual budget appropriations for agencies like the Department of Energy.$118 million for fiscal year 2024.Large-scale demonstrationRegional direct air capture hubs in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law.$3.5 billion for 4 MtCO2 scale DAC hubs (FY22-FY26).Deployment45Q tax credit, enhanced in the Inflation Reduction Act.Up to $180/tCO2 for DAC and up to $85/tCO2 for BECCS.Creating demandCDR Purchase Pilot Prize.$35 million for program directed in FY2023 appropriations; $20 million included in FY2024 appropriations to continue the program.

Note: As of April 2025, there is uncertainty associated with the status of some of these funding streams following funding freezes by the Trump administration.

Several bills were introduced, though not passed, in the 118th Congress (January 2023 through January 2025), suggesting growing CDR support. The Federal CDR Leadership Act and the bipartisan CREST Act proposed scaling government procurement of CDR, while the Climate Pollution Standard and Community Investment Act included direct government procurement through a Negative Emissions Activities Fund as part of a larger climate policy. In the 119th Congress, lawmakers introduced the Foreign Pollution Fee Act, which levies a fee on imported industrial products based on their carbon intensity and includes a provision to allow producers to purchase CDR to reduce their liability.

While none were adopted, a handful of noteworthy bills were also introduced in state legislatures. A California bill (SB 308), which passed the state Senate in 2023, would have required companies to purchase CDR to address an increasing fraction of their remaining emissions. This would complement state requirements for net-zero emissions by 2045 and 85% gross emissions reduction by that year. Bills were also introduced in New York in 2021 and Massachusetts in 2023 that would require state government procurement of certain amounts of CDR. While none of these measures advanced, they indicate growing interest in the topic.

Other state legislation is also relevant: Vermont and New York adopted climate change superfund acts in 2024. These require fossil fuel companies to pay for damage caused by their historic GHG emissions. A similar federal bill was introduced in Congress in 2024 and other state bills were introduced in California, Maryland and Massachusetts. While none of these bills direct funds to CDR, they introduce a potential funding mechanism — fees tied to past GHG emissions — that could be used for a variety of climate-related costs, including but not limited to, funding development and deployment of CDR.

What Policy Design Considerations Are Needed?

Scaling CDR in the U.S. to the level needed to meaningfully address climate impacts will be a multi-decade project. Because of limitations on government purchasing capacity and the voluntary market, reaching that goal may require future policies that mandate purchase of CDR in some way by companies that continue to emit greenhouse gases. Before such a policy could become feasible, two key puzzle pieces will need to be in place:

1) CDR policy must be paired with, and complement, deep emissions reductions.

CDR policies cannot exist in a vacuum, but rather, must complement emission reduction requirements to achieve net-zero by 2050. This is important for a few reasons.

Reducing emissions is generally less expensive than CDR and will play the largest part in reaching global climate goals. Scaling CDR to gigaton level will not make much of a difference if emissions continue at their current rate or only decline slightly; CDR must be paired with deep emissions reductions (around 80% to 85% or more based on various modeling estimates) to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Reducing emissions by moving away from fossil fuels also reduces other air pollutants which can improve air quality and human health.

Further, CDR is not an unlimited resource. How it is used must be carefully planned so as not to impede sustainability limits on land, water and energy availability as well as societal impacts. Once net zero is achieved, scaling CDR will be necessary to move toward net-negative emissions in the second half of the century. Deeply reducing emissions reduces the need for CDR to achieve net zero but does not eliminate the need to scale up CDR to address legacy emissions once net-zero has been achieved.

Recent legislation such as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act have provided significant incentives for developing and deploying low-carbon infrastructure and projects, while recent regulations have targeted emission reductions for power plants and vehicles. But with President Trump and the Republican-led Congress already moving to redirect funding and roll back regulations, progress on economywide decarbonization is likely to slow — though it’s unlikely to stop.

A federal CDR purchase mandate is therefore currently unlikely and will remain so until significant progress can again be made on emission reduction incentives and requirements. For now, efforts can focus on ensuring that CDR investments and projects meet high standards of quality during the initial stages of deployment.

2) Establish a framework to ensure high-quality CDR is scaled.

Defining what counts as “high-quality” CDR can include a wide range of attributes. While some principles might be specific to certain CDR approaches, others cut across all types of CDR. Criteria included in CDR procurement legislation and those already being used by private buyers to make purchasing decisions can serve as starting points. Across these efforts, general categories of quality criteria include:

• Criteria related to measurement, reporting and verification (MRV): for example, proving or maximizing net-negativity, proving additionality, meeting a certain duration of permanence, sharing data transparently, conducting third-party verification and addressing uncertainty associated with permanence, as well as physical leakage.
• Criteria for impacts on the environment and people: for example, measuring and minimizing environmental harms, using only waste or residue biomass, minimizing negative impacts on people and providing social benefits (e.g., job creation).
• Criteria related to technology development: for example, maximum cost, leveraging private finance, contribution to technological diversification or demonstrated potential to scale.
• Other criteria: for example, prohibition on use of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery or requirements on the use of or investment in renewable energy.

Differences in quality criteria among existing efforts may be attributable to the different objectives within the various policies and corporate purchases. Some focus on increasing technological diversity and supporting industry development, while others focus on supporting approaches with the capacity to scale to the highest level.

What Could a Policy Look Like?

A policy that requires companies that continue to emit GHGs to purchase a proportional amount of CDR could be an important part of a comprehensive set of policies and incentives that also includes emission reduction requirements. Such a package is needed to mitigate climate change and its impacts.

This approach is attractive because it simultaneously generates investment in CDR while incentivizing emissions reductions. If the CDR purchase requirement increases over time, companies would be further incentivized to invest in emissions reduction measures to avoid the increasing CDR obligation. reach certain targets for CDR scaling.

The 2023 version of California’s SB 308 provides one approach to such a CDR policy. California already has in place an important prerequisite that is not yet in place at the national level: targets established for net-zero GHG emissions by 2045 with at least an 85% reduction in gross emissions from 1990 levels by that year. These dual targets help ensure that any CDR policy is additional to significant emission reductions and not in lieu of them. Establishing such requirements in law or regulation at the national level will be a heavy lift but ultimately necessary for the U.S. to achieve net-zero emissions.

SB 308 included three critical elements for scaling CDR to help California achieve net-zero:

• Requiring California’s Air Resources Board to create a process for ensuring that any carbon removal included was durable, together with systems for monitoring, reporting and verification, ensuring financial responsibility and tracking any CDR credits allowed into the system.
• Requiring consideration of the benefits to and impacts on neighboring communities in certifying CDR projects for inclusion in the system.
• Requiring major GHG polluters, including fuel providers covered under California’s cap-and-trade program, to purchase certified CDR credits to cover a percentage of their emissions, with the percentage increasing from 1% in 2030 to 100% in 2045 in line with California’s net-zero emissions target.

In addition, SB 308 included provisions for a two-phase crediting system that would allow temporary credit for some less-durable sequestration methods that would need to be replaced by credits for more durable options. This was included to allow for the use of nature-based credits, which are currently less expensive and often have additional non-climate benefits.

Beyond determining quality considerations and ensuring complementary effort on emissions reduction, federal regulatory policy for CDR would require consideration of other design questions, such as: which emitters are covered, which greenhouse gases are in scope, would historical emissions be covered in addition to current emissions, and how is permanence addressed in the quality requirements (i.e., are nature-based approaches included).

Where Do We Go from Here?

While federal action on is unlikely in the near-term, there are ways to start developing and building support for carbon removal policies that can be implemented in the future. Steps that can be taken now to build a foundation for future regulatory policy include:

• Enacting CDR procurement programs and purchase requirements at the state level, particularly states with net-zero targets.
• Expanding federal government procurement of CDR.
• Assessing and identifying the incentives and regulations that will be needed to reduce emissions as a complement to scaling CDR.
• Establishing strong quality standards for CDR in near-term regulation (e.g., around government procurement for CDR).
• Developing an outline for regulatory policy design, in part based on the first two elements.

Meanwhile, continued dialogue among a diverse set of constituencies can help ensure that CDR is deployed safely and to the benefit of local communities, and can help build a broader base of support. This dialogue can also help pave the way for greater political support.

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Authors Katie Lebling Kevin Kennedy Angela Anderson Danielle Riedl Hannah Harasaki

What Is a ‘Just Transition,’ and Are Countries Really Making Progress? margaret.overh… Thu, 05/01/2025 - 12:30

Building a sustainable future will require major changes to how we power and operate our economies, with inevitable ripple effects on people's livelihoods. Consider how coal communities could be reshaped when a plant closes, or how auto workers will navigate the shift to electric vehicle manufacturing.

At the same time, transitioning from carbon-intensive industries to more sustainable ones can bring remarkable benefits. Alongside protecting people from increasingly dangerous climate extremes, the transition can create millions of new jobs and boost global GDP, offering new opportunities for growth and development in regions affected by the transition.

A "just transition" seeks to balance these risks and benefits fairly, leaving no one behind.

A growing number of countries have embraced just transition principles in their national climate plans and policies over the last decade. And many are taking concrete steps to achieve their goals, such as working with stakeholders to develop just transition roadmaps or plans, upskilling and reskilling workers in green jobs, or phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. But the question remains: How much progress are countries really making toward a just transition?

Few countries transparently monitor their just transition efforts, making it difficult to assess progress and for communities to hold governments accountable to their promises. But new guidance developed by WRI and the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT), informed by select countries that are leading the charge in this area, offers a way forward.

What Does a 'Just Transition' Really Mean?

A "just transition" refers to addressing climate change in a fair, just and inclusive manner. This means creating decent work opportunities for all, avoiding risks like unemployment and displacement, and taking an inclusive approach to managing challenges associated with the low-carbon transition.

There are many pieces to this puzzle. A just transition should include "distributive justice," which calls for the benefits and challenges of the transition to be fairly shared across society; "procedural justice," which means people should be involved in decision-making processes that impact them; and "restorative justice," which calls for addressing past harms.

In other words, a just transition is not only about creating new jobs for those whose livelihoods are linked to fossil fuels (though that's an important component). It can also be about repairing historical inequities, such as unequal pollution burdens. It can mean ensuring social benefits, such as clean transportation or new workforce opportunities, are available for all. It can involve prioritizing social welfare as a key indicator of national progress.

A vibrant park on the site of a former coal mine in Gelsenkirchen, Germany. A just transition aims to ensure that all the benefits of shifting to a cleaner economy, including things like cleaner air and social welfare, are equally shared. Photo by Rupert Oberhauser/Alamy Stock Photo

Importantly, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to a just transition. Each community, country and region will face unique challenges in addressing climate change, and the right path forward will vary based on their social, political and geographical contexts.

For example, South Africa — a coal-dependent country that struggles with high unemployment and inequality — views its just transition as an opportunity to "achieve a quality life for all South Africans." It specifies that the transition should boost social inclusion, reduce poverty, and "[put] people at the centre of decision making, especially those most impacted, the poor, women, people with disabilities, and the youth." South Africa also calls out opportunities for action, such as building "affordable, decentralised, diversely owned renewable energy systems" and ensuring "sustainable, equitable, inclusive land use for all."

Scotland, one of Europe's largest fossil fuel producers, has put a strong focus on employment for its just transition. Scotland highlights the need for "skills training and education that helps to secure good, high value jobs in green industries like low-carbon manufacturing, renewables, and tech," as well as "job security for those in industries that will play the biggest part in the transition … from those working in petrol stations to those on oil platforms."

Are Countries Making Progress on Just Transitions?

The idea of a "just transition" gained prominence when it was included in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Since then, it has taken root in national plans and policies.

The number of countries that explicitly include just transition concepts in their climate plans (known as "Nationally Determined Contributions," or "NDCs") has increased from just one (South Africa) in 2015 to 66 (as of April 2025). Some countries only refer to the concept in passing while others, such as Chile and the United Kingdom, dedicate entire sections to how they'll address a just transition. The U.K.'s NDC, for example, notes the creation of an Office for Clean Energy Jobs to help ensure quality and abundant opportunities for its energy workforce.

Countries have also been incorporating just transition in their long-term low-emissions development strategies (LT-LEDS or "long-term strategies"), which aim to align national development priorities with climate action. Fifty-seven percent of long-term strategies submitted as of September 2023 reference a just transition, though to varying degrees; countries such as Indonesia and Spain offer clear descriptions of just transition efforts, while others lack such details.

Some countries are now moving beyond pledging and planning, developing national strategies and policies that translate just transition principles into concrete action.

• In addition to its Office of Clean Energy Jobs, the United Kingdom launched Skills England, an initiative aimed at upskilling or reskilling workers so they can take advantage of jobs in the clean economy.
• In the United States, past policies have had a strong focus on distributive justice. The Biden Administration's Justice40 initiative, for example, aimed to channel 40% of federal climate investments into communities that have been disproportionately burdened by pollution (though the future of this initiative is unclear under new leadership).
• In South Korea, the government has noted it will support small and medium-sized enterprises in their low-carbon transitions by enforcing policy measures that facilitate green technology and sustainability.
• In Canada, the government developed a Coal Community Transition Fund to support municipalities and First Nations impacted by coal phaseout in Alberta. Resulting funds have helped pay for things like social and economic impact studies, community transition planning and initiatives to build up local businesses.

In parallel with this, innovative climate finance mechanisms are emerging to help accelerate countries' just transition efforts. Models such as Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) and Country Climate and Development Platforms are mobilizing finance at the national level to implement green growth at scale. For example, South Africa signed a deal for a JETP in 2021 to mobilize $8.5 billion from partner countries. This has allowed the country to make strategic investments in at-risk value chains, such as the automotive industry and the agriculture industry, to begin the transition towards a cleaner, greener and more equal society.

From Commitment to Measuring Impact

This growth in just transition commitments suggests a promising trend. But how much progress are countries actually making? The answer to this is less clear-cut.

Most countries still lack processes and systems to track progress toward their just transition goals. While this may sound like a "nice to have," it's critical for driving real-world change. Clear information on progress can help governments refine their approaches and better align policy and finance with just transition goals. By transparently assessing impacts on jobs, gender equity and other socioeconomic priorities, governments can show national and international stakeholders what's working well, what could be emulated and what they might need further support on.

Determining how to measure and track this progress can be challenging. Despite over a decade of tracking sustainable development indicators, many countries do not have consistent socioeconomic data tracking mechanisms in place, creating a blind spot when it comes to identifying specific support that could be provided to disadvantaged groups.

However, some countries are starting to make progress on this front.

Nigeria is working toward understanding whether the benefits of climate action are equitably distributed, with a focus on vulnerable populations such as women, youth, Indigenous communities, and people with disabilities. The country's Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment, with the support of ICAT, worked to develop a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) framework for a Just and Gender Inclusive Transition. The framework — which applies to the oil and gas and agriculture, forestry and land use sectors — identified key indicators to track how transition efforts in these areas are affecting vulnerable groups.

South Africa recently developed a monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) framework to support policy makers in understanding national and local progress toward a just transition, including the impacts on specific at-risk sectors. The country identified key indicators, looking at things like racial and gender employment disparities in transition-impacted sectors such as energy; multidimensional poverty levels in coal-dominated communities, such as Mpumalanga; and the percentage of people with vocational training in clean sectors who find employment within six months of graduating.

Cleaning off rooftop solar panels in Nigeria. Nigeria is working to assess how its efforts to shift toward a cleaner economy affect people across society, particularly vulnerable groups like women and children. Photo by SnapperUK/Alamy Stock Photo

The new ICAT Just Transitions Monitoring Guide draws lessons from these countries, offering comprehensive guidance for other governments looking to monitor their just transition efforts and better understand where support could be targeted. The guide includes step-by-step processes to develop just transition-related goals and priorities; select targets; identify social, economic and environmental indicators; and analyze and communicate data to a range of stakeholders.

Wherever countries are in defining and formulating their just transition plans, they can start developing monitoring processes and identifying indicators to track and inform these efforts. For instance, with ICAT's support, Brazil's environment ministry is utilizing the guide to develop a strategy for monitoring the socio-economic impacts of its National Climate Plan. Countries can leverage this guidance to get a clearer picture of their own progress, build on successes, and identify areas where further support or targeted policies may be needed.

Enabling Just Transitions at Scale

Countries are increasing their commitments to a just transition and working to define what this could look like in their own unique contexts. But without monitoring in place, it will remain difficult for communities to understand whether governments are delivering on their promises.

While monitoring is one of the key factors for ensuring transparency and accountability towards a just transition, it is not the only one. Scaling just transitions across regions, sectors and countries will require significant shifts from both institutions and the public. Governments will need to make a concerted effort to move from developing one-off projects toward fostering consistent, systemic and coordinated action that can enable just transitions at larger scales. This includes working together with other governments (both domestically and internationally) as well as the private sector to scale up financing and promote public-private partnerships.

At every stage, social dialogues need to be built in so that impacted groups are meaningfully involved in the decisions that impact their communities. Only when all groups of people are represented and planned for can we ensure the transition to a more sustainable future is truly just.

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Authors Chelsea Gómez Cynthia Elliott Mikayla Pellerin Neelam Singh Ginette Walls

Biomass Can Fight Climate Change, But Only If You Do It Right alicia.cypress… Thu, 05/01/2025 - 07:00

Biomass is fast becoming a topic of interest for governments looking for alternative energy sources and solutions for the climate crisis. New WRI research shows that limited biomass use can help achieve net-zero emissions goals in the United States. However, guidelines will be needed to ensure its use doesn’t displace agricultural land used for food production or inadvertently contribute to higher carbon emissions that results from land-use change.

What Is Biomass? What Are its Best Uses to Curb Climate Change?

Biomass refers to any material that comes from living things, including wood and bark from trees, leaves or stems from plants, and even animal manure.

When it comes to fighting climate change, carbon-rich biomass material can be used to remove carbon from the atmosphere, or it can be used as an alternative to fossil fuels for producing energy and other products. Many industries, including aviation, chemical manufacturing and carbon removal are increasingly looking to use biomass as a potential energy source or feedstock.

Agricultural waste, such as corn stover — the parts of the corn plant that are not harvested for food production — is one source of biomass that could be used for climate benefit. Photo by Matauw/Shutterstock.

However, as demand for biomass increases, unsustainable use of biomass resources could thwart decarbonization efforts. Growing trees or crops specifically for biomass energy can displace land needed for food and other agricultural production, potentially forcing additional land to be cleared elsewhere to make up the difference. That, in turn, releases carbon dioxide previously stored in soils and vegetation.

Using energy systems modeling and land-use analysis, new WRI research on biomass and land use  has found that a few use cases for biomass can contribute to decarbonization. These include replacing carbon in products that do not have an easy substitute for fossil fuels, like petrochemicals, creating next-generation fuels that do not make dedicated use of land and carbon removal.

Sequestering the carbon in biomass could be one of the most climate-friendly uses of biomass, because — if it’s done right — it could provide relatively durable and cost-effective carbon removal while providing land management benefits, like mitigating wildfire risk.

The Role of Biomass in Carbon Removal

Biomass’s molecular structure contains a lot of carbon that originates from absorbed atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2). This means that biomass theoretically has high carbon removal potential.

Biomass carbon removal and storage (BiCRS) can both store carbon and produce products that replace fossil fuels, such as hydrogen. Whereas some biomass approaches prioritize energy generation, BiCRS prioritizes carbon removal and may produce byproducts that can be synthesized and used for fuel or in industrial processes.

There is potential for BiCRS to play a significant role in U.S. carbon removal. WRI analysis shows that BiCRS could account for around 20% of total biomass use by 2050 if biomass is optimally allocated between BiCRS and other uses.

How Does BiCRS Work? 

Different chemical and physical processes break down biomass and turn it into energy, fuel or products while capturing the carbon that is contained in biomass. Some BiCRS pathways that are most promising for supporting economy-wide decarbonization are:

• • Gasification, a process that produces synthesis gas, which can be used to produce liquid fuels, or hydrogen. Hydrogen can provide energy storage or be further reformed to create clean electrofuels or chemicals. Up to 100% of the carbon from these processes can be captured and sequestered underground.
   
• • Pyrolysis, a high-heat process that creates charcoal-like biochar and bio-oil. Biochar can be used as a soil additive that sequesters carbon, and bio-oil can be injected underground or mixed with products like asphalt to provide carbon removal, or it can be further refined to make hydrogen or other valuable fuels.
   
• • Products, a pathway that utilizes forestry residues that are too small to be used for timber to create other building materials like particle board that store carbon for the lifetime of the material.
   
• • Burial, a pathway that relies on the natural ability of forest residue and wood to decay slowly. Biomass can be permanently preserved and buried in special underground containers when the transportation of waste biomass is difficult. Biomass burial may be a cost-effective in some areas, such as in forests with high fire risk and large quantities of flammable biomass.
   
• • Fermentation, a process of turning biomass into alcohol and capturing the carbon that is produced. Today, most biomass fermentation uses corn to make ethanol, but the production of cellulosic biofuels using biomass wastes and residues is a more sustainable option. These fuels are known as ‘cellulosic’ fuels because they break down the tough cellulose structure that makes up wood and plant stems.

Some BiCRS pathways like biomass burial and underground injection of bio-oil are in development and currently exist at a pilot scale. Other BiCRS approaches like biomass gasification for carbon removal and hydrogen production will require costly new facilities to create a steady demand for biomass for these uses.

Responsible biomass sourcing and strong policies that include monitoring, reporting and verification for carbon removal projects would be needed to ensure that BiCRS projects provide real climate benefits.

Despite the nascence of BiCRS approaches, companies are attracting millions of dollars of federal and private investment, signaling the likely expansion of the industry. New legislation also looks to expand federal support to include BiCRS with biomass guardrails. BiCRS accounts for 90% of carbon removal that has been delivered through the voluntary carbon market to date, and BiCRS could contribute a high percentage of durable carbon removal credits in the coming decade.

How to Sustainably Source Biomass in the US

To build a net-zero economy by 2050, sourcing and using biomass in ways that do not increase national and global emissions will be critical.

In the face of climate change, lands will be put under increasing pressure to meet demand for food, fiber, energy, carbon removal and other ecosystem services. Meanwhile, land is finite and diverting agricultural and forestry lands to biomass production could, in turn, emit more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. WRI research shows that without proper regulation, demand for biomass could take up over 100 million acres by 2050 — an area around the size of California and equal to almost a quarter of present-day U.S. cropland. This is nearly 12 times the land that could be needed for wind and solar by 2050. Therefore, guardrails will be needed to avoid negative climate and other environmental impact.

Robust lifecycle assessment and project-level monitoring, reporting and verification will be needed to keep track of factors like forgone land carbon sequestration; displaced production of food, feed and fiber; the time it takes for plants and trees to regenerate after harvest; and the emissions associated with transporting, processing and refining biomass. To be truly net-beneficial to the climate, biomass carbon removal should abide by the following sourcing principles. (These principles are tailored to the U.S. but can provide a useful guide for how other countries or regions can develop their own.)

1) Prioritize wastes, residues and by-products.

The sources of biomass most likely to provide effective carbon removal are wastes, residues and by-products from unused plant or animal materials that result from normal farm, forestry or municipal operations.

Agricultural waste can include corn stover — the non-edible parts of the corn plant — rice hulls and nut shells. Forestry wastes include wood and paper mill residues, such as sawdust and black liquor — the substance that remains after the pulping of wood to make paper — and woody waste from forestry operations or dead wood from wildfire treatments or natural disasters. Finally, municipal organic waste comes from urban and residential areas and includes things like food waste from homes and restaurants.

Food waste is one way to sustainably source materials for biomass. Photo by joerngebhardt68/Shutterstock.

Many wastes and residues are currently burned or left to decompose, which releases carbon into the atmosphere. Using wastes for BiCRS can avoid or at least delay these emissions. However, when wastes are removed from fields or forests, good management is essential for maintaining soil health and ecological functioning. Certain agricultural conservation practices entail retaining residues, as the decomposition of dead material can enhance soil health. More research is needed to determine the appropriate amount of agricultural and forestry residue that should be left on farms and forest floors to maintain soil health and soil carbon stocks in each region of the U.S. While biomass wastes and residues have the potential to be used for carbon removal, quantities are limited and will likely be in demand across multiple industries.

2) Avoid biomass that makes dedicated use of land.

WRI research shows that once land use emissions are accounted for, using food crops for non-food purposes, like energy production or carbon removal, does not support decarbonization. For example, when corn and soybeans are diverted for biofuel, it displaces food production. To make up for the lost food production, agriculture often expands into high-carbon ecosystems. This phenomenon is called indirect land use change, and it is responsible for the large carbon footprint of crop-based biofuels. Also, using crops to produce energy uses far more land per unit of useable energy than other renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind farms. Because of this, dedicated corn or soy crops are not appropriate sources of biomass for carbon removal nor energy production. This principle also holds true for purpose-grown energy crops that compete with food crops for land.

Guardrails on the collection of biomass raw material are needed to prevent this type of environmental harm, which undermines both nature and climate goals. WRI’s analysis shows that unrestricted expansion and use of purpose-grown biomass would have enormous land use implications. Biomass should not be grown on prime farmland nor natural or high conservation value lands. If natural lands are converted to biomass production systems, they will likely undergo a drastic decrease in carbon storage from either their vegetation, soil or both. As such, lands with large natural carbon stores in soil or aboveground vegetation should never be compromised for the sake of sourcing biomass.

3) Forestry wastes, residues and by-products should come from ecologically managed forests.

When done responsibly, BiCRS may provide a win-win opportunity by using material from forestry practices that would otherwise decay or burn. 

This is especially relevant in the western U.S., where land management agencies aim to reduce severe wildfires through forest treatments that often include biomass removal (i.e., thinning). However, creating a market for forestry wastes could incentivize over-harvesting, particularly if large-diameter forestry residues like large branches and tree stumps are removed, which can deplete forest carbon stocks over several decades. To ensure mutual benefit, residues should come from practices that increase the resilience and health of forest ecosystems and protect soil carbon and habitats.

Using Biomass Responsibly

Using biomass to decarbonize comes with environmental and climate risks, but there are opportunities to use biomass responsibly.

As industries like aviation, chemical manufacturing and carbon removal look to biomass as a potential replacement for fossil fuels, demand for biomass is likely to far outstrip the sustainable supply. Therefore, policymakers will need to carefully consider the trade-offs between different land uses, like food and agricultural production, as the U.S. works toward its climate goals.

Despite decades of incentives for first generation biofuels made from food crops, WRI analysis finds that they are not an effective tool for reaching net-zero emissions. In contrast, when residues from agriculture and forestry are used for BiCRS, chemicals and next-generation fuels, they have the potential to support decarbonization. 

Biomass is a limited resource, and in some cases, the optimal climate benefit may be from leaving it in place on natural landscapes to preserve the ecosystem services it provides. With the growing demand for biomass, policies with sourcing guardrails that can be tailored to the complex realities of different biomass types and BiCRS methods, as well as accurate carbon accounting, will be critical. Guardrails must prevent the use of biomass feedstocks that contribute to land use change, cause environmental degradation, or do not truly lead to net greenhouse gas mitigation. Where certification standards exist, enforcement is often a challenge that needs to be addressed. Here, again, rigorous monitoring, reporting, and verification and accurate carbon accounting are needed to ensure climate benefits.

In all cases of biomass use, input from local and Indigenous communities must be carefully considered to ensure no harm is being done. Biomass processing facilities must take steps to minimize negative air and water quality impacts. And moreover, policymakers at all levels should enact policies or regulations to prevent any undue environmental burden of biomass harvesting, processing or usage on historically disadvantaged communities.

Editor's Note: This article was first published Jan. 16, 2024. We updated it on May 1, 2025 with new research, data and information.

 

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Our Ocean Conference: 10 Years of Progress, With More to Achieve shannon.paton@… Tue, 04/29/2025 - 16:16

International conferences are often criticized as talk shops — lots of interesting discussions and impressive attendees, but a far cry from the tangible action needed to tackle existential issues like climate change and pollution. Meanwhile, multilateral processes can be long and complicated, with outcomes that can take years to take effect. For example, the High Seas Treaty, which aims to protect the nearly two-thirds of the ocean that lie beyond national borders, was 20 years in the making — and, despite being agreed to in March 2023, it has yet to come into force.

Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry founded the Our Ocean Conference (OOC) in 2014 to “focus on action, not talk.” A decade later, has it delivered?

Our Ocean Conference, Athens Greece Assessing 10 Years of International Commitments to Sustainable Ocean Action: A Global Stocktake of the Our Ocean Conference

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As the new secretariat of the OOC, WRI sought to answer this question in an effort to improve the transparency and accountability of pledges. For the first time, we analyzed 10 years of OOC-related commitments from governments, companies and many others. We found that the conference has generated an impressive 2,600 commitments worth $160 billion — but there’s still more work to do.

1) Mobilizing Ocean Finance

Possibly the most impressive finding from our research is the total value of the pledges made at the OOC: $160 billion from public and private organizations, $133 billion of which has either already been delivered or is in progress. 

The majority of the financial commitments — $86.8 billion — have gone toward ocean-climate projects, ranging from offshore wind and blue carbon to green shipping. Thirteen of these projects are valued at over $1 billion apiece, underscoring the growing recognition that ocean-based action can support emissions reductions while also delivering marine conservation. 

However, to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14), which aims to conserve and sustainably use the ocean for sustainable development, it is estimated that $175 billion per year is needed for ocean conservation, while the overall global climate finance goal is $1.3 trillion annually.

2) Ocean Partnerships

The OOC has also spawned a wide variety of global partnerships and projects. Partnerships are key to scaling resources, coordinating action, sharing knowledge and best practices and raising global ocean ambition. For example:

• Subnational governments launched the Ocean Acidification Alliance in 2016 to address the impacts of ocean acidification on oyster hatchery production along the North American Pacific Coast. As the ocean absorbs more carbon dioxide, it is becoming more acidic, which heavily impacts marine life. Today, the alliance has expanded to over 130 members across 22 countries, delivering action to protect coastal communities and livelihoods from acidification and other climate-ocean impacts.
• Global Fishing Watch, launched in 2016, uses satellite data to spotlight where fishing activity is taking place and where it may harm vulnerable marine populations and ecosystems. It now provides a global open-ocean data platform to help governments identify and halt illegal fishing, among other things.

Global Fishing Watch’s vessel viewer tool

• The Green Shipping Challenge seeks to align the shipping sector with the goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C. Related OOC announcements have included new green shipping corridors connecting ports and governments across ocean basins and public-private partnerships to reduce emissions.

3) Ocean Protection

The Our Ocean Conference aims to support the 30x30 target, the global goal to protect at least 30% of the planet’s land and ocean by 2030. In total, 42% of globally implemented Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) were first announced at the OOC, an area totaling 8.7 million square kilometers (3.4 million square miles), roughly the size of Brazil.

Small island states have led the way. Palau announced its National Marine Sanctuary at the 2015 conference, protecting an incredible 475,077 square kilometers (183,428 square miles) — 80% of its ocean territory. The Cook Islands announced its Moana reserve spanning 1.9 million square kilometers (733,594 square miles) in 2017, and Niue’s announcement at the 2022 conference established its 317,500-square-kilometers (122,587-square-miles) marine park.

Protecting 30% of the ocean will, however, require the number of MPAs to be significantly scaled up in the next five years.

What’s Next for the Our Ocean Conference?

The OOC has driven considerable progress over the last decade. But to truly help protect critical ocean ecosystems and achieve global goals, it will need to lean into a few areas over the next 10 years:

1) Mobilize action to support negotiated ocean goals and targets

With only five years remaining to meet the goals of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 30x30 target, the ocean is at a critical juncture.

Multilateral instruments such as the High Seas Treaty, the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and the International Maritime Organization’s plan to reduce shipping emissions will be critical to achieving these goals. But they need to be backed by concrete commitments, sustained finance and ambitious policies. The OCC will be an important platform to maintain this implementation and delivery focus as the decade continues.

2) Strengthen transparency and accountability in the global ocean community

The OOC is not just about ambition — it’s about accountability. More than 65% of OOC commitments have received at least one progress update.

While that is an impressive statistic for a global platform that engages hundreds of organizations and governments, there is still progress to be made. There are also inherent challenges in assessing impact when relying on governments and organizations to provide voluntary, self-reported data. In the next 10 years, the OOC can further its commitment to transparency and accountability by improving reporting outcomes. This can include modifying the reporting framework to collect more detailed progress updates and increasing engagement with commitment-makers to encourage more accurate and timely updates.  

While an estimated $24 billion has been delivered, the disbursement of $109 billion in committed funding remains in progress. The OOC can help unlock this disbursement by supporting commitment-makers with implementation, such as a convening platform to share lessons learned, best practices, successes and challenges. 

3) Expand geographic and sectoral engagement

Ocean solutions work best when everyone has a seat at the table. The ocean is interconnected, and its issues are global, so it’s vital that all regions and stakeholders are represented, especially those most impacted, such as small-island developing states, whose communities and economies are intrinsically linked to the health of the ocean.

While the OOC has served as a critical incubator for cross-sector partnerships, an analysis of all commitments revealed a notable geographic skew, with the majority made by organizations and governments based in Europe and North America, and comparably very few from Africa, Latin America and South Asia. In the face of ongoing Global North-Global South divisions in the environmental policy space, it will be critical for the OOC to increase engagement with historically underrepresented regions and countries to raise overall global ambition, address their unique needs and vulnerabilities and ensure equitable implementation of ocean solutions.

Additionally, the conference can and should seek to improve engagement with non-state actors, especially the private sector and financing institutions, which have made less than 10% of all commitments. With reports indicating that $175 billion is required to finance SDG 14 per year, there is an urgent need for continued ocean finance from all sources, both public and private. Meanwhile, more inclusive engagement can ensure that the needs of young people, Indigenous groups and women are at the forefront of future conferences.

Protecting the Ocean for People, Nature and the Climate

The voluntary commitments generated through the OOC have a valuable role in the ocean policy space, complementing and strengthening the outcomes of negotiated processes and agreements. They present a more flexible tool to encourage ocean action and engagement, especially from governments, communities and organizations with limited capacity and resources.

As the planet continues to warm and communities face the devastating impacts of climate change, now is the time for even greater momentum in protecting our global ocean.

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Our Ocean Conference Delivers $133 Billion For Ocean Action darla.vanhoorn… Mon, 04/28/2025 - 09:15

Urgent Challenges Remain to Meet Global Deadlines in a Pivotal Year for the Ocean – Including High Seas Treaty and 30x30

BUSAN, Korea (April 29, 2025) — The Our Ocean Conference (OOC) has mobilized $133 billion in funding for ocean action over the past decade, according to a new report launched today by World Resources Institute (WRI) to mark the conference’s 10th anniversary. 

However, the report also underscores the urgent need for greater ambition, especially in light of key global ocean targets, including the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) and the 30x30 goal, which calls on countries to protect 30% of the world's land and water by 2030.

Since its inaugural meeting in 2014, OOC has become a leading platform for governments, businesses and civil society to make commitments advancing marine conservation, ocean-based climate solutions and sustainable blue economy initiatives.  

WRI’s analysis identifies over 2,600 commitments for ocean action made at the conference over the past decade, collectively worth approximately $160 billion. As of January 2025, $133 billion has already been delivered or is currently in progress (with 43% of pledges successfully completed; 38% still in progress; and, 18% yet to be started). 

The majority of the financial commitments, $86.8 billion, have gone towards ocean-climate projects, ranging from offshore wind and blue carbon to green shipping, with 13 climate-related commitments valued at over $1 billion a piece—underscoring the growing recognition that ocean-based action can support carbon dioxide emission reductions while also delivering marine conservation. 

To meet UN SDG 14 (life below water), it’s estimated that $175 billion per year is needed for ocean conservation, while the overall global climate finance goal is $1.3 trillion annually. As world leaders prepare for COP30 in November, integrating ocean-based solutions into the global climate finance agenda is crucial to meeting ambitious targets. 

OOC has been particularly effective at attracting support for marine protected areas (MPAs), an essential tool in ocean conservation at a time when marine systems face unprecedented pressure from overfishing, pollution, and warming waters. 42% of all the world’s MPAs implemented globally can be traced to announcements made at OOC, covering a total of 8.5 million square kilometers- an area roughly the size of Brazil, according to an independent study from Oregon State University.

These voluntary commitments take on renewed significance in this critical year for the ocean, helping to deliver on recent landmark treaties and global ocean goals. The High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which includes the "30x30" target, both demand unprecedented ocean protection. So far, just 21 countries have ratified the High Seas Treaty, with anticipation that 60 can be reached by the UN Ocean Conference this June for it to enter into force. 

“The 10th Our Ocean Conference will encourage the international community to take immediate action to address the crisis our ocean is facing under the slogan 'Our Ocean, Our Action', said Do-hyung Kang, Minister of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea. "The conference will primarily focus on the achievements and success stories over the past 10 years while also establishing the future direction for international cooperation over the next decade. It is set to be a significant moment for international cooperation, providing a crucial foundation for our collective efforts towards a shared future.” 

“Our research demonstrates that the Our Ocean Conference is a leading platform for mobilizing finance and vital ocean action, but greater global ambition is required to address the urgent challenges," said Dr. Tom Pickerell, Global Director, WRI Ocean Program. "For example, we know that readily available ocean-based solutions can deliver up to 35 percent of the annual greenhouse gas emission cuts needed by 2050 to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. It’s time the ocean’s potential was realized.”

“From ecotourism, to green shipping, to renewable energy, vibrant sustainable development and a healthy ocean can go hand-in-hand," said Dr. Dionysia-Theodora Avgerinopoulou, Greek Prime Minister's Special Envoy for the Ocean; Member of the Hellenic Parliament; 2024 Our Ocean Conference Coordinator. "The Our Ocean Conference is an important champion of this vision, and one I hope will inspire both the public and private stakeholders to become more involved worldwide.” 

WRI’s progress report includes a series of recommendations to improve OOC outcomes moving forward, including:

• Actively fill geographic and policy gaps in OOC commitments to increase inclusion and mobilize commitment across Africa, Latin America and South Asia.
• Strengthen partnerships with governments while scaling engagement with the private sector, academia, intergovernmental organizations, local communities and underrepresented groups.
• Improve the OOC online platform to enhance data quality, consistency and transparency.
• Conduct further thematic analysis of commitments including deep dives, regular progress assessments, and an exploration of implementation barriers and solutions.
• Increase coordination between OOC and other multilateral forums, including the UN Ocean Conference, to address the risk of duplication between voluntary commitment platforms and drive to global ocean ambition.
• Explore options to provide more concrete support for organizations to implement their commitments through internal knowledge sharing and external partnerships.

About the Our Ocean Conference 
The Our Ocean Conference gathers approximately 1,000 global leaders from various sectors, including heads of state and high-level government officials from over 100 countries, and representatives from more than 400 international and non-profit organizations. Together, they discuss diverse and concrete actions for a sustainable ocean.

Since the inaugural Our Ocean Conference in the United States in 2014, over 2,600 voluntary commitments have been announced at subsequent conferences held in Chile, the European Union, Indonesia, Norway, Palau, and Greece. Today, the conference serves as a leading platform for establishing global ocean norms.

Key achievements of OOC include expanding marine protected areas, reducing marine plastic pollution, eradicating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, reducing lost and discarded fishing gear, ratifying the High Seas Treaty, supporting ocean research, science and technology, and addressing the impact of climate change on the ocean.

About World Resources Institute (WRI)
WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations. Learn more at wri.org. 

 

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RELEASE: 2025 P4G Vietnam Summit Concludes, Driving Climate Action and Green Investment in Emerging Economies darla.vanhoorn… Fri, 04/25/2025 - 12:56

Global leaders gather to discuss scalable solutions for climate impact; P4G announces $4.7 million in funding and technical assistance for 17 startup partnerships.  

HANOI, VIETNAM (April 25, 2025) — The 2025 Partnering for Green Growth and the Global Goals 2030 (P4G) Vietnam Summit concluded with an urgent call to action and renewed global commitment to scaling innovative climate solutions and unlocking green investment in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs).  

Hosted by the Government of Vietnam on April 16-17 under the theme "Sustainable and People-Centered Green Transition," the Summit brought together over 800 leaders from governments, businesses, multilateral institutions and civil society to explore scalable climate solutions and build partnerships that support startups across Africa, Asia and Latin America.  

This included discussions on strategies for fast-tracking the green transition in EMDEs, business matching that paired startups with investors and the Green Growth Exhibition, which showcased climate startups’ products and solutions. 

H.E. To Lam, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, opened with the need for comprehensive national planning, bold public sector leadership and private sector involvement to scale green growth, noting Vietnam's commitment to integrating the green transition into its national development strategy. Other high-level attendees included Pham Minh Chinh, Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; and Abiy Ahmed Ali, Prime Minister of Ethiopia, with virtual remarks by Mette Frederiksen, Prime Minister of Denmark and Emmanuel Macron, President of France.  

A pre-summit hosted by P4G, a World Resources Institute initiative, took place on April 14-15, showcasing climate startups through panel sessions and the P4G Pitch Day, and convening its National Platforms — high-level public-private country networks that support climate entrepreneurs — and the Global Advisory Council for their annual meetings. 

Key outcomes and achievements from the pre-summit include: 

• P4G announced $4.7 million in grant funding and technical assistance for 17 startup partnerships in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.
• Over 70 climate startups from Vietnam and other developing economies pitched their business models to investors, with several, including P4G-funded startups Crustea, Sabio and agriBora, attracting investor interest.
• P4G signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Republic of Korea committing $1.8 million to accelerate P4G’s impact — reaffirming Korea's long-standing support for sustainable growth in emerging economies as a P4G founding member.
• Participating countries endorsed a declaration calling for people-centered green growth policies and support for global entrepreneurship and innovation.  

“The Summit was a clarion call for countries to invest in climate innovation and design strong policies that support climate startups,” said Robyn McGuckin, Executive Director, P4G. “P4G is showcasing how startups are a powerful yet underutilized tool for mobilizing private investment toward national climate goals.” 

At COP29, wealthy nations agreed to increase climate finance for developing nations by $300 billion annually by 2035, but this falls short of the $1.3 trillion needed. The Summit serves as a model for how public-private partnerships can help fill that gap and drive tangible solutions for climate action, job creation and economic growth.  

As attention turns to the 2027 P4G Ethiopia Summit, the momentum from Hanoi provides a foundation for ongoing progress, with a continued focus on innovation, inclusion and securing the investments needed to drive resilient country transitions. 

About P4G 
P4G helps early-stage climate startups in emerging markets and developing economies become investment ready. We provide startups with grants and technical assistance, and partner them with national level public-private platforms to help navigate the marketplace. Through this approach, P4G strengthens market systems for climate entrepreneurs and accelerates just and resilient country economic transitions. Hosted by World Resources Institute and funded by Denmark, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea, P4G accelerates food, water and energy partnerships in Colombia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, South Africa and Vietnam. Learn more at p4gpartnerships.org.  

About World Resources Institute 
WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations. Learn more at wri.org. 

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What We Know About Deep-Sea Mining — and What We Don’t margaret.overh… Wed, 04/23/2025 - 09:00

Minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earth elements are essential ingredients in everything from wind turbines and electric vehicles to cell phones, medical technologies and military infrastructure. Mining for these materials on land is already well established, but with demand surging, some are now looking to tap the seafloor for its millions of square kilometers of metal ores.

Some countries and companies have already begun exploring underwater mineral deposits and mining techniques — but the prospect of deep-sea mining remains controversial. Despite years of research, little is known about the deep ocean. Many fear that extracting minerals from it could pose grave consequences for both marine life and planetary health.

While nations can currently pursue deep-sea mining in their own domestic waters, the world is still awaiting exploitation regulations from the UN's International Seabed Authority (ISA) that will dictate whether and how it could proceed in international waters, where the bulk of the ocean's critical minerals are found.

With the future of deep-sea mining still under debate, here's what we know so far about the proposed practice and its impacts — and what we don't:

1) What Is Deep-Sea Mining and How Would It Be Done?

Deep-sea mining aims to retrieve valuable mineral deposits found on the ocean's floor, hundreds or even thousands of meters below its surface. Alongside a diverse array of marine life at these depths are significant reserves of copper, cobalt, nickel, zinc, silver, gold and rare earth elements.

In the deep sea, these minerals are contained within slow-forming, potato-sized polymetallic "nodules," as well as in polymetallic sulfides (large deposits made up of sulfur compounds and other metals that form around hydrothermal vents) and metal-rich crusts on underwater mountains (seamounts). While there has been commercial interest in these minerals for decades, recent advancements in technology have made it feasible to mine these areas by sending vehicles down to harvest mineral deposits from the seafloor.

Mineral nodules on the seafloor in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, a key area of interest for deep-sea mining. Photo by ROV KIEL 6000/GEOMAR

In the case of polymetallic nodules — which are currently the primary focus for deep-sea mining in international waters — mining vehicles would remove mineral deposits from the surface of the seabed, along with the top layers of sediment, using a suction device not unlike a vacuum cleaner. The materials collected would then be piped up to a surface vessel for processing. Any waste, such as sediments and other organic materials, would be pumped back into the water column.

The bulk of the most attractive mineral deposits are found on vast seafloor abyssal plains in international waters. One area of particular interest is the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in the Pacific Ocean. This mineral-rich region already hosts exploration contracts for 17 deep-sea mining contractors, with their combined exploration areas covering approximately 1 million square kilometers (about the same area as Egypt).

2) What's the Current Status of Deep-Sea Mining?

While exploratory mining to test equipment has occurred at a small scale, deep-sea mining has not yet been undertaken commercially. But some national governments and mining companies plan to begin as soon as possible.

A few countries have already approved permits to explore mineral resources in their own domestic waters (known as "exclusive economic zones," or "EEZs"). However, most deep-sea mining interest is concentrated in international waters, which means the industry's future will largely hinge on how the ISA decides to regulate it. After years of negotiations, the ISA is due to adopt a final set of regulations in July 2025 that will govern responsible commercial mining operations in international waters.

Opinion remains deeply divided on whether deep-sea mining should be allowed at all. Given the insufficiency of information on how it could affect marine environments, countries such as Germany and Canada, as well as the European Parliament, have called for national and regional moratoria on deep-sea mining. Portugal recently passed a law banning the practice in its national waters for the next 25 years.

Meanwhile, Canadian mining company The Metals Company announced in March 2025 that, through a U.S. subsidiary (The Metals Company USA LLC), it had begun the process of applying for licenses and permits under the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's mining code, known as the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980 (DSHMRA). This pathway is possible because the U.S. has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), under which the ISA sits. Hence the U.S. is not an ISA member and is not bound by ISA processes.

This could potentially accelerate the timeline for commercial deep-sea mining by circumventing the ISA's permitting process altogether. Depending on the outcome of The Mining Company's application, other companies may follow this route, undermining international efforts to secure shared standards.

3) What Are the Potential Benefits of Deep-Sea Mining?

Proponents of deep-sea mining argue that it can help meet the world's pressing need for critical minerals, which will likely only continue to grow as countries invest more in decarbonization, digitization, defense and infrastructure. Estimates suggest that global demand for nickel, cobalt and rare earth elements may double by 2040 in a net-zero emissions scenario. Several studies have concluded that there is no shortage of mineral resources on land, but the world still faces significant hurdles in locating viable reserves and quickly scaling up mining and processing operations.

Some also view deep-sea mining as an alternative pathway that can circumvent certain risks associated with mining on land. Since extraction would occur exclusively at sea, deep-sea mining is unlikely to be associated with environmental hazards such as deforestation and freshwater pollution that can impact communities neighboring terrestrial mines. Yet others argue that infrastructure built to process and transport deep-sea minerals would require land acquisition and development, which may impact local communities' property, food sources and lifestyle.

Similarly, the difficulty in accessing deep-sea mineral deposits for exploitation means that artisanal (small-scale) mining operations would be impossible, and strong regulation of labor conditions may be feasible. This could potentially avoid the human rights abuses associated with some terrestrial mining operations. However, experiences of labor abuse in distant-water fishing operations show this outcome is not guaranteed.

4) What Are the Risks of Deep-Sea Mining?

While the deep sea was once thought to be devoid of life — too dark, cold and starved of food for anything to survive — we now know that it is the largest habitable space on the planet and home to a dazzling array of life. To date, tens of thousands of species have been found in the deep ocean. Estimates say there could be millions more. In the Clarion-Clipperton Zone alone, a key area of interest for deep-sea mining, researchers have recently discovered over 5,000 species that were entirely new to science.

A starfish in a field of manganese nodules on the seafloor in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. Thousands of previously unknown deep-sea species have already been discovered in this area, which some seek to mine for its mineral resources. Photo by ROV-Team/GEOMAR

With exploration and testing still in the early stages, further research is needed to determine the possible ecological impacts of deep-sea mining. But the science to date paints a concerning picture.

• Direct harm to marine life: There is a high likelihood that less mobile deep-sea organisms would be killed through direct contact with heavy mining equipment deployed on the seabed, and that organisms would be smothered and suffocated by the sediment plumes these machines are likely to create. Warm mining wastewater could also kill marine life through overheating and poisoning.
• Long-term species and ecosystem disruption: Mining activities could impair the feeding and reproduction of deep-sea species through the creation of intense noise and light pollution in a naturally dark and silent environment. For example, the sound pollution from these activities could negatively impact large mega-fauna like whales, posing further risk to populations already strained by climate change and other human activities. Because many deep-sea species are rare, long-lived and slow to reproduce, and because polymetallic nodules (which may take millions of years to develop to a harvestable size) are an important habitat for deep-sea species, scientists are fairly certain that some species would face extinction from habitat removal due to mining, and that these ecosystems would require extremely long time periods to recover, if ever.
• Possible impacts on fishing and food security: It's not just the seafloor that's at risk. Under current designs, waste discharge from mining vessels could spread over large distances, potentially kilometers away from the areas being mined. This may pose a threat to open ocean fish and invertebrates which are crucial to international fisheries — such as tuna stocks that help drive the economies of small island developing states like Kiribati, Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands. Effects of this mining waste could include suffocation, damaged respiratory and feeding structures, and disrupted visual communication within and amongst species, alongside changes in the oxygen content, pH, temperature and toxicity of seawater. However, more research is needed on the characteristics of the discharge plumes themselves and the tolerance of ocean species to fully understand these impacts.
• Social and governance risks: While extraction would occur offshore, the deep-sea mining industry would still need shoreline facilities for processing and transshipment of material. This would require land acquisition and development, which has historically driven habitat loss affecting coastal communities that depend on marine resources. Though the UN has designated high-seas minerals "the common heritage of [hu]mankind" and declared that any mineral extraction should benefit all nations, the current regulatory regime of the ISA appears to promote the flow of mining profits to developed states, or to shareholders of mining companies, rather than being inclusive of developing nations.
• Potential climate impacts: The ocean is the world's largest carbon sink, absorbing around 25% of all carbon dioxide emissions. Microscopic organisms play a critical role in this climate-regulating system, helping to sequester carbon in the deep sea and reduce emissions of other planet-warming gases (such as methane) from seabed sediments. The loss of deep-sea biodiversity following mining activity may impact the ocean's carbon cycle and reduce its ability to help mitigate global temperature rise.

5) Is Deep-Sea Mining Necessary?

The global supply of critical minerals (including rare earth elements) must grow in the coming years, and quickly. But there is no easy answer to meet this demand responsibly given the immature state and potential dangers of mining at sea and the well-understood harms associated with mining on land. While mineral resources on land appear sufficient to meet global needs, the world must address how to responsibly scale up supply in a way that minimizes environmental, social and governance risks while also creating benefits (such as safe, good-paying jobs) for nearby communities.

Circularity is an important pathway to meet the demand for minerals while reducing dependency on new mining. IEA estimates that significantly scaling up recycling could reduce the need for newly mined minerals by 40% for copper and nickel and 25% for lithium and cobalt by 2050. For some minerals, such as lithium and battery-grade nickel, the share from recycling will remain low for another 5-10 years before end-of-life EV battery volume starts to rise. For other minerals, such as copper and cobalt, there is already opportunity to scale recycling today, since they are widely used in many sectors such as electronics and infrastructure.

Better recycling practices in established waste streams, such as from electronics and electrical equipment, can help alleviate some short-term supply pressure while preparing the secondary supply chain to handle a large volume of end-of-life zero-carbon energy products in the future. There is also a range of research efforts underway to obtain the necessary minerals without mining virgin land, including recovery from coal waste or hard rock mine tailings.

How technology evolution is changing demand for minerals should also be considered. Take batteries as an example: There is a growing shift away from nickel manganese cobalt oxides (NMC) batteries toward lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries. LFP batteries gained significant market share from 2015 to 2022, and their key materials, lithium and iron, are not targets of deep-sea mining. Emerging technologies such as sodium-ion batteries also have the potential to alter the EV battery market by replacing lithium and cobalt with cheaper, more abundant options.

With Serious Questions Still Unanswered, What Comes Next?

After failing to reach an agreement at previous meetings, the ISA is aiming to finalize regulations for commercial mining during its 30th session in July 2025. It is crucial that the regulations fully consider the following key questions and knowledge gaps:

• What is the potential magnitude and extent (both in space and time) of deep-sea mining impacts on marine species and environments, and what are the likely ecological consequences?
• What are the potential social and economic impacts of deep-sea mining? Is it possible for the industry to be advanced in a way that meets the UNCLOS goal of fostering sustainable economic development, international cooperation and equitable trade growth for all countries?
• How can a circular mineral economy be further developed to lessen the need for environmentally intrusive practices? More research must be conducted into land-based and urban mining practices to improve their efficiency, as well as into improving product design to reduce demand for and increase recycling of critical minerals.
• What are the possible positive and negative implications of deep-sea mining in achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals, as well as for furthering research into deep-sea environments?
• What regulations could be developed to ensure that the financial benefits from deep-sea mining operations, should they occur, are equitably distributed among nations?

Finally, for the exploration of deep-sea mineral resources to continue, regulations should be transparent and collaborative, with participation from interested parties and key stakeholders — including ISA members, mining corporations and scientists. The regulations need to be backed by science and other forms of knowledge, enforceable, and offer effective protection for delicate marine environments from the impacts of mining.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in July 2023. It was last updated in April 2025 to reflect developments in deep-sea mining policy.

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Authors Oliver Ashford Jonathan Baines Melissa Barbanell Ke Wang

What Would Ambitious Climate Commitments Look Like for the World’s Top Emitters? It’s Complicated shannon.paton@… Tue, 04/22/2025 - 15:10

It’s been nearly 10 years since 194 countries adopted the Paris Agreement on climate change. And while many have made strides forward, their collective efforts still fall far short of what’s needed to avoid increasingly dangerous impacts and limit warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F).

The UN’s latest assessment, for example, finds that countries’ current policies put the world on course for 3.1 degrees C (5.6 degrees F) of warming, with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions holding steady at 57 metric gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2030 and 2035. To limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C, these emissions must instead decline rapidly to 33 GtCO2e in 2030 and 25 GtCO2e in 2035.

The good news is that this year presents a prime opportunity to change course, with countries set to put forward new nationally determined contributions (NDCs) ahead of COP30 in November 2025. The Paris Agreement requires that each successive NDC reflect a country’s “highest possible ambition,” as well as its “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” All eyes are now on governments to establish bold, new emissions-reduction targets for 2035, as well as strengthen their existing targets for 2030, in line with these core tenants. But as NDCs begin to trickle in, a critical question remains: What would ambitious targets look like for major emitters like the European Union or China?

The short answer? No matter which way you slice it, major emitters need to go further.

The longer answer is more complicated ...

5 Approaches for Setting National Emissions-Reduction Targets for 2030 and 2035

Divvying up the responsibility of achieving any global goal to individual countries is a complex, value-laden process. For example, should countries that can achieve the largest and cheapest emissions reductions set the most ambitious targets? Or should wealthy nations that have historically emitted the most GHGs shoulder the greatest responsibilities?

Various corners of the climate community tackle these questions differently, using a range of methods to develop near-term national benchmarks. These perspectives can yield distinct — and for some countries, contradictory — results.

To illustrate what ambition looks like under different lenses for six major emitters, we compiled 2030 and 2035 national benchmarks derived from five of the most widely used approaches and compared them to targets in these countries’ most recent NDCs. They include:

1) 1.5°C-aligned, Least-cost Pathways: Modelled scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C at the lowest possible cost — such as those featured in reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — are among the most common sources for establishing national benchmarks. While some global climate models can now generate least-cost pathways for major emitters, others still lack country-level data. They instead simulate global or regional scenarios that must be downscaled to the national level.

A Deeper Look at 1.5°C-Aligned, Least-Cost Pathways

In addition to maximizing cost-effectiveness globally, one of the main benefits of deriving national benchmarks from 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost scenarios is that they can account for important interactions across sectors (such as how decarbonizing power generation alongside scaling up electric vehicles can reduce transport emissions) and countries (for example, how supportive policies adopted in one major economy can help reduce the cost of zero-carbon technologies more broadly and, in doing so, accelerate adoption in other nations).

But these scenarios have also faced criticisms that extend beyond their treatment of equity and fairness. More specifically, some 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways feature large-scale carbon removal from bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation/reforestation that could harm biodiversity, food security and human rights.

So, while we present 2030 and 2035 benchmarks from least-cost pathways that hold warming to 1.5 degrees C from the IPCC scenario database, we filter out those that rely on unsustainable levels of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation to achieve this temperature goal, following criteria developed by Climate Analytics and used for global, sectoral benchmarking in the State of Climate Action series. Ideally, other approaches that rely on these least-cost pathways as a starting point for national benchmarking — namely 1.5 degrees-C-aligned, fair-share perspectives — would employ similar filters.

2) 1.5°C-aligned, Fair-share Pathways: A well-cited critique of relying solely on least-cost pathways to establish national benchmarks is that they ignore equity and fairness. Not only do inequalities in incomes, energy use and GHG emissions among countries persist in IPCC scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, but because they prioritize economic efficiency, these least-cost pathways can also assign some developing countries disproportionate responsibility for reducing GHG emissions, relative to their contributions to the climate crisis. Fair-share perspectives attempt to address such limitations — for instance, by considering historical responsibility for total emissions, economic capacity and equality in per capita emissions — when determining each country’s contribution to limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C.

But even defining equity and fairness across different fair-share approaches remains hotly contested, and such perspectives do not necessarily consider feasibility. Some countries’ fair-share contributions, for example, require GHG emissions to reach net zero or net negative by 2030, but such steep declines strain the bounds of feasibility even under the most favorable political conditions. In these select cases, approaches may allow for countries to compensate for what they cannot reduce domestically by financing emissions reductions beyond their borders.

3) National Modelled Pathways to Net Zero: Still other methods avoid global pathways entirely and instead rely on country-specific modeling. These scenarios focus not on determining an individual nation’s contribution to the global goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C, but rather on achieving that country’s pledge to reach net-zero emissions. They show how steeply emissions need to decline in 2030 and 2035 to stay on track to reach net zero — typically around mid-century for most countries.

4) Linear Trajectories to Net Zero: A related but simpler approach gaining traction among some governments is a “linear or steeper” trajectory to net zero. Essentially, if countries drew a straight line to their net-zero target — for example, 0 GtCO2e in 2050 — then their 2030 and 2035 targets should either be on this line or below it, reflecting a constant decline in GtCO2e each year. But the devil is in the details, as the starting point governments select may significantly impact the steepness of the line; the steeper the line, the more ambitious the national benchmarks will be.

5) Bottom-up, Feasibility-focused Modeling: This method relies on country-specific modeling to determine what level of mitigation is feasible within a given nation, irrespective of a global limit on warming or that country’s commitment to reach net zero. Often relying on more granular, country-specific data, these studies primarily estimate GHG emissions reductions that could be achieved if a government instituted a carbon price, championed a specific policy portfolio or deployed a particular suite of zero-carbon technologies. Some of these modeling efforts also quantify mitigation that is possible if a country pursues a “just transition” or achieves national development priorities, alongside efforts to mitigate climate change. These scenarios may end up charting pathways to net-zero emissions or show that deep GHG emissions cuts in line with 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways are feasible, but these end goals are not inputs to the modeling.

This list of methods is not exhaustive. For example, we excluded a carbon budgeting approach due to a lack of national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035. But like 1.5 degree C-aligned, fair-share pathways, this method aims to more equitably distribute responsibility for achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal by allocating the global carbon budget to countries according to their relative shares of the world’s population.

What Do Ambitious 2030 and 2035 Emissions-Reduction Targets Look Like for 6 of the World’s Biggest Emitters?

Together, China, the United States, India, the European Union, Brazil and Indonesia currently emit more than half of the world’s GHGs each year. Their near-term climate ambition, then, plays an outsized role in determining whether the world can reduce emissions enough to hold global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C.

Relying on the five approaches above, we assessed just how ambitious these major emitters’ current mitigation targets are, as well as what strong 2030 and 2035 targets could look like for those that have not yet submitted their new NDCs.

The headline is that while most major emitters have set near-term targets that would be considered ambitious under at least one perspective, none feature targets for 2030 and 2035 that are sufficiently ambitious across each of the five approaches assessed. What’s more, all six NDCs fall well short of what’s needed to keep the 1.5 degrees C limit within reach.

Brazil

Among the first countries to submit a new NDC in November 2024, Brazil committed to reduce GHG emissions 59-67% by 2035, relative to 2005. While President Lula’s government did not strengthen the country’s 2030 target that aims to lower GHG emissions 53% from 2005 levels, it did reiterate Brazil’s pledge to reach climate neutrality by 2050. If achieved, these targets would cause GHG emissions to fall from 2.6 GtCO2e in 2005 to 1.2 GtCO2e by 2030, 0.84-1.0 GtCO2e by 2035 and 0 GtCO2e by 2050. 

Brazil’s target for 2030 is considered ambitious under only two of the five approaches, while its target for 2035 is fully aligned with just one. More specifically, linear trajectories to net zero show that the country’s GHG emissions drop to 1.1-1.5 GtCO2e by 2030 and 0.85-1.1 GtCO2e by 2035 — equivalent to cuts of 43-56% and 57-67% from 2005 levels, respectively. Bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling affirm that near-term reductions of this magnitude are possible.

Aligning Brazil’s NDC with 1.5 degrees C, however, would require deeper cuts. Least-cost pathways to 1.5 degrees C show the country’s GHG emissions dropping 84-93% by 2035, relative to 2005, while a fair-share approach developed by Observatório do Clima calls for similarly steep declines, with GHG emissions decreasing 93% from 2005 levels by the same year. In real terms, this means that GHG emissions would fall to just 0.17-0.42 GtCO2e by 2035.

Although Brazil has already submitted its new NDC, there are still opportunities for President Lula’s administration to deepen mitigation efforts over the next decade. For example, the government has yet to publish a long-term strategy, which could help guide implementation.

China

China overtook the United States as the world’s largest emitter in the early 2000s, with annual GHG emissions climbing from roughly 6.9 GtCO2e in 2005 to nearly 13 GtCO2e in 2021. In its most recent NDC published in 2021, the Chinese government committed to peaking CO2 emissions before 2030, reducing the amount of CO2 emitted per unit of GDP produced (also known as carbon intensity) by at least 65% from 2005 levels by 2030, and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060. Lack of detail in China’s most recent NDC as well as some ambiguity in the scope of the country’s net-zero target makes it challenging to translate these commitments into absolute levels of GtCO2e. But a recent analysis from Climate Watch suggests that the country’s GHG emissions would reach roughly 13 GtCO2e in 2030 if the government achieved its near-term intensity target.

China’s 2030 target falls short on ambition across all approaches. These lenses, however, differ on the magnitude of cuts required by the end of this decade. 1.5 degree C-aligned, least-cost pathways, for example, show steep declines down to 4.9-5.9 GtCO2e, while country-specific modelling to net zero suggests smaller decreases to roughly 11 GtCO2e. But across all perspectives, GHG emissions fall below the 13 GtCO2e implied by China’s current NDC. This suggests that there’s considerable room for China to strengthen its 2030 target.

These five approaches also call for continued GHG emissions reductions through 2035. Fair share-based perspectives suggest relatively modest declines in GHG emissions to 7.3-12 GtCO2e (note that these figures exclude emissions from land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF), which acts as a net sink and accounts for -5% of China’s total net emissions). Modelled pathways to net zero also fall within this range. Yet other approaches imply much deeper cuts. Bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, for example, indicates that China could reduce its GHG emissions to 4.8-8.9 Gt CO2e by 2035, while 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways project emissions falling all the way down to 3.8-4.6 GtCO2e in the same year.

Emitting roughly a quarter of the world’s GHGs, China’s ambition on climate change significantly impacts the world’s ability to confront this global crisis. A bold, new commitment to slash economy-wide emissions by 2035, as well as a far stronger 2030 target in the country’s next NDC, could go a long way in keeping the 1.5-degrees C limit within reach.  

European Union

Submitted in 2023, the European Union’s most recent NDC commits its 27 members to reduce GHG emissions at least 55% from 1990 levels by 2030, as well as to collectively achieve climate neutrality by 2050. If fully implemented, the region’s GHG emissions would fall from today’s 3.1 GtCO2e to 2.1 GtCO2e by the end of this decade and to 0 GtCO2e by midcentury.  

The EU’s current target for 2030 aligns with just two approaches. Linear trajectories to net zero show the region’s GHG emissions falling to 1.5-2.2 GtCO2e by the end of this decade, with bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling suggesting that the upper bound of this range is possible. But to help limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, the EU would need to strengthen its near-term ambition. More specifically, least-cost pathways aligned with this temperature goal project GHG emissions declining to 1.9-2.0 GtCO2e — equivalent to a 57-60% reduction from 1990 levels. A fair-share-based contribution from the EU would require still greater ambition. Under this lens, GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) drop to near or below zero, representing at least a 91% reduction from 1990 levels. These trends roughly hold even when accounting for the region’s land sink, which has sequestered an average 0.29 GtCO2e per year since 1990.  

Looking beyond 2030, continued steep declines in emissions are paramount. EU lawmakers are currently debating a new target proposed by the European Commission that would reduce GHG emissions 90% by 2040, relative to 1990. And while the region’s 2035 target is not yet formally on the table, policymakers are actively discussing how to estimate it. Some are drawing a straight line from the EU’s 2030 target to its existing 2050 target and arguing that the 2035 target should achieve a 66% decline from 1990 levels, while others are drawing a straight line from the EU’s 2030 target to the proposed 2040 target and advocating for a 73% reduction from 1990 levels by 2035. Approaches that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C call for even greater ambition. Least-cost pathways, for example, model a 71-80% decrease in GHG emissions relative to 1990, while fair-share approaches indicate that the EU’s GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) fall by more than 100%. Therefore, only the 73% reduction under discussion among EU lawmakers could be considered sufficiently ambitious for a 1.5 degrees C future.

India

India’s GHG emissions have yet to peak, rising in recent years from about 2.0 GtCO2e in 2005 to 3.4 GtCO2e in 2021. India’s most recent NDC from 2022 commits to reducing the amount of emissions released per unit of GDP produced (also known as emissions intensity) by 45% from 2005 levels by 2030, as well as reaffirms its pledge to reach net-zero emissions by 2070. The government, however, has yet to clarify whether these targets refer to all GHGs or just to CO2, and this lack of clarity complicates efforts to assess the country’s ambition. But assuming that India’s pledge to reduce emissions intensity covers all GHGs, recent analysis featured on Climate Watch suggests that achieving this near-term target would further increase emissions to 4.7 GtCO2e by 2030.

While all approaches allow India’s GHG emissions some room to increase through 2030, its current target aligns with only two of them. Country-specific modelling efforts that estimate feasible GHG emissions reductions under different policy portfolios, for example, show India’s emissions reaching between 3.4-5.1 GtCO2e in 2030, while national modelling to net zero similarly project GHG emissions rising to 4.8 GtCO2e by the end of this decade. 1.5 degrees C-aligned, fair-share approaches — which are particularly salient in the context of India’s relatively small historical contribution to the climate crisis, low per capita emissions and development challenges — show somewhat smaller increases in GHG emissions to 3.7-4.0 GtCO2e by 2030 (excluding emissions from LULUCF, which act as a net sink and accounts for just -1% of India’s total net emissions). 

While approaches diverge on whether India’s emissions can continue rising through 2035, all agree that GHG emissions cannot grow substantially beyond levels implied by the government’s 2030 target. On one end of the spectrum, 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways model GHG emissions declining to 1.6-2.3 GtCO2e by 2035, while on the other, country-specific modelling to net zero indicates that GHG emissions roughly stabilize at their projected 2030 value of 4.8 GtCO2e in 2035. Fair-share approaches similarly find that GHG emissions remain relatively steady at 3.7-4.1 GtCO2e in 2035. But bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling project a more mixed bag of GHG emissions rising and falling between 2030 and 2035 across different scenarios.

Indonesia

Indonesia’s latest NDC from 2022 commits to lowering GHG emissions almost 32% by 2030, relative to a business-as-usual scenario (its “unconditional” target). With additional climate finance from international funders, the government could achieve more aggressive cuts of just over 43% (its “conditional target”). These targets translate to absolute GHG emissions of 2 GtCO2e (unconditional) or 1.6 GtCO2e (conditional) in 2030, as compared to the approximately 1.4 GtCO2e emitted today. The Indonesian government has also previously pledged to peak GHG emissions by 2030 and reach net zero by 2060. 

Indonesia’s 2030 targets fall short of all but one of the approaches. Indeed, 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways show GHG emissions declining to 0.80-0.88 GtCO2e by 2030, while bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling call for cuts of a similar, albeit smaller magnitude. Only country-specific modelling to net zero by 2060 shows GHG emissions rising from current levels to reach 1.6-2.8 GtCO2e by 2030 — a range that encompasses both the country’s conditional and unconditional targets.

Submitting a new NDC this year offers Indonesia an opportunity not only to strengthen its current target for 2030, but also to set a new, ambitious target for 2035. National modelling to net zero by 2060 generally show GHG emissions peaking in 2030 before declining to between 1.3-2.4 GtCO2e in 2035, while linear trajectories to this same pledge show slightly deeper cuts from Indonesia’s 2030 targets to 1.0-1.6 GtCO2e. 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways chart even more ambitious declines to 0.61-0.78 GtCO2e in 2035, with bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling affirming that cuts of this magnitude could technically be achieved.

United States

Just prior to leaving office, the Biden administration published the United States’ new NDC. It commits the world’s second-largest emitter to reducing GHG emissions 61-66% from 2005 levels by 2035, as well as reaffirms the country’s previous pledge to cut emissions 50-52% from 2005 levels by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050. In real terms, this NDC promises that GHG emissions will fall from 6.6 GtCO2e in 2005 to 3.2-3.3 GtCO2e by 2030, 2.2-2.6 GtCO2e by 2035 and 0 GtCO2e by 2050.

But with the change in administration and President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the federal government is already beginning to roll back climate action, as well as adopt tariffs that are disrupting efforts to combat the climate crisis. Still, civil society groups and many state governments have rallied around this new NDC and have committed to still make progress toward these targets.

U.S. targets for 2030 and 2035 are fully consistent with three of the five approaches. Lowering GHG emissions to 2.2-2.6 GtCO2e by 2035 falls within the range estimated by bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, pathways to net zero, and linear trajectories to net zero. These same trends hold for the U.S.’ existing target for 2030. 

But aligning the U.S. targets with a 1.5 degrees-C future would require deeper cuts. Least-cost pathways to this temperature limit, for example, call for GHG emissions to fall to 2.4-3.1 GtCO2e by 2030 and 1.6-2.3 GtCO2e by 2035. Only the most ambitious bound of the U.S. target for 2035 falls within this range. Fair-share perspectives posit that the U.S. — as the world’s wealthiest country, a nation with relatively high per capita emissions and the largest cumulative emitter of GHGs since the pre-industrial era — has an imperative to go further still. Under this lens, GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) fall at least 87% by 2030 and 99% by 2035, relative to 2005. These trends roughly hold even when accounting for the country’s land sink, which has sequestered an average 0.90 GtCO2e per year since 2005. Since such steep declines would prove enormously difficult to achieve domestically, the United States could still deliver a fair-share contribution to 1.5 degrees C by providing additional finance to support emissions reductions and carbon removals beyond its borders.   

Will Major Emitters Submit Stronger NDCs?

The Paris Agreement is clear: NDCs should reflect countries’ “highest possible ambition,” with each round putting forward stronger targets than the last. But as this analysis confirms, there are still gaps between major emitters’ near-term targets and what’s urgently needed to keep the 1.5 degrees limit within reach. For some countries, their 2030 and 2035 targets also fall short of the ambition required to stay on track to achieve their own net-zero pledges.

Greater ambition from all countries — and especially these major emitters — is paramount. In a moment of global economic uncertainty, the need for ambitious climate action that targets both inclusive economic prosperity and long-term stability is stronger than ever. The NDCs that governments submit this year, as well as the plans and finance they put in place to achieve them, will decide the fate of the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal. Major emitters must meet this moment by stepping up their ambition in their new round of NDCs. 

About the Data

Brazil 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to Brazil’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Deep Decarbonization’ scenario by Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative and from the two ‘Just Transition’ scenarios from the Climate and Development Initiative (2021). For linear trajectories to net zero, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from its 2005 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from Observatório do Clima (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Brazil’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019. 

China 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to China’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Carbon Neutrality’ scenario by the Energy Policy Simulator and the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative’s ‘GHG Net Zero’ scenario. For linear trajectories to China’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing a straight line from China’s 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2060. Because China’s emissions have yet to peak, authors did not draw a straight line from the most recent year of historical data. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Climate Mitigation’ and ‘Towards Sustainability’ scenarios by Lu et al. (2024) and from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by  Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Climate Watch in 2019. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from Climate Watch, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

European Union 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the minimum and maximum values of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change’s filtered pathways. Regional modelled pathways to the EU’s net-zero pledge were not available. For linear trajectories to the EU’s net-zero pledge, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from the EU’s 1990 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from the EU’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from the EU’s First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

India 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to India’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Enhanced NDC’ scenario by the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative. For linear trajectories to India’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing a straight line from India’s 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2070. Because India’s emissions have yet to peak, authors did not draw a straight line from the most recent year of historical data. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Long-term Decarbonization’ and ‘NDC-SDG Linkages’ scenarios by the Energy Policy Simulator, GEM India’s ‘Net Zero’ scenario and the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Climate Watch in 2019. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from Climate Watch, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

Indonesia 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to Indonesia’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘DDS Low’ and ‘DDS High’ scenarios by the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative and the ‘NZ2060’ scenario by the Low Carbon Development Initiative (2021). For linear trajectories to Indonesia’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing straight lines from the country’s 2030 NDC targets and stated peak value in 2030 to net-zero GHG emissions in 2060. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Indonesia’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from Indonesia’s First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

United States 

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modelled pathways to the U.S.’ net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Central’ scenario by Jones et al. (2024), the ‘Net Zero’ scenario by Jenkins et al. (2024), the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative’s ‘Deep Decarbonization’ scenario and the Energy Policy Simulator’s ‘NDC’ scenario. For linear trajectories to the U.S.’ net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from the U.S.’ 2005 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modelling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Higher Ambition’ and ‘Higher Ambition+’ scenarios by Iyer et al. (2025), the ‘Enhanced Ambition’ scenario by Zhao et al. (2024) and from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from the U.S.’ First Biennial Transparency Report in 2021. 

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from the U.S.’ First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015. 

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A Look at China’s Innovative Corporate Carbon Accounting and Rating Platform margaret.overh… Thu, 04/17/2025 - 07:00

China's commitments to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 come with an enormous financing need. Estimates suggest the country must invest at least RMB 2-4 trillion (approximately US$275-$550 billion) per year in green and low-carbon projects to meet these goals​. Public funding alone can cover only about 10%-15% of this required investment​, leaving a large financing gap that private sector capital must fill. This makes the development of carbon-linked financial products and investment mechanisms a priority.

China's sustainable finance market is already large and growing, with trillions in outstanding green loans and green bonds. Yet many companies — especially small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)— still face difficulties in accessing green finance. SMEs often lack the necessary data for emissions disclosure, making it difficult for them to demonstrate reductions and qualify for green financial products. A survey conducted in 2023 found that around 60% of small and micro enterprises did not know how to measure their greenhouse gas emissions, reflecting significant gaps in technical capacity that hinder their access to green finance.

Financial institutions, for their part, struggle to incorporate climate factors into decision-making due to inconsistent and incomplete corporate climate-related data. Without clear climate-related data, they cannot accurately assess companies' carbon performance or develop appropriate green financial products. The issue is further compounded in hard-to-abate industries like steel, cement and petrochemicals, as it's difficult for financial institutions to define transition activities and recognize meaningful decarbonization efforts.

To bridge this gap, China has developed an innovative Corporate Carbon Accounting and Rating Platform, which leverages digital technologies to automatically capture and evaluate carbon performance of corporates in a way that financial institutions can easily understand. The platform has been piloted in at least six regions across China since 2021.

Here we offer an overview of the platform, breaking down how it can help scale China's sustainable finance and enhance financial inclusion — particularly for SMEs and hard-to-abate industries — as well as potential opportunities to support its expansion.

What Is China's Corporate Carbon Accounting and Rating Platform?

The Corporate Carbon Accounting and Rating Platform is a digital solution that automates the collection of corporate emissions data to help streamline carbon accounting and carbon performance evaluation. Its results are used to inform financial institutions in delivering finance with special terms linked to climate performance.

Here's how it works:

1. Data acquisition: The platform dynamically collects corporate energy consumption data for operational emissions1 along with economic activity data (such as output, value-added and tax revenue). Data is sourced from statistics managed by local government departments (such as taxation, environment and economics) and centralized in a government-backed data platform.
2. Carbon performance evaluation: Using an embedded carbon accounting model, the platform generates key indicators, such as carbon emission intensity per unit of output and emission reduction rates relative to a baseline year. These metrics are then translated into company ratings based on a structured rating methodology.
3. Application: The rating results are provided either as scores or color codes, which financial institutions can use to screen clients and charge differentiated loan interest rates to support their emissions-reduction activities. Currently, loans are the most commonly used financial instruments linked to the platform.

The platform is different from traditional corporate carbon rating approaches in a few key aspects.

First, it offers top-down data acquisition empowered by digital technology. Unlike the traditional bottom-up self-reporting approach to collect emission data from corporates, this platform sources data directly from local departments or energy management systems. This centralized data acquisition process helps generate timely and high-quality results.

In addition, it facilitates government involvement to drive synergies. Local governments play an active role in the initial construction of such a platform, facilitating direct data access through official endorsement. This government involvement also encourages broader participation from financial institutions and corporates, unlocking greater data availability and financial resources.

While the platform is initiated by local governments, its construction and operation are managed by public data management entities, such as State Grid Huzhou Electric Power Company, Quzhou Energy Big Data Center and Shenzhen Credit (a government-backed credit information platform). This means its coverage and ratings systems vary by city or region.

What Benefits Does the Platform Bring?

China's platform is intended to help both enterprises and financial institutions unlock more opportunities for sustainable finance. By streamlining carbon accounting, enhancing data accuracy and linking carbon performance to financial resources, the platform improves efficiency and helps businesses pursue decarbonization efforts — especially benefiting SMEs and businesses in hard-to-abate industries.

Specifically, it offers several novel benefits:

• Using ratings to provide simple language to financial institutions and facilitate transition finance: The platform translates carbon-related data into clear rating results, providing a common language within each city or region for assessing and comparing carbon performance between companies in the same sector. This helps financial institutions make informed decisions on sustainable finance, especially in hard-to-abate industries.

   

  The platform also captures more detailed company-level carbon reduction information than is available in other green financing products, enabling banks to recognize credible transition activities easily. For example, Shandong leveraged the platform to launch the region's first "transition loan" for the petrochemical sector.

   

• Lowering the cost of data acquisition, especially for SMEs: One of the advantages of the platform is to reduce costs of data acquisition for both enterprises and financial institutions, particularly for small businesses. By centralizing data collection and utilizing government resources, the platform allows financial institutions and companies to generate emissions results without incurring additional costs.

   

• Improving efficiency to access emissions data: By directly integrating real-time energy consumption data from local energy systems and tax records, the platform allows corporates to instantly access their carbon performance results. For financial institutions, reliable and readily available data improves efficiency in assessing corporate carbon performance, enabling more precise decision-making when offering sustainable financial products.

   

• Incentivizing corporates to improve their carbon performance: The platform effectively links carbon performance ratings to tangible financial benefits, creating a clear incentive for companies to improve their carbon efficiency. For example, companies with better carbon ratings in pilot regions like Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Qinghai have access to lower-interest loans and preferential financial terms. This encourages businesses to invest in greener technologies and pursue carbon reduction strategies aligned with broader climate goals.

How Does the Platform Scale Green Finance? Examples from Quzhou, Huzhou and Shenzhen

China follows a "pilot-then-promote" approach to policy implementation, first testing in designated pilot zones before scaling new policies nationwide. Huzhou and Quzhou serve as national green finance pilot zones, while Shenzhen, as a pioneering hub of China's reform and opening-up, continues to be at the forefront of green finance innovation and policy experimentation.

As of 2024, pilot practices with the new platform were implemented in six cities: Quzhou, Huzhou, Shenzhen, Zhaoqing, Qinghai and Guangzhou, and more are evolving. While the platform offers the same core function in each case (using digital data acquisition to calculate emissions and generate ratings), detailed approaches — such as rating criteria, data acquisition method, sectoral coverage, the operating entity and more — vary across regions. Among these, Quzhou, Huzhou and Shenzhen are the most representative.

Quzhou: A pioneer with broad sectoral coverage

Quzhou, the first city to launch this platform in 2021, covers a wide range of sectors, including industry, agriculture, energy, construction, transportation, residential life and forestry carbon sinks. As of August 2023, Quzhou's carbon accounting and rating platform covered 2,766 industrial corporates, 1,000 agricultural entities, 98 energy corporates and 129 construction entities. The platform uses real-time energy data collection via devices installed at enterprises, with updates every 15 minutes.

Based on the rating methodology, corporates are labelled by different colors, influencing the credit granted from financial institutions. Commercial banks can access and utilize corporate carbon credit reports through the "Qu Rong Tong" (衢融通) platform, a multidimensional data platform built on provincial and municipal data-sharing systems. These reports include three key components: corporate energy consumption structure, carbon emission data and labeling results.

For example, in Qujiang Rural Commercial Bank's "Carbon Finance Easy Loan" (碳融易贷) product (Figure 1), enterprises labelled as "Deep Green" receive an interest rate discount of 50 basis points (BP), while "Light Green" enterprises receive a 30BP reduction. In contrast, "Yellow" and "Red" enterprises face cautious support or are restricted from new credit access. These loans can support projects such as industrial equipment upgrades, energy efficiency improvements and sustainable agricultural practices.

Figure 1: Qujiang Rural Commercial Bank's "Carbon Finance Easy Loan" Huzhou: Wider applications backed by a strong data-sharing mechanism

In Huzhou, the platform is widely recognized as the "Industrial Carbon Efficiency Code" and is now being scaled up to the provincial level. This code displays carbon emission results with their corresponding ratings (Figure 2). The platform in Huzhou covers 49,345 industrial enterprises above a designated size in Zhejiang Province. It is supported by a robust data sharing mechanism, which leverages Huzhou's policies connecting key departments for energy and economic data integration.

Distinct from other pilot cities, the platform in Huzhou has a wider range of applications beyond green finance, extending to energy-saving services and energy trading. Huzhou Municipal Bureau of Economy and Information Technology, in collaboration with the grid company and third-party service providers, offer free energy-saving assessments and develop carbon-reduction plans for enterprises rated at Levels 4 and 5, and subsidize 10% of the costs for energy-saving and efficiency improvement projects. "In Huzhou, the primary goal of establishing this platform is not just monitoring, but actively guiding enterprises in their low-carbon transition," said a representative from the Municipal Bureau of Economy and Information Technology.

Huzhou also pioneered a dedicated local policy supporting green electricity trading through its platform. The platform can automatically link a company's green electricity procurement to its performance rating, which helps corporates improve their code level. By November 2024, Zhejiang had facilitated 3.3 billion kWh of green electricity trading.

As of February 2025, the platform had enabled RMB 30.318 billion (US$4.17 billion) in green loans and supported 210 firms in green electricity trading, helping to cut 1.4 million tons of carbon emissions. It had also supported 81 projects, such as industrial energy efficiency upgrades, renewable energy adoption and process optimization, reducing emissions by a further 64,000 tons. For example, a cement company in Huzhou replaced outdated production lines with a smart manufacturing system, lowering coal consumption per ton of cement by 10% annually through the loan provided.

Figure 2: Huzhou's Industrial Carbon Efficiency Code Shenzhen: Empowering SMEs to access green financing

Launched in July 2024, Shenzhen's carbon accounting and rating platform primarily serves SMEs, with 85% of the 50 pilot companies being small and medium-sized enterprises. Unlike Quzhou and Huzhou, Shenzhen uses digitalized tax data to capture relevant invoices, calculate carbon emissions and generate rating reports. The third-party provider, a consulting firm expert in carbon rating and sustainability, develops the carbon rating methodology; Shenzhen Credit2 (深圳征信) operates the platform, providing access to invoice data and generating rating reports; while Shenzhen Green Exchange3 (深圳绿色交易所), Shenzhen's official carbon trading platform, oversees the accounting process and ensures data accuracy through cross-validation. This highly efficient process enables users to download reports within five minutes, significantly reducing the previous weeks-long workload for carbon emissions accounting.

The rating report categorizes corporates into nine levels from AAA to CCC, with five indicators (energy efficiency, carbon emissions efficiency, energy-saving effect, emission reduction effect and industry efficiency) each scored out of 100. The report also presents the energy consumption structure and carbon emissions in the form of a pie chart and includes other emission information, such as annual emissions, carbon reduction, per capita emissions, annual energy consumption and energy savings, among others.

In Shenzhen's first phase, the "Carbon Reduction Loan" product was promoted, with eight pilot banks using the ratings in credit approval, loan pricing and risk management. Companies with significant emission reductions receive differentiated benefits such as lower interest rates, longer terms and more favorable loan conditions, with maximum discounts of up to 30 BP. Banks can allocate funding to specific projects or general-purpose loans. For example, Postal Savings Bank Shenzhen Nanxin Branch issued a RMB 3 million (approximately US$412,000) loan to an environmental tech firm for wastewater treatment upgrades.

Carbon accounting platforms factsheet:

 

Quzhou

Huzhou

Shenzhen

Leading departmentQuzhou Branch of the People's Bank of China, Quzhou Market Supervision AdministrationState Grid Huzhou Power Supply Company, Huzhou Economic and Information Bureau, Huzhou Statistical BureauShenzhen Municipal Bureau of Ecological Environment, Shenzhen Branch of the People's Bank of ChinaEnergy collection typeCoal, oil, natural gas, electricity, heatCoal, oil, natural gas, electricity, heatElectricity, fuel, steam, heatRating indicator

• Emission intensity per unit of output

 

• Emission intensity per unit of added value

 

• Emission intensity per unit of tax revenue

• Emissions level (emission per unit added value)

 

• Carbon utilization level (carbon efficiency level of an enterprise within its industry)

 

• Neutrality progress (% of achieving carbon neutrality)

• Three key dimensions (emission efficiency, emission reduction effect, industry endowment)

 

• Five major themes (energy efficiency, carbon emission efficiency, energy-saving performance, emission reduction performance, and industry efficiency)

 

• Nine indicators (rate-based, intensity-based)

Rating outcomeReport-based (Enterprise carbon credit report)Code-based (Industrial carbon efficiency code)Report-based (Corporate carbon account rating report)What Challenges Still Need to Be Addressed?

While China's platform presents a promising solution for integrating carbon performance into financial decision-making, a few challenges emerged along with its implementation. These could become more prominent issues as it rolls out in more places.

Limited emissions coverage and data accessibility

A major limitation of the platform is its incomplete coverage of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, with Scope 3 emissions currently excluded, which hinders alignment with international standards like the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Protocol. The platform focuses mainly on energy consumption, failing to capture all relevant emissions sources such as fugitive emissions, outsourced logistics, and emissions from leased assets or company-owned vehicles. This results in an underestimation of a company's carbon footprint and may lead to biased rating results. 

For example, in Huzhou, the platform only accounts for emissions from electricity, natural gas, coal and petroleum, neglecting mobile combustion and industrial process emissions. Companies that have more emissions from mobile combustion and industrial process will receive more favorable ratings compared with those don't, even if they may not have better carbon performance.

Lack of a consistent rating methodology

The inconsistency in carbon rating methodologies across pilot regions presents another challenge for scaling the platform. Different regions use varying evaluation systems, criteria and thresholds, such as color-coded classifications (as in Quzhou's four-color system) or financial credit-style ratings (as in Shenzhen's AAA-CCC system), making it difficult to replicate elsewhere.

Although Shenzhen, Quzhou and Huzhou have led the way in publishing their accounting and rating methodologies, none of them are national standards, so the reliability and authoritativeness are yet to be proved. As a matter of fact, pilot banks in Shenzhen found the rating result of their clients were sometimes out of expectation, leading to the question of whether the methodology accurately reflects the carbon performance of corporates.

Insufficient financial and policy incentives to motivate participation

So far, the platform's adoption has primarily been led by local governments in pilot regions. They convene expert groups, hire technology providers, fund the running of the platform, and sometimes provide moderate financial incentives to encourage voluntary participation from enterprises and financial institutions. For example, Shenzhen provides a RMB 500,000 (approximately US$68,800) subsidy to banks and financial institutions that achieve significant business growth through carbon accounting and rating platform innovations. However, banks and their clients aren't always motivated to provide or authorize access to additional data for carbon rating purposes, as they may not see clear benefits of joining the scheme.

More incentives could help keep the platform running and growing. Such incentives could be leveraged from existing monetary, fiscal and industrial policies, such as interest rate discounts using PBOC's carbon reduction lending facility, or tax credits originating from green industry policies. Expanded incentives could help sustain the platform's financial viability and encourage broader adoption.

What's Next?

Looking ahead, this platform could play a pivotal role in bridging finance and corporate decarbonization. It offers significant potential for broader applications, in areas such as energy savings diagnostics, government project screening, corporate climate disclosure, supply chain decarbonization and more, as more corporates get involved. Huzhou's experience may be a good reference point for exploring applications in energy saving diagnostics and green electricity trading.

For now, pilot regions are continuously refining the platform based on their experiences. For instance, Shenzhen is currently evaluating the applicability of the methodology and plans to promote it as an industry standard. Additionally, the city aims to expand policy incentives and explore broader applications for the platform.

Other regions can seek to replicate the platform by leveraging digital technology and a robust rating methodology. Successful implementation will likely require active government involvement and policy support, including both financial and policy incentives.

 

1 Operational emissions (scope 1&2 emissions): such as natural gas used in company-owned boilers, fuel for company vehicles, and purchased electricity, etc.

2 Shenzhen Credit: officially known as the Shenzhen Credit Service Platform, an official local credit reporting platform in Shenzhen, consolidating over 500 million government data records. It offers a range of credit reporting products — including corporate credit reports and enterprise profiles — to local banks. The platform plays a key role in financial credit reporting, governance, and public services.

3 Shenzhen Green Exchange: Formerly known as the Shenzhen Emissions Exchange, it was established in 2010 as China's first pilot carbon trading platform. Rebranded in 2024, it serves as Shenzhen's designated trading platform for carbon allowances and credits, supporting market-based mechanisms for emissions reduction.

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• Private Sector Finance
• Accelerating Subnational Actions for Carbon Neutrality in China

Authors Siqi Zhong Ting Su Xiaozhen Li Xinyi Zhang

STATEMENT: Kenya to host 11th Our Ocean Conference in 2026 darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 04/16/2025 - 08:11

LONDON (April 16, 2025) – The Republic of Kenya has been confirmed as the host of the 11th Our Ocean Conference (OOC) in 2026. 

Launched in 2014 by the U.S. Department of State and former Secretary of State, John Kerry, the Our Ocean Conference is an annual event that brings together governments, the private sector, NGOs and the academic community to drive urgent ambition and action for the ocean. World Resources Institute is the Secretariat of the conference. 

The conference supports efforts across finance, policy, capacity building, research, and more, focusing on six key areas: marine protected areas, sustainable blue economy, climate change, maritime security, sustainable fisheries and marine pollution. 

To date, the conference has generated over 2,600 commitments worth more than $140 billion — a testament to its vital role in global ocean protection and sustainable management. The 2026 edition will mark the first time the conference is held on the African continent, spotlighting the region's ocean leadership and priorities. 

Following is a statement from Tom Pickerell, Global Director, Ocean Program, World Resources Institute: 
 
“Kenya has long been an advocate and leader on ocean issues — as an active member of the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy (Ocean Panel), the host of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and a pioneer in ambitious policies to tackle plastic pollution and foster a sustainable ocean economy. 

“The Our Ocean Conference is a critical platform for mobilizing finance and catalyzing vital ocean action. In its first ten years, it has been an effective mechanism to further progress against multilateral agreements and encourage new announcements of marine protected areas. Our research shows that each successive conference has raised ocean ambitions both globally and regionally.  

“As the first Our Ocean Conference to be held in Africa, Kenya will have the opportunity to draw global attention to the region's priorities and challenges — ranging from ocean-climate resilience and sustainable fishing to maritime security, marine conservation, pollution and the sustainable ocean economy.  

“As the Our Ocean Conference Secretariat, we look forward to working with next year’s host as they define priority action areas, shape the agenda, and build on the expected momentum of the 10th conference in Busan later this April, to mobilize a new wave of commitments into the conference’s second decade.” 

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How Cities Are Placing People at the Center of Urban Mobility Transformations shannon.paton@… Tue, 04/15/2025 - 12:06

What does it take for cities to create a true systems change that creates a holistic, positive shift of the entire urban system? Finding and celebrating examples of this feat is at the heart of the WRI Ross Center Prize for Cities.

Since 2018, WRI has received more than 900 submissions to the Prize, selected 20 finalists and awarded four $250,000 grand prizes. As we tell the independent jury that selects the grand prize winners, we believe each finalist, every cycle, could be a worthy grand prize winner. They have all demonstrated transformative impacts over multiple years. These projects were not just good ideas; the local governments and community organizations behind them executed brilliantly and their communities have already seen meaningful change. 

We recently checked in with three former Prize finalists (one of whom won the grand prize) that focus on different aspects of sustainable transportation to see how their transformations have endured. From ultra-low emissions zones to bus rapid transit networks and school safety zones, these three projects show how cities around the world can reimagine urban mobility, not only reducing greenhouse gas emissions but also improving the lives of billions of residents.

Equality in Safety: SARSAI

Road crashes are the leading cause of death among young people in Africa. Even for survivors, the consequences can be life-altering: a road-traffic incident can derail a child’s education or end career prospects, while medical costs can push families into poverty. In some countries, road-traffic crashes cost between 1% and 9% of GDP.

Amend, a nonprofit with offices in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania, won the inaugural 2018-2019 Grand Prize for School Area Road Safety Assessments and Improvements (SARSAI), an innovative road safety project around 18 schools in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

A group of children utilize a crosswalk near their school in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Drawing from lessons learned with SARSAI, the organization Amend is now taking its road safety work to other cities and countries across sub-Saharan Africa. Photo by WRI.

Within Dar es Salaam, a neighborhood’s volume of road-traffic injuries was closely correlated with socioeconomic indicators, such as income levels and educational attainment. SARSAI worked with local communities to conduct standardized road safety assessments and provide community education workshops. They then implemented cost-effective, site-specific safety interventions focused on school zones. They installed bollards, speed bumps and footpaths to provide students with safer commutes to school, improved signage to affect traffic, and did community outreach to involve key stakeholders in the design of interventions.

Though the work was focused on the infrastructure around schools, the result was a sea-change for entire communities on how they saw and addressed road safety. Amend’s safety interventions reduced child-vehicle collisions by 26% and lowered vehicle speeds by 40%, protecting children who had previously borne the brunt of crashes, but also improving safety for all road users.

Since winning the Prize for Cities grand prize, Amend has extended its street design services far beyond Dar es Salaam.

“The Prize gave us a big boost as we were starting down this path a few years back,” said Jeffrey Witte, executive director of Amend. “We are now scaling up the principles in SARSAI to roads projects across Africa.”

The nonprofit launched a Safe Schools Africa program in 2022, with help from multiple development banks, including the World Bank and European Investment Bank. The program applies SARSAI’s evaluation and design process to roads in Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. So far, it’s helped city planners design more than 948 kilometers (589 miles) of pedestrian-friendly roads, according to Amend. In two years, the project has benefited approximately 100,000 students across 100 schools and received enough funding to continue work into 2030.

In December 2024, Amend earned the Prince Michael International Road Safety Award for its work across Africa.

The evolution of Amend and the approaches pioneered with SARSAI is a testament to the importance of simple, data- and community-backed road safety interventions and the reverberating impacts on a city of safer, smarter infrastructure.

Achieving Inclusion Through Safety: Zu Peshawar

Launched in 2020, and a finalist for the 2021-2022 Prize, the Zu Peshawar bus rapid transit (BRT) service created a more efficient, inclusive alternative to a public transport system that had posed chronic problems for riders in Pakistan’s sixth largest city. Peshawar’s previous patchwork system of hundreds of informal bus operators had clogged streets and offered poor service. It did not reach all parts of the city, it was inaccessible to the disabled, and women and transgender riders frequently faced harassment. 

Zu Peshawar transformed the city’s transport infrastructure by creating the first formal public transport system. Informal service operators were folded into a municipality-run agency with, initially, 27 kilometers (16.8 miles) of BRT corridors, 30 stations and 220 diesel-electric hybrid buses. New buses came equipped with low floors to accommodate wheelchairs. A gender action plan was developed, including reserved seating for women and video monitoring. Later, a bikeshare system and 120 kilometers (75 miles) of new footpaths were also launched by the city.

The improvements translated to increased user satisfaction and passenger volume across public transport. Despite launching during COVID-19, Zu Peshawar nonetheless quickly reached 265,000 daily riders (in a city of 2 million) and measured a 10-times increase in female public transport ridership.

A woman boards a section of a city bus for women only. Zu Peshawar’s dedicated seats and bus designs have protected women, transgender and disabled riders while growing access to opportunity for all residents. In its next phase, it stands poised for electrification and continued expansion. Photo by WRI.

The past three years have seen continued growth in the system. According to Imran Mohammad, TransPeshawar’s general manager of operations, Zu Peshawar’s fleet has grown to 244 buses with wheelchair accessibility. The system, he said, now serves 300,000 peak daily riders, with women accounting for 30% of all bus riders and provides access to approximately 5,000 people with disabilities. 

“This is unbelievable for us,” said Mohammad. “Because at the time, we were not supposing that this project will increase ridership so much.”

Thanks to the surge in demand, Zu Peshawar is poised for additional expansion. The BRT system recently began feasibility studies for a Phase II, which would add another 20 kilometers (12 miles) of high-speed bus corridors and 250 fully electric buses to the city by 2030. The new buses will replace existing diesel buses and help expand the fleet. Meanwhile, other major Punjab cities have followed Peshawar’s example. Last May, Lahore announced its purchase of 300 e-buses and construction plans for new terminals.

This growing adoption of mass transport comes on the heels of changing national policy. Mohammad pointed to Pakistan’s involvement in COP29 — which included a pledge to protect climate-vulnerable children and a call for climate contributions — as a sign of the federal government’s commitment to environmental mitigation efforts.

Zu Peshawar — the first “Gold Standard” BRT system in the Indian peninsula and the first public transport system in Pakistan to feature diesel-electric hybrid buses — created crucial momentum. “At that time, the people in the other cities were afraid of the new technology,” Mohammad recalled. But after the new model and new vehicles improved service and lowered operational costs, other cities got the “courage” to change, he said.

In July 2022, TransPeshawar won the “Best Smart Ticketing Programme” from Transport Ticketing Global and was an honorable mention for the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy’s Sustainable Transport Award in 2022 and 2024.

Zu Peshawar reflects the transformative power that public transportation has to improve the lives and the functioning of an entire city.

Cleaner Transport for All: The Ultra-Low Emission Zone

In 2019, an Imperial College London study found that if no further action was taken to reduce air pollution, around 550,000 Londoners would develop diseases attributable to air pollution over the next 30 years, cumulatively costing the health and social care systems 10.4 billion pounds (about $13.3 billion)  by 2050. In response, in 2020, London launched the world’s first-ever Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ). The ULEZ was a Prize finalist in 2020-2021 for its innovative approach and already significant impact on reducing pollution in London.

At its core, the ULEZ is simple: The scheme imposes fees on all gas- and diesel-powered vehicles throughout a prescribed area of London’s downtown, as well as additional fines on vehicles with non-compliant tailpipes. The fees are then invested into the city’s public transport system. Its aim is to incentivize and support cleaner modes of travel and reduce congestion.

But the details also reveal the close ties between transport, public health and social justice. Because of urban design and other factors, road transport pollution in London disproportionately affects low-income communities of color, who, despite contributing the least to air pollution, bear the heaviest burden. By restricting high-emission vehicles and investing in cleaner transport, the ULEZ directly addresses these inequities.

The ULEZ diverted 44,100 vehicles off the roads and drove down roadside nitrogen oxide pollution by 44% within a year of its implementation. Revenue from ULEZ policies was used to replace old diesel buses with electric-powered ones. Additionally, to ease the financial burden of switching to fuel-efficient vehicles in low-income communities, the mayor introduced the UK’s largest-ever scrappage scheme, allocating 210 million pounds (about $253 million) in 2023 to help residents and businesses transition to cleaner vehicles, making cleaner air mobility more accessible to all residents.

Since being named a Prize finalist, London’s city government has expanded the ULEZ to encompass all city districts. By 2024, the city’s fleet of zero-emissions buses was expanded eightfold, reaching over 1,400 buses comprising electric and hydrogen fuel-cell models, in addition to thousands of electric taxis and new vehicle-charging infrastructure. A 2024 report credited the ULEZ with a 62% decrease in roadside nitrogen oxide emissions between 2017 and 2023. Roadside concentrations of fine particulate matter, which can damage lungs and increase risk of heart disease, fell by 40% during that time.

“The success of London’s approach has accelerated policies to reduce air pollution, with Clean Air Zones, based on the structure of the ULEZ, now introduced in Birmingham, Portsmouth and Bath, and others planned in the UK,” said Sarah Morris, air quality manager at the Greater London Authority. 

London still lays claim to the toughest congestion pricing scheme in the world, but it has been joined in recent years by similar efforts in Stockholm, Milan and New York City. 

By reducing pollution, expanding mobility access and protecting vulnerable communities, London’s ULEZ shows that sustainable transport can be a critical intervention for public health and social justice.

Bicyclists and buses share the roads in London. By placing fees on noncompliant, gas- and diesel-powered vehicles, London’s Ultra-Low Emissions Zone has allowed the city to invest in electric mobility and more active modes of transport. Photo by WRI. Creating Transformative Change

Navigating the complex city systems that create meaningful change is incredibly challenging. Recognition can play a key role in amplifying successful initiatives, helping them gain momentum, scale up and ultimately reach other communities that might learn from them. The WRI Ross Center Prize for Cities and other awards like it not only help validate impactful work but can help projects attract support and expand their platforms for change. 

Ultimately sustained investment and recognition in public transit will be key to building more accessible, resilient and thriving cities. An estimated 4.6 billion riders globally used public transportation in 2024, yet half of all urban residents still lack access to public transit. Finding new ways to invest in public transportation and active mobility is increasingly urgent as cities seek to rein in carbon emissions and continue building thriving economies. Investment in global urban transport infrastructure must double by 2030 in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) benchmark. 

These transformative projects exemplify this balancing. When transportation networks connect children to education, workers to jobs and communities to essential services, they do more than move people — they fuel productivity, improve public health and drive economic growth, creating stronger and more equitable cities for all.

men-cycling.jpg Cities WRI Ross Center Prize for Cities Urban Mobility Cities GHG emissions transportation Health & Road Safety Type Project Update Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Urban Mobility
• WRI Ross Center Prize for Cities
• Health & Road Safety

Authors Hanwen Zhang Meghna Ray Jen Shin

STATEMENT: Countries Agree to Global Fee on Shipping Industry’s Emissions nate.shelter@wri.org Mon, 04/14/2025 - 09:10

LONDON (April 14, 2025) — Countries agreed on a draft deal through the International Maritime Organization to place a price on the shipping industry’s emissions. The agreement, which is set to be formally adopted in October, requires ships to pay a fee based on the carbon intensity of their fuel mix and is intended to spur the transition to lower-emission fuels.

The High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, of which WRI is the Secretariat, has previously shared a set of priority actions for the shipping industry’s sustainable transition.

Following is a statement from Tom Pickerell, Global Director, Ocean Program, World Resources Institute:

“While the agreement is a step forward, it falls short of the ambition the climate crisis demands. The agreement will likely deliver only a fraction of the emissions cuts needed for the IMO’s own 2030 climate goals, doing too little to speed the shift to zero-emission ships.

“The lack of a universal carbon levy misses a major opportunity to fund green fuels and infrastructure, especially for vulnerable coastal countries.

“Shipping drives global trade and connects communities, but decarbonizing marine transport is critical to ensuring the long-term resilience of global supply chains and the ocean’s health.

“We urge governments and the shipping industry to build on this agreement and rapidly establish national targets for decarbonizing shipping, support the development of zero-emission fuels, modernize fleets, and transform port infrastructure.”

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How Inclusive Dialogues Are Paving the Way for a Just Transition in Peru alicia.cypress… Fri, 04/11/2025 - 09:25

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As Peru prepares to submit its updated national climate plan, known as a nationally determined contribution (NDC), ahead of the annual UN climate summit (COP30) in Brazil this year, the country has a pivotal opportunity to create a climate policy that benefits Peruvian society while also protecting communities and workers employed in more traditional and carbon-intensive sectors.

This just transition approach also ensures that the benefits and consequences from climate actions are shared fairly and that vulnerable populations are supported as the country shifts to a net-zero economy.

While Peru does not currently have an official definition of just transition in its national policy framework, some local organizations have begun to shape an understanding of what it could mean for the country. For instance, organizations like the Natural Resource Governance Institute highlight that the global shift to clean energy can intensify socio-environmental conflicts associated with mineral extraction. In Peru — where minerals critical to clean energy technologies, such as copper, are abundant — this transition presents both economic opportunities and social and environmental challenges, such as increasing deforestation, loss of biodiversity and displacement of vulnerable and indigenous communities, among others.

To help Peru create a more inclusive climate policy grounded in the principles of a just transition, WRI and Peru’s Ministry of Environment (MINAM) organized inclusive dialogues in 2024 to gather perspectives from different stakeholders.

Here’s how Peru approached participatory climate planning and what resulted from these inclusive dialogues.

Citizen Participation in Planning a Just Transition

For several years now, Peru has been promoting various avenues for different groups and levels of society to participate in and promote climate action. These spaces include the National Commission on Climate Change (CNCC), the National Women’s Committee on Climate Change, the Platform for Indigenous Peoples to Confront Climate Change and the Youth Promotion Group on the CNCC.

Indigenous peoples' participation in these dialogues recognizes the value of their ancestral knowledge in caring for existing ecosystems and their traditional practices in managing climate risks. Creating spaces for women to participate provides opportunities to confront gender inequalities through a just transition process as well.

The 2024 dialogues organized by WRI and MINAM included an in-person event and a webinar. The discussions were aimed at convening people with less access to formal participation, like women’s and youth organizations and Indigenous communities, with representatives from government, unions, multilateral development banks, the private sector and various grassroots and international organizations. These dialogues contributed to constructing the national position on just transition for COP29 in Azerbaijan in 2024.

"Citizen participation is crucial in planning for a just transition in Peru because it ensures that decisions reflect the needs and priorities of affected communities, fostering inclusion and equity," said Milagros Montes, a representative of Jóvenes Peruanos frente al Cambio Climático (Peruvian Youth against Climate Change). "Youth are a key part of this process because they represent the generation that will face the greatest impacts of climate change and have the creativity, energy and vision to drive innovative solutions with global impact. Their involvement ensures that policies are resilient and aligned with a more just and sustainable future."  

Lessons Learned from Inclusive Dialogues

The dialogues provided valuable lessons on how the country can effectively integrate just transition principles into its national policies, specifically in its upcoming NDC. One key takeaway is the need to ground the concept in both national and local contexts. While the term has gained traction globally recently, it often carries perspectives shaped by narratives from wealthier nations, which may not fully align with Peru’s priorities, needs and challenges. 

During the workshop in Peru, participants discussed how to integrate just transition policies into the country's national policies. Photo by WRI.

To address this gap, it is essential that local voices and goals have a central role when deciding on specific interventions for the transition to a low-carbon future. For example, as highlighted in the discussions, ensuring access to decent, dignified and well-paid work for communities affected by the transitions is a clear goal for the community. The future and the path towards it must reflect Peruvians' lived realities, cultural values and socio-economic conditions. Local actors — especially those usually underrepresented in decision-making processes, such as Indigenous communities, workers, women and youth — should have opportunities to define what justice means for them in the context of climate action.

This kind of bottom-up governance could be more appropriate for promoting energy transitions and gaining public support. Identifying key stakeholders and creating safe spaces for dialogue are essential to guaranteeing effective citizen participation in transition policies.

Another lesson from the dialogues is the need to address diverse notions of justice when discussing just transitions. Discussions around this topic mostly focus on redistributive justice, which concerns the fair distribution of risks and opportunities resulting from climate action. However, there are other types to consider: restorative justice seeks to repair the damage generated by the traditional economy; procedural justice ensures that the transition process is inclusive, transparent and equitable for all parties involved; and intergenerational justice underlines the responsibility of current generations towards future generations.

Lastly, justice-focused climate action offers a unique opportunity to address long-standing social and economic inequalities while promoting sustainable development. A just transition must prioritize those most affected by climate change and socio-economic inequalities. Climate action initiatives should aim to reduce poverty by creating green jobs, improving access to essential services and fostering equitable economic growth.

As Peru moves forward, the country can build on its existing participatory climate infrastructure to embrace a bottom-up governance approach that allows policies to be grounded in local realities and that includes communities that have historically been excluded from decision-making. While the NDC update offers a valuable opportunity to articulate the country’s commitment to a more just and equitable climate agenda, concrete efforts and actions to fulfill that commitment is what will have an impact.

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• National Climate Action

Authors Héctor Donado Rocío García García-Naranjo Ruth Mier y Terán Celine Novenario Alex Simpkins Iryna Payosova

National Development Banks Can Do More to Help Drive Countries’ Green Transformations margaret.overh… Fri, 04/11/2025 - 08:00

We know that global efforts to rein in climate change are far off track — and we know what's needed to right the ship: Rapid and transformative action to slash emissions and build resilience to climate impacts, in a way which puts people at the heart. But who will finance and implement these changes?

According to the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, developing countries (excluding China) will need to invest $2.3-$2.5 trillion per year in nature and climate action by 2030, from both domestic and international sources. This is about 77% more than current financing levels.

Funding from international sources such as multilateral development banks (MDBs) — which are already key providers of climate finance — will play a major role in closing this gap. But additional sources will also be needed. How countries will mobilize their own domestic resources (both public and private) is therefore an increasingly important question.

National development banks (NDBs) don't often feature in these conversations. But they could play a much bigger role moving forward.

With combined assets of approximately $20 trillion, the collective firepower of NDBs far exceeds that of MDBs, whose assets amount to less than $3 trillion. And NDBs have several features that make them uniquely poised to help drive countries' transitions to greener and more sustainable economies. They're focused on national development goals, have strong local expertise, can lend in local currency, may make decisions more quickly than MDBs and more.

In fact, NDBs already provide one-fifth of climate finance globally. Yet they could be doing much more: According to a recent survey, the share of green assets in their credit portfolios is only 14% on average.

We examined a few NDBs that are supporting countries' green transformations and which barriers they need to overcome.

Why National Development Banks Are Key to Environmental Solutions

NDBs are public financial institutions typically created and owned by a single government. They use domestic public resources and leverage finance from private domestic and international capital markets to fund domestic development goals. Traditionally, NDBs have tended to support infrastructure projects (such as in energy and transport); agriculture; or micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises — all of which have a critical role to play in countries' green transitions.

The Finance in Common Summit 2025, held in Cape Town, South Africa in February 2025, gathered the community of public development banks writ large, including national development banks. Messages from this summit underscored the urgency of mobilizing the full spectrum of capabilities from NDBs to deliver on development and climate goals.

NDBs share some of the features that have made MDBs such important players in the climate sphere. Like multilateral development banks, NDBs operate under public mandates and thus — while needing to make financially sound decisions — are not purely profit-driven like private sector banks are. This allows them to provide patient long-term capital for climate projects that do not meet the risk-return profile needed for private investments. NDBs also often benefit from a public guarantee, which not only underwrites this approach to risk, but also allows them to raise money from capital markets to fund projects and significantly increases the size of their lending portfolios.

Unlike commercial banks, these institutions prioritize development over profit, and they usually have some form of concessional (affordable) financing to support policy-related goals. They are well-placed to address financing gaps at local and national levels through their strong local presence and expertise, as well as their ability to support project origination and smaller projects. Crucially, NDBs lend in local currency; this eliminates exchange rate risk, helping to bring down the overall risk of green projects and make them more viable. And they may have more streamlined decision-making or faster processes than MDBs.

Moreover, NDBs exist in nearly every country. The most comprehensive estimates are that 480 national development banks exist across 154 countries globally. Most of these nations (60%) have more than one institution.

While not all NDBs are deeply involved in climate action, several have introduced innovative approaches to green financing.

1) Providing Tailored Financial Solutions

NDBs have an intimate understanding of their domestic markets, including local policy environments and economic conditions. This expertise allows them to design and implement solutions that align with national priorities while addressing specific local challenges and lending in local currency.

Example: Supporting a just energy transition in South Africa

As South Africa looks toward a low-carbon future, it's grappling with many competing priorities: how to reduce its heavy dependence on coal while also expanding energy access, reducing poverty and helping workers in the fossil fuel sector shift to more sustainable jobs. Of the ZAR1.48 trillion (about US$98.7 billion) South Africa estimates it needs to meet its climate goals, almost half (45%) is still unmet.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) has emerged as a key player in realizing the country's plans to transition away from fossil fuels and increase investment in renewable energy.

DBSA disburses funds from international development finance institutions (including MDBs) to municipalities, private companies and NGOs, which tend to be too small for these international actors to reach.

In addition to its own direct investments, DBSA oversees project implementation as an intermediary. In September 2024, the bank matched a ZAR1.98 billion (EUR100 million/about US$104 million) loan from the European Investment Bank for its Embedded Generation Investment Programme. The program contributes subordinated debt and concessional equity — notably, in local currency with DBSA managing exchange fluctuations through hedging — to help launch small and medium-sized renewable energy projects by independent power producers.

DBSA is also incorporating labor and social concerns in its support for a just energy transition in South Africa. In November 2024, the bank secured a grant from the French Development Agency (AFD) to expand skills development, training and entrepreneurial support in Mpumalanga Nkangala District, a major region for the country's coal sector. These efforts aim to help workers navigate the transition away from coal.

Technicians install rooftop solar panels in Cape Town, South Africa. The Development Bank of South Africa is helping channel finance into workforce training programs that will assist coal workers in transitioning to more sustainable livelihoods. Photo by Suretha Rous/Alamy Stock Photo.  2) Addressing Market Gaps and Financing Public Policy-Oriented Actions

NDBs can help fill a gap by financing projects that are essential for building more sustainable economies but are not currently attractive to commercial banks. Financing climate adaptation is particularly challenging because projects can be small and fragmented and a range of investments are needed — from those that largely generate public goods and avoid losses to those that generate revenue streams.

Example: Financing adaptation projects in India

The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) is India's primary development finance institution, driving sustainable growth and resilience in the country's rural and agricultural sectors. The bank has recognized the importance of embedding climate in its funding considerations: Today, it's leading projects that address adaptation and resilience needs across economic and social strata in the country.

NABARD prepares annual plans for all districts in the country, quantifying opportunities for investments in adaptation and resilience projects. It has also developed a green taxonomy to identify and prioritize funding for climate projects.

For example, NABARD channels international finance — including from the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund — into local climate resilience projects, ensuring that underserved rural areas receive financing for critical adaptation efforts. As of March 2024, NABARD's financial report mentions that the bank had so far supported 40 climate change projects with financial assistance of ₹1971 crores (about US$237 million).

Among these projects, the bank has financed over 1,800 water harvesting structures (such as check dams and percolation tanks) in the water-scarce areas of Rajasthan. This has improved water availability, supported irrigation and created local employment opportunities. It's helping strengthen climate resilience in the region while sustaining both social and economic outcomes which rely on reliable access to water.

Women harvesting wheat in Rajasthan, India. India’s National Bank for Agriculture and Rural development has funded extensive projects to improve local livelihoods by making agriculture more resilient to climate change. Photo by David South/Alamy Stock Photo 

Another notable initiative is the bank's Tribal Development Fund, designed to support diversified livelihoods for tribal communities. The fund has supported over 600,000 families through more than 1,000 projects across the country. One such project in Telangana has transformed 500 acres into sustainable horticulture farming and brought 115 acres under irrigation. The beneficiaries saw their annual incomes increase by over 200%, on average, from around ₹30,000-₹40,000 (about US$347-$462) per year to around ₹100,000-₹168,000 (about US$1,156-$1,942) per year.

3) Mobilizing Public and Private Actors to Mitigate Risks

Green projects often face high upfront capital costs and higher perceived risks that can deter private investors, especially in developing countries.

Like MDBs, NDBs have a variety of tools at their disposal for derisking. These include co-financing with private banks and using blended finance mechanisms (such as guarantees and, in some cases, subsidized terms) to catalyze private sector participation in green investments.

Example: Mobilizing private investments for green projects in Brazil

The Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES)'s long-term strategy underscores its role in promoting a green and just transition. It's especially focused on diversifying partnerships and developing blended finance approaches to attract more private finance.

Notably, BNDES reserves a portion of the profits from its commercial loans or equity investments for seed funding to projects that support social, cultural, environmental and technological objectives. For example, its Socio-Environmental Fund matches up to R$1 in grants for every R$1 invested by the private sector in projects that support education, the environment, or job and income generation — a model the bank terms "matchfunding." By matching private sector investments with grants, BNDES shares the associated risks of these projects and stretches its public funds further by mobilizing private sector financing and partnerships.

In 2021, BNDES used matchfunding to increase the scale of ecological restoration projects using both native species and agroforestry systems across Brazil. The Floresta Viva ("Living Forest") initiative aims to invest R$693 million (about US$118 million) over seven years to restore between 25,000-35,000 hectares across the country, with up to 50% financed by BNDES's Socio-Environmental Fund and the remainder financed by private sector institutions.

Challenges Faced by National Development Banks

Despite their potential, NDBs face significant hurdles to increasing the scale of their green investments — from limited capital to a lack of technical know-how. But here, too, some NDBs are charting a way forward.

Limited capital and dependence on government support

Many NDBs' balance sheets are insufficient for addressing the magnitude of domestic challenges. As governments face ongoing budget constraints, NDBs are looking to external funding sources to bridge their financing gaps.

NDBs can seek more international funding to expand their capital base. However, since they lend in local currency, the question of who ultimately bears the exchange rate risk (international actors or NDBs) is unresolved. A 2023 survey estimates that two-thirds of NDBs are exposed to currency risks and most external financing to these banks, including from MDBs, happens in hard currency.

NDBs can also syndicate loans to share risks across a group of lenders and mobilize private finance on a subordinated basis — for example, through secondary market mechanisms or an originate-to-share model. The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB) has grown its investor base to over 40 institutional investors in the past decade through capital layering, offering different segments of risk capital alongside debt issuance. In 2023 alone, TDB increased its lending by 10% from the previous year (to US$19.1 billion) through syndications and acted as a lead arranger for US$4.1 billion in lending.

NDBs in stronger and larger economies will likely have an easier time implementing such solutions. For example, if their domestic capital market is strong enough, NDBs can issue bonds in local currency to avoid exchange risks. South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) recently raised over ZAR2.0 billion (about US$112 million) for its inaugural sustainability bond, which included a significant subscription by International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank's private sector arm.

Scarcity of concessional financing

NDBs are well-versed in using their funds to leverage private resources. However, they can struggle to obtain the grants needed to blend with private finance for green projects where returns are — or are perceived to be — too low to mobilize private investment alone. BNDES overcame this challenge by reserving a portion of its profits for grants in projects that support social and environmental objectives, bringing about programs like the Floresta Viva initiative.

Flocks of birds in the Pantanal, the world’s largest tropical wetland. The Brazilian development bank BNDES has used a matchfunding model to raise private sector finance for restoration, biodiversity protection and other nature-based projects in the Pantanal and other critical areas. Photo by elleon/iStock

NABARD, in another instance, has been exploring alternative mechanisms to bolster its adaptation and resilience investments. The global Adaptation Fund metes out money for countries' adaptation efforts, but it's not a lot — the allocation for India is capped at approximately $20 million; too limited to adequately address the need of even any one state in India. Recognizing this, NABARD has sought to leverage separate, additional concessional finance beyond the Adaptation Fund. In 2024, NABARD signed an MoU with the Government of Goa and World Bank to set up a blended finance facility to leverage various sources of concessional finance through MDBs, bilateral institutions and philanthropic foundations for climate action. By attracting private finance through this World Bank-powered facility, NABARD can do more than it would have been able to do alone. It ensures that precious grant finance is used strategically to leverage far more investment.

Insufficient capacity and institutional barriers

Despite the lack of a project pipeline being a significant constraint in increasing climate finance — and the potential of NDBs to help with project development — NDBs often have insufficient technical capacity for developing green investments. Governments and international organizations can help build up institutional and staff capacity to improve NDBs' ability to effectively design, implement and manage green projects and portfolios.

NABARD, for example, regularly organizes training sessions to strengthen its institutional capacity to address climate needs through the Centre for Climate Change at the Bankers Institute for Rural Development (BIRD).

NDBs also work with various implementation agencies and project partners who often lack technical expertise to develop high-quality project documentation. Regular capacity building can enhance their ability to craft robust investments that integrate climate goals.

Capacity challenges in NDBs can also be more structural, applying not only to their ability to develop green projects but to build lending portfolios that generate sufficient returns. In such instances, oversight and fiduciary management training are needed. These could be provided by capacity-building units of MDBs or other institutions that support NDBs in strengthening fiduciary frameworks and green finance capacity.

Lack of robust impact measurement frameworks

NDBs are often hindered in their ability to attract public and private co-financing due to a lack of robust frameworks for measuring and reporting on the environmental and social impacts of their investments. Aligning their reporting with government-wide frameworks and global goals (such as the Sustainable Development Goals, Paris Agreement and Global Biodiversity Framework), can help to enhance NDBs' relevance and impact.

In its role as a financial intermediary, DBSA overcomes this challenge by measuring and reporting the results of executed projects directly to the national monitoring system for South Africa's Just Energy Transition Investment Plan. (This, in turn, is linked to the country's national climate plan under the Paris Agreement.) DBSA supports implementing institutions that receive funds channeled through the bank to fulfil these reporting requirements. At the same time, DBSA becomes a more attractive intermediary for international co-financing since the environmental and social impacts of its projects are both clearly reported and linked to national priorities and goals.

This demonstrates the valuable role that governments can play: working with NDBs to ensure they are maximizing support for domestic priorities and plans associated with these international agreements — and monitoring their contributions to this effect.

Accelerating Green Transformations

NDBs could be catalysts in countries' green transformations. With their combination of local expertise, public mandate and ability to de-risk investments and provide local currency lending positions, NDBs can be critical agents of change. However, their potential remains largely untapped due to structural and financial constraints.

Stronger partnerships with international institutions (such as MDBs and bilateral development finance institutions) can provide NDBs with technical assistance, knowledge sharing, and additional sources of funding or co-financing. Though the diverse landscape of NDBs can make it challenging for international actors to identify and form relationships with these institutions, many NDBs are engaging more in international forums like the Finance in Common Summit and environmental negotiations.

NDBs can play a more integrated role with other transition financiers by participating, or even leading (such as BNDES has), in country platforms. Country platforms allow NDBs to achieve far greater scale and impact by combining their strengths in project origination, local currency lending and smaller scale financing with dialogue on policy reform as well as financial instruments from MDBs and the private sector.

Moving forward, governments, international organizations and the private sector should work together to empower NDBs, ensuring they can combat environmental crises while fulfilling their sustainable development mandate, helping to support growth and jobs. Given the constraints on resources and importance of the task, making national and international, public and private finance work better as a system has never been more important. By helping NDBs make full use of their capabilities, the global financial system can accelerate countries' transitions to a safer, more sustainable future.

solar-water-pump-karnal.jpg Finance Finance climate finance adaptation finance development low carbon development Type Commentary Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Finance for Developing Country Climate Action
• Adaptation Finance and Investment

Authors Carolyn Neunuebel Gauri Atre Valerie Laxton

Tree Cover Is Still Declining Overall in Latin America, but New Data Shows Where It’s Coming Back shannon.paton@… Thu, 04/10/2025 - 14:13

Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have major goals to restore their degraded landscapes.

Forest loss has been a decades-long problem, with the region losing nearly 15 million hectares of trees (1.2% of the total) from 2015 to 2023. However, recognizing the importance of forests for both people and nature, 18 countries have committed to protect and restore over 50 million hectares of degraded and deforested land by 2030 as part of Initiative 20x20.

With five years left to achieve the goal, how are countries doing?

For a long time, measuring progress on restoration has been a difficult task, due to lack of consistent and credible data. But for the first time, new satellite data can “see” year to year where trees are growing, where they remain standing and where they’re disappearing.

Produced by the University of Maryland, this data enables us to determine the dynamics of tree cover change across Latin America from 2015 to 2023. While it is not a perfect proxy for measuring restoration progress — satellites can’t tell whether tree cover gain is due to planned restoration, natural regrowth or industrial plantations — we can combine it with other datasets to get some insights.

The data shows that while Latin America overall lost more tree cover than it gained from 2015 to 2023, progress is being made compared to historical trends. Among the 18 countries participating in Initiative 20x20, three countries gained tree cover from 2015 to 2023, 10 remained neutral and five experienced losses.

But looking strictly at the amount of tree cover a country had in 2023 compared to 2015 does not tell the entire story. The dynamics of yearly changes in tree cover and where those changes are happening can reveal a lot about progress on restoration and conservation. For example, in some countries, gains in tree cover were mainly from increased plantations, which don’t always benefit the environment.

Here are five key insights from the data:

1) Tree cover is very stable from year to year in some countries, but fluctuates significantly in others.

With the new data, we can see whether there is more, less or the same amount of tree cover in 2023 compared to 2015. Our analysis shows that 13 of the 18 countries studied had about the same or more tree cover in 2023 as compared to 2015.

However, this “net neutral” status could result from very different scenarios: It could mean that tree cover remained largely unchanged over the time period; or it could mean that large swaths of tree cover were lost, but then replaced by an equivalent amount of gain elsewhere.

In terms of ecosystem health, unchanged tree cover is better. It means that old-growth forests remain standing to provide habitat for plants and animals, sequester carbon, protect water supplies and offer other critical services. Once forests are cut down, it can take decades for new trees to grow large enough to provide these services.

For example, tree cover in Costa Rica and Panama was very stable from 2015 to 2023, with only minor changes from year to year. Meanwhile, in Chile and Nicaragua, tree cover fluctuated tens of thousands of hectares from year to year, even though the countries’ total amount of tree cover in 2023 was roughly the same as in 2015.

These patterns reflect different dynamics. Chile, Nicaragua and the other countries where tree cover is more dynamic have more plantations or “working” forests that are continually harvested and regrown, as well as higher instances of disturbances like fire or hurricanes that cause losses which then naturally regenerate. The stability in Costa Rica and Panama points to greater forest conservation and fewer natural or human-caused disturbances.

2) Tree cover is expanding on farms.

Proportionally, croplands experienced the highest net gains in tree cover of any other landscape — nearly 300,000 hectares, or a 24% increase relative to 2015 tree cover levels. The majority of this net gain was concentrated in seven of the 18 studied countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay.

While we can’t determine exactly what is going on in all these cases, some of this gain is from agroforestry and sustainable agriculture, including integrating trees with crops to stabilize soils and increase productivity. But most is likely due to plantation establishment, such as for timber, rubber and oil palm. For example, Uruguay saw a significant amount of gain in tree cover from 2015 to 2023, but it occurred primarily in the form of plantations.

While plantations can be beneficial when they take deforestation pressure off of natural forests or improve the productivity of formerly degraded lands, they can also be detrimental. For example, if plantations replace natural forests with monocultures or are planted in areas that do not naturally support forests, such as native grasslands, they can harm biodiversity, water availability and soil quality. These types of plantations are not usually considered restoration.

3) Many cities are becoming greener.

Two-thirds (12 of 18) of countries studied had net tree cover gain in cities and near other built infrastructure, such as along major roads and highways. Trees in urban areas provide cooling shade, clean the air by filtering out pollutants, and create inviting spaces for people to enjoy time outdoors.

Two countries — Nicaragua and Colombia — led the way on “greening” their developed areas, with net tree cover gains of 3% and 2%, respectively. For example, Cali, Colombia was recently certified by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Arbor Day Foundation as one of the “Tree Cities of the World” due to its network of urban forests and green spaces within the city, which promote biodiversity and improve the quality of life for residents.

4) Protected areas are often the best way to conserve forests — when they’re effectively managed.

Across all countries, 95% of tree cover inside protected areas was stable — meaning no gains, losses or disturbances occurred between 2015 and 2023. This indicates that establishing protected areas is often an effective way to conserve forests.

Peru, Ecuador and Chile had the most stable forests inside their protected areas, with more than 98% of the interior forest area showing no change.

However, in three countries — Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala — tree cover inside protected areas was more unstable than other areas, ranging from only 75%-80%. Net forest loss in these countries was actually higher inside protected areas than outside. While some of the observed forest loss may be due to natural disasters, policies and their enforcement deserve a closer look in these nations.

5) National policies to incentivize restoration show positive results.

El Salvador and Guatemala have implemented unique, government-led programs that both prioritize and finance restoration. Data suggests these programs are having a positive impact on tree cover gain.

El Salvador was the only one of 18 countries to experience net tree cover gain across all land types, including inside protected areas. Deforestation has been a problem in El Salvador for decades; it lost all but 6% of its native forest cover by the 1970s. Though the country started with less tree cover than others in 2015, the data clearly shows that trees are coming back everywhere. These positive trends are at least in part due to political support for restoration, such as the government’s Environmental Incentives and Disincentives Program of 2022, which rewards sustainable activities and discourages landscape degradation. Newer policies, like the 2024 Environmental Assessment System to better evaluate the impacts of human activities on the environment and the 2025 National Program for the Restoration of Ecosystems and Productive Landscapes, should further encourage restoration.

Guatemala has also seen positive results. The Guatemalan government implemented its PROBOSQUE program in 2017, providing finance to smallholder farmers to conserve, plant and maintain trees on their lands. Analysis of mapped PROBOSQUE sites established between 2017 and 2020 show that 20,600 hectares of tree cover were stable and there was net gain of 830 hectares as of 2023. Continuing the PROBOSQUE incentives program, along with its associated mapping and monitoring, could help further support farmers and trees.

Using Data to Inform Progress and Spur More Restoration

Using this data, national and local governments can better identify successful programs or where change is needed. For example, in Guatemala, while PROBOSQUE has helped improve tree cover on farmers’ lands, forests inside the country’s protected areas are still being lost. Because the data shows the bigger picture of what’s happening to trees throughout the country, it can be used to monitor and inform policies and incentives.

Improved documentation of where restoration is occurring is also essential. We now have the data to see tree cover change, but we still need more information about where to look to assess progress against restoration goals and determine whether restoration efforts are actually producing healthier and more resilient ecosystems — which is ultimately the goal. Combining this data with on-the-ground documentation will enable people to better assess where countries stand on restoring their degraded landscapes.

In the 10 years of Initiative 20x20, an important lesson learned is that it takes many actors and a coalition of projects, policies and incentives working together to build momentum for success. Improving access and availability of data to monitor change is one more tool that can help support sustainable landscapes well into the future.

tree-planting-amazon.jpg Forests Latin America data data visualization deforestation agriculture Cities conservation National Climate Action Forests Type Finding Exclude From Blog Feed? 0 Projects

• Initiative 20x20
• Global Forest Watch

Authors Katie Reytar Victoria Rachmaninoff René Zamora Cristales Peter Potapov

The Most Impactful Things You Can Do for the Climate Aren’t What You’ve Been Told margaret.overh… Wed, 04/09/2025 - 00:01

The message is everywhere: You (alone) can save the planet.

Choose a veggie burger instead of beef. Book this flight, not that one. Buy thrift over fast fashion. Shrink your "carbon footprint."

But here's what most people don't know: The very concept of a personal carbon footprint originated with oil giant British Petroleum (BP). In 2004, BP launched a carbon calculator to persuade people to measure their personal climate impacts. The campaign worked — shifting our collective gaze from fossil fuel companies, the biggest drivers of the climate crisis, to individuals like you and me.

Two decades later and with climate disasters rapidly intensifying, we're still caught in this sleight-of-hand. Choices made by corporations and governments continue to shape the speed and scale of climate disruption, while marketing campaigns around climate action try to shift our focus to consumer decisions.

New WRI research tells a different story. Our data shows that pro-climate behavior changes, such as driving less or eating less meat, could theoretically cancel out all the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions an average person produces each year1 — specifically among high-income, high-emitting populations.

But it also reveals that efforts focused exclusively on changing behaviors, and not the overarching systems around them, only achieve about one-tenth of this emissions-reduction potential. The remaining 90% stays locked away, dependent on governments, businesses and our own collective action to make sustainable choices more accessible for everyone. (Case in point: It's much easier to go carless if your city has good public transit.)

This doesn't mean personal choices don't matter. In fact, they matter immensely — but not exactly in the ways we've been led to believe.

How Much Do Personal Choices Affect the Climate?

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), comprehensive shifts in human behavior could theoretically reduce global emissions by up to 70% by 2050. This would essentially wipe out emissions from China, the U.S., India, the EU and Russia combined.

But the key word here is "comprehensive." The IPCC is clear that these massive reductions would result from individual behavior change combined with supporting policy, industry and technological transformations that make those behaviors possible and widely accessible.

Understanding 'Average' Emissions

The 'average' person produces 6.28 tonnes of GHG emissions annually. But this number varies widely by country and income level. Wealthier, higher-consuming populations may emit up to 110 tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) per year. Among lower-income groups, emissions can be as low as 1.6 tonnes of CO2e per year. For populations living in poverty, emissions will actually need to increase to meet critical development goals, such as expanding energy access.

What slice of this can be achieved through individual behavior change alone? WRI's new research is the first to quantify the gap between projected emissions reductions (what's theoretically possible) and real-world impacts (what's proven to be feasible). We calculated how much emissions could fall if everyone adopted key climate-friendly behaviors, then compared this with actual results from programs and interventions that attempted to change these behaviors at an individual level.

We found that, in theory, shifting to 11 pro-climate behaviors we analyzed in the energy, transport and food sectors could reduce individuals' GHG emissions by about 6.53 tonnes per year. This would more than cancel out what an average person currently emits (about 6.3 tonnes per year). However, our data also shows that when people attempt these changes in the real world, without supportive systems, they typically only reduce emissions by about 0.63 tonnes yearly — just 10% of what's theoretically possible.

It's not that individual changes don't matter; when someone switches to an electric vehicle (EV) or avoids a flight, they make a real impact. The problem is that without supportive infrastructure, policies or incentives (such as public EV chargers or financial subsidies), these programs struggle to drive the broad-based change the world really needs.

Electric vehicles at a curbside charging station in Amsterdam. Policies and investments that make low-carbon choices more affordable and convenient are essential to unlocking climate-friendly behaviors. Photo by arkanto/Shutterstock How You Can Help Drive Systemic Change

Given that climate change is heavily influenced by government and corporate decisions, our votes and collective consumer power are crucially important.

Voting at both the national and local levels is key, as elections directly determine whether governments enable or hinder pro-climate behaviors. In the U.S., for example, the Trump administration has called to repeal federal tax credits that make sustainable choices, such as EVs and home solar, more financially accessible for Americans.

When national policies shift away from climate action, state and local electoral pressure becomes even more crucial. In California, vehicle emission standards have preserved consumer access to cleaner transportation options amid threats of federal rollbacks.

Likewise, collective consumer pressure can help shift large companies toward more climate- and environmentally friendly practices. This means moving beyond individual purchases toward organizing campaigns that push companies to make sustainable choices the norm. Take Nestlé's Kit Kat: When Greenpeace exposed that the company was using palm oil linked to deforestation — threatening orangutan habitats in Indonesia as well as the climate — viral campaigns and public outcry forced Nestlé to drop the supplier and commit to sustainable sourcing within five years.

Which Day-to-Day Choices Have the Biggest Climate Impact?

Systemic pressure creates enabling conditions, but individuals need to complete the loop with our daily choices. It's a two-way street — bike lanes need cyclists, plant-based options need people to consume them. When we adopt these behaviors, we send critical market signals that businesses and governments respond to with more investment.

WRI's research quantifies the individual actions that matter most. While people worldwide tend to vastly overestimate the impact of some highly visible activities, such as recycling, our analysis reveals four significant changes that deliver meaningful emissions reductions. In order of climate impact, these behaviors are:

1) Shift to sustainable ground travel

Shifting out of gas cars by opting into public or active transit dramatically reduces emissions. Our research shows that living car-free is 78 times more impactful than composting. In other words, one person giving up their car has the same climate impact as 77 people taking up composting. Giving up your car may seem extreme or infeasible, but it doesn't have to be all or nothing; changes like switching to a hybrid or electric car can also have a significant impact.

2) Shift to air travel alternatives

Whenever possible, replace flying with videoconferencing, train travel or even driving (ideally in an electric or hybrid vehicle). While air travel is not a significant factor for most of the world — 89% of the world's population has never set foot on a plane — it's one of the most carbon-intensive activities we can do. Those in higher income brackets who fly more frequently have a greater responsibility to lead in this area. (If you're an organization wondering what you can do to reduce business travel, WRI has some tools and insights.)

3) Install residential solar and increase home energy efficiency

Investing in rooftop solar and improving home energy efficiency — such as by upgrading insulation, installing heat pumps or moving to a smaller house — can significantly cut emissions. While changing light bulbs or turning off appliances has a minor effect, structural home efficiency improvements and clean energy adoption drive far more significant reductions. Due to their high upfront cost, these actions are often more feasible with supportive government programs like tax credits and incentives.

4) Eat more plant-rich meals

Reducing meat and dairy consumption, particularly beef and lamb, has a massive and underestimated impact on the climate. While shifting to organic food, buying local and reducing processed foods all have benefits, these changes pale in comparison to dietary shifts that move away from animal proteins. Full veganism can save nearly 1 ton of CO2 annually, about a sixth of the average global citizen's total emissions. But even reducing meat intake captures 40% of that impact.

How Can Governments and Industry Unlock Broader Change?

These individual actions can have a real impact on emissions. But without systemic shifts and support, they will not drive change at the speed and scale the climate crisis demands.

To help people move away from gas-powered vehicles, governments can take steps such as investing in protected bike lanes and expanding electric charging infrastructure. Improved public transit, meanwhile, can drive down car use and make commuting cheaper and more efficient — a win for the climate and for our wallets and well-being.

In Bogotá, Colombia, consistent investment in cycling infrastructure coupled with supportive initiatives (like the popular Ciclovía program, where over 100 km of streets become car-free on Sundays and national holidays) have helped make sustainable transportation both practical and appealing. The share of trips made by bicycle in Bogotá rose from just 0.58% in 1996 to 9% in 2017, showing that when governments create the right conditions, sustainable behaviors can follow.

Pedestrians and cyclists take advantage of Bogotá's Ciclovía program, which closes some roads to car traffic on Sundays and national holidays; a prime example of how government initiatives can encourage low-carbon transportation. Photo by Ivan_Sabo/iStock

In the energy sector, governments can offer financial incentives for home solar, energy-efficient renovations and more. Take the Netherlands: Once labeled a "renewable energy laggard," it has become Europe's leading per-capita user of solar panels, in part thanks to generous subsidies and a net-metering system that allows homeowners to deduct electricity they feed into the grid from their usage.

When it comes to shifting diets, institutions like governments, public organizations and schools can increase plant-based meal options in cafeterias and canteens (such as by adopting "meatless Monday," like the Los Angeles Unified School District did in 2012). And businesses can make lower-carbon choices easiest and most affordable — for instance, by highlighting plant-based options on menus and pricing them competitively.

WRI's Coolfood initiative has demonstrated that simple changes can transform dining behaviors. When Sodexo (a global food service provider operating in schools, hospitals and corporate cafeterias) adopted descriptive dish names like "Sweet and Smoky Tacos," which centered taste and flavor rather than plant-based ingredients, the probability of consumers purchasing these dishes doubled.

How to Shift Behaviors Most Effectively

Our research shows that how initiatives to change behavior are designed is important. We coded all interventions aimed at driving key pro-climate behaviors into six categories:

We found that "choice architecture" (such as putting more sustainable options front and center) and commitment devices to form longer-lasting habits (such as encouraging pledges to take public transport more often) are the most impactful tools. Meanwhile, information-based approaches (such as carbon footprint calculators) are among the least.

Importantly, sustainability initiatives in industry and policy must be aligned with evidence on effective emissions reductions, instead of adopting visible but minimal-impact measures. Offering recycling bins shows environmental awareness, but providing affordable solar solutions, plant-rich meals or electric transportation goes a longer way toward genuine climate progress.

One powerful tool for government action is countries' national climate commitments (NDCs). WRI research shows that the world's top emitters have historically overlooked behaviors with high emissions-reduction potential, such as food choices and air travel, in their NDCs. With new and updated NDCs due in 2025 under the Paris Agreement, countries have an immediate opportunity to address human behavior change in high-emitting sectors, both through deploying behavior change tools and putting supportive policies in place to make these shifts accessible.

Leveraging Our Collective Power

While our choices matter for the climate, the "carbon footprint" narrative has obscured where our true power lies. This individualistic framing fragments our collective strength, keeping us focused on isolated personal behaviors rather than the transformative power of collective action.

WRI's research suggests a more impactful path forward. Rather than calculating our carbon math, our most meaningful individual action may be expanding our collective civic footprint. This can transform not just what we consume, but what choices exist for everyone.

Our power has always been greater than we've been led to believe. It's time we reclaimed it.

 

1 Average per capita emissions based on data from WRI's Climate Watch platform. For more information, see here.

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Nature Crime Threatens Our Planet. Here Are 5 Ways to Fight Back. alicia.cypress… Tue, 04/08/2025 - 09:55

The growing scourge of nature crime — which includes illegal forms of logging, mining, fishing, forest conversion and wildlife trade — is devastating ecosystems and species around the world, robbing communities and governments of valuable resources and revenues. These crimes are estimated to generate as much as $280 billion in annual criminal proceeds, according to Interpol — money that could go to communities for health, education and development initiatives.

Nature crimes are also accelerating the impacts of climate change and biodiversity loss, which have dire impacts on our planet. For example, half of all tropical deforestation is illegal, according to the World Economic Forum. From fires and floods to the destruction of critical ecosystems and the decline of iconic wild species, nature crimes are putting us at even greater risk.

The humphead wrasse has become a major illegal fishing target for Hong Kong's live reef food fish trade. Acceleration of nature crimes are contributing to biodiversity loss around the planet. Photo by Tatiana Belova /Shutterstock.

What’s more, these crimes undermine global cooperation efforts on climate change, biodiversity and other environmental threats that are already hobbled by growing political rifts, bureaucracy, funding cuts, and in some countries, an inward, populist and sometimes xenophobic political turn.

Organized criminal elements are exploiting these political currents to exploit the planet's living resources, building on the opportunities of a globalized world.  

It’s increasingly clear that we won’t be able to effectively slow the worst impacts of climate change and biodiversity loss without countering nature crime. Solutions, like emerging technologies that can trace product origins, strengthening legal frameworks and empowering Indigenous communities with tools and resources, are just some of the ways the world can fight back.  

In the Amazon basin and elsewhere in the world, illegal mining — particularly for gold — is a major cause of tropical forest destruction. Photo by Tarcisio Schnaider/Shutterstock. A Persistent Problem   

This is not a problem that’s going away. Nature crimes are on the rise, with illegal gold mining among the fastest growing. Venezuela and Ecuador, for example, have reported large increases, especially since the price of gold rose significantly following the COVID-19 pandemic. The profits generated annually from illegal gold mining are estimated to be as much as $48 billion globally, according to Interpol.

Since 2016, the value of illegal gold exports surpassed cocaine in Colombia and Peru, respectively the largest and second-largest producers of cocaine globally. Cocaine and gold are becoming inextricably linked in many regions, with cartels using gold to launder illicit drug cash.

Indeed, convergence with other crimes is a regular feature of these environmental offenses. The links between illegal mining and illegal logging, for example, are well established. As a 2024 WRI report highlighted, the impact of mining, both legal and illegal, on global deforestation is striking, with nearly 1.4 million hectares of trees lost between 2001 and 2020 as a direct result of mining. That’s an area roughly the size of Puerto Rico.

At sea, illegal fishing fleets abound with human rights abuses and other forms of serious organized crime. In November 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned individuals associated with the Gulf Cartel due to their involvement in illegal fishing, human smuggling and narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Mexico.

These are complex crimes. To address this, a new WRI report on nature crime, aims to provide greater understanding on how these crimes work, their enablers and their convergences, and offers a range of solutions to fight back.

Fishing vessels are spotted in a protected marine reserve off the coast of Asia. Illegal fishing is frequently linked to labor and human rights abuses and other forms of organized crime. Photo by Richard Whitcombe/Shutterstock.  5 Ways to Halt Nature Crime

Here are five approaches that, if executed effectively, could turn the tide on nature crime.

1) Follow the Money

Nature crimes are routinely entangled with financial crimes, with illicit profits laundered into the global banking system. While it is somewhat of a cliché, there has been proven success in following the money to prosecute environmental criminals for financial offenses. Given that many jurisdictions impose harsher sentences for financial crimes, like money laundering, than environmental offenses, focusing on the money is a key approach to taking down the perpetrators.

Yet there are challenges. The sheer complexity of the crimes, with layering of transactions to obscure illicit sources of funds, presents a major obstacle. Furthermore, the linkages between nature crime and financial crimes are often missed or not prioritized by investigators. This needs to change: Illegal forms of logging and deforestation, along with illegal mining, are the highest-value crime types linked to associated financial crimes, according to the multilateral Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog.

Progress, however, is being made. Last year saw the launch of the Amazon Region Initiative Against Illicit Finance, a partnership between Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and the U.S., to “combat the financing of nature crime and counter the transnational criminal organizations benefiting from it.”

The private sector is also stepping up, with WWF and Themis — a developer of anti-money laundering software — creating a new Environmental Crime Financial Toolkit.  Launched at the 2024 UN Biodiversity Conference (COP16), this resource helps the financial sector better understand illicit activities associated with nature crime. Elsewhere, the Private Sector Dialogue on the Disruption of Financial Crime Related to Crimes that Affect the Environment, hosted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in partnership with Interpol, the Nature Crime Alliance and United for Wildlife, bring together financial institutions, law enforcement, financial intelligence units and civil society to increase awareness of the financial fingerprints of nature crime. If banks get better at identifying financial flows linked to environmental crimes, the networks involved will face increasing disruption.

These efforts are making it harder for perpetrators to conceal their crimes — and their profits.

2) Seize the Potential of Emerging Technologies

In March 2024, Belgian authorities announced that some 260 metric tons of Russian timber had entered Belgium in violation of EU sanctions imposed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This discovery was not the result of intelligence tip-offs or vessel tracking. Rather, the timber’s origin was only established due to cutting-edge scientific techniques that leverage chemical and genetic information — one of several nascent technologies that could dramatically improve the detection of products resulting from nature crime.

Elsewhere, artificial intelligence is reshaping the fight against wildlife crime, with the development of camera traps that can differentiate between probable poachers and other individuals. This reduces false alarms while enabling rangers to know exactly what they are dealing with when receiving alerts.  

Investing in and scaling these emerging technologies — alongside established ones such as geospatial monitoring that can identify nature crimes on land and sea — will equip frontline defenders and law enforcement actors with the tools that can thwart criminals on the ground.

3) Empower People and Communities on the Frontlines

Indigenous peoples and local communities are among the most affected by nature crimes such as land grabbing and illegal mining. As a result, they are often subjected to violence and intimidation by criminal gangs. In their role as frontline defenders, Indigenous communities must be supported in protecting their homes and livelihoods, as well as the biodiversity and ecosystems upon which we all depend.

This includes forging partnerships with the private sector, such as tech companies, to provide access to innovative tools and technologies that can give frontline defenders an advantage over the criminal gangs active in their area. Training communities to use platforms such as Global Forest Watch and other monitoring systems has already seen positive results. The challenge now is to scale these activities. 

Building trusted relationships between Indigenous communities and law enforcement — bridging local intelligence with policing power and resources — is also essential. Such relationships will not only support investigations and prosecutions but can also lead to more effective protections for frontline defenders themselves, who are regularly murdered in the defense of nature.  

The remnants of cut-down Spanish cedar in the Amazon forest of Peru. Spanish cedar, a valuable commercial timber species, is widely and illegally logged across the Amazon. Photo by André Bärtschi. 4) Ramp Up Multi-Sector Approaches

Multi-sector collaboration is a common thread across many of the approaches used to combat nature crime. It is essential in tackling the complex web of vested interests that drive environmental crimes around the world.

The Amazon Conservation Association (ACA) — a civil society organization — routinely cooperates with a federation of Indigenous peoples and local communities in Peru to monitor areas under threat from illegal mining. Using its Mapping the Andean Amazon Program (MAAP), which harnesses satellite imagery, ACA shares confidential reports with the federation, which then works with affected communities to determine if legal challenges should be brought and engage relevant government departments to bring them forward. Between 2022 and 2024, this collaboration has directly led to five major law enforcement operations — a strong example of multi-sector cooperation resulting in direct action against nature crime. In one such operation in Barranco Chico, Peru, authorities discovered illegal mining camps, where they destroyed heavy machinery, including diggers and trucks. Deforestation linked to mining subsequently decreased in this region, ACA reported.

Multi-sector approaches are also championed by initiatives like the Nature Crime Alliance, a global, multi-sector network hosted by WRI. With more than 40 members across governments, law enforcement and civil society, it is a model that in its two-year existence is already bearing fruit.

This month, the Alliance published a suite of new resources, developed in consultation with members, which aim to support law enforcement investigations and deepen civil society access to the latest research and insights on nature crime issues. Many of these resources have been shaped by the Alliance’s activities, such as supporting Interpol’s work to strengthen links with civil society organizations focusing on wildlife crime. The Alliance also runs a working group with Indigenous Peoples Rights International to empower frontline defenders via trainings, provide access to technologies, and advocate at the policy level.  

Financial commitments in support of multi-sector collaborations are also emerging. In January, the German government announced a 5 million euro ($5.4 million) grant to Interpol and WWF to tackle environmental crimes in a strong example of greater collaboration between law enforcement and civil society.

If we are going to reduce nature crime, and protect global biodiversity, the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities, and our national economic and security interests, we need to break the silos and get sectors working together more closely.

5) Strengthen Legal Frameworks

Another essential step is to ensure that legal and institutional frameworks are up to the task of prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators of nature crime. Criminal activities are forever evolving and adapting. Laws and judicial processes need to keep pace.

Reforming legal practices, such as widening the threshold of evidence that is admissible in court, would make a huge difference. In many cases, evidence gathered by civil society organizations or journalists — such as remote sensor data — cannot be used in prosecutions. A shift here would significantly increase convictions. Similarly, establishing stronger land rights for Indigenous peoples and local communities, and properly enforcing these rights, will go some way in tackling offenses such as land grabbing.

At the policy level, developments to international frameworks could also bolster law enforcement efforts. The relationship between these frameworks and local laws can be seen in the UNODC’s analysis of the global criminalization of environmental crimes. This 2024 study noted that the environmental offenses which most frequently meet the definition of “serious crimes” under the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) are those that fall under well-established international frameworks; wildlife crime and waste trafficking, covered by the UN Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, respectively. However, these frameworks need to be strengthened. CITES, for example, has consistently failed to stem the trade in iconic animals such as cheetahs. Despite being accorded the highest level of protection under CITES, some 4,184 cheetahs were involved in trafficking incidents between 2010 and 2019, with cubs being traded through loopholes in the convention’s system. Today, it is thought that as few as 6,500 mature cheetahs remain in the wild.

Since 2020, there has been growing support for a new protocol to the UNTOC to cover the trafficking of wild fauna and flora in addition to its existing focus on human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and illicit manufacture and trafficking in firearms. This would unlock a range of international collaborative tools for law enforcement agencies.

Live cheetahs are widely trafficked from Africa to the Gulf States. More than 4,000 cheetahs were involved in trafficking incidents between 2010 and 2019. Now, there are fewer than 6,500 mature cheetahs that remain in the wild. Photo by slowmotiongli/Shutterstock. Making Progress in 2025

These solutions highlight that fighting back against nature crime is possible. What we need now is the political will among governments and donors to ensure resources flow to where they are needed most. Throughout 2025, there will be meaningful opportunities for governments and international organizations to make significant progress. They include:

• The IUCN World Conservation Congress — the major international summit on protecting fauna and flora that convenes every four years, taking place this October in Abu Dhabi — presents a key opportunity to elevate political will for stronger action against nature crime. Several major civil society organizations are already coordinating on a new omnibus resolution motion on nature crime ahead of the Congress. The motion, should it be adopted, will complement ongoing efforts to integrate nature crime as a core priority in IUCN's four-year program of work (2026-2029), cementing the issue in the international conservation agenda.
• The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) Conference of the States Parties will take place in December in Doha. As a legally binding treaty, the UNCAC is among the best tools to fight organized and international networks perpetrating environmental crime. The upcoming UNCAC COSP11 is therefore a major opportunity to influence policymakers and drive tangible change on this issue, with networks like the UNCAC Coalition’s Environmental Crime and Corruption working group leading the charge.
• The Conference of the Parties for CITES convenes in Uzbekistan in November. Establishing more stringent enforcement of the convention and closing loopholes to combat illegal international trade in endangered species of fauna and flora, such as the cheetah, would be a welcome development.
• Finally, the United Nations annual climate summit (COP30) will take place this year in Belem, Brazil, at the mouth of the Amazon river. Hopefully, this setting will encourage governments to highlight the threat that forest crime poses to conserving the threatened Amazon rainforests, a critical component of the global effort to limit the emissions that are driving climate change.

Bolstering these high-level frameworks can drive much-needed political will to counter nature crimes at the national or regional levels, thus supporting the strengthening of local laws and enforcement operations on the ground. They can also serve as a vehicle to promote the expansion of international sanctions for environmental crimes — a move that would make the consequences of committing these crimes in line with their devastating impacts.

In a world of contesting demands on funding and resources, nature crime has for too long been overlooked. Failure to make meaningful progress on this issue will spell the failure of global environmental goals. That is a price none of us can afford to pay.

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Understanding the Paris Agreement's 'Global Goal on Adaptation' margaret.overh… Fri, 03/28/2025 - 12:00

Portugues

A staggering 3.6 billion people — nearly half of the global population — are currently considered highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranging from droughts, floods and storms to heat stress and food insecurity. This number will only continue to rise as long as global temperatures keep climbing.

While the world must act swiftly to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and halt climate change, action is also needed to build the resilience of people already feeling its impacts — and those who inevitably will soon. Climate adaptation efforts must be quickly scaled up to safeguard vulnerable communities, from building sea walls for flood protection to restoring forests that maintain water supplies and planting more resilient crops.

Yet global progress on climate adaptation has been small-scale, slow and fragmented to date, coming up woefully short of the world's need.

The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) aims to address this shortfall by providing a clear framework and targets for measuring progress on adaptation. A well-crafted and widely supported GGA will guide global adaptation efforts by highlighting where and how adaptation plans and policies are being implemented, and which areas are falling behind.

Although the GGA was included in the Paris Agreement in 2015, the eight years that followed saw limited progress on developing it. However, countries finally agreed to an overarching framework at the 2023 UN climate summit (COP28). The framework provides a strong foundation, laying out key areas for global adaptation action. But it still lacks quantified, measurable adaptation targets as well as measures to mobilize finance, technology and capacity building (known as "means of implementation") — all of which are critical to driving real-world outcomes.

Negotiators are tasked with resolving these issues in 2025. They'll work to enhance the GGA framework so that it truly drives action at the scale needed, and so countries will have a useful set of indicators by which to measure and track its progress.

What Is the Global Goal on Adaptation?

The Global Goal on Adaptation is a collective commitment under Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement aimed at "enhancing [the world's] adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change." Proposed by the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) in 2013 and established in 2015, the GGA is meant to serve as a unifying framework to drive political action and finance for adaptation on the same scale as mitigation. This means setting specific, measurable targets and guidelines for global adaptation action, as well as enhancing adaptation finance and other types of support for developing countries.

Flooded homes in Bangladesh after extreme rainfall. Many communities and countries that are most vulnerable to climate change impacts also have the fewest resources to scale up their adaptation efforts and build resilience. Photo by Muhammad Amdad Hossain/Climate Visuals

The GGA is meant to enable adaptation actions that are timely, scalable and specific. Because countries are experiencing climate change impacts to different degrees and are vulnerable to them in different ways, it is also meant to encourage solutions that consider local contexts and the particular needs of specific groups of vulnerable people.

How Can Countries Achieve the Global Goal on Adaptation and Its targets?

The needs of all countries — especially those most vulnerable to climate change — must be fully included and addressed as countries work to enhance and implement the GGA. This means ensuring that the framework and its tracking mechanisms uphold four key principles:

Driving Climate Action for Vulnerable Countries

This article was written by members of the ACT2025 consortium, a group of experts from climate-vulnerable countries working to drive greater climate ambition on the international stage. Learn more about ACT2025 and its work here.

Focus on equity and justice

Equity and justice must be core considerations when operationalizing the GGA so that adaptation measures do not worsen existing inequalities. For instance, finance mechanisms should be designed to avoid increasing debt levels for developing countries — many of which are already heavily burdened by debt, limiting their ability to pay for climate action.

Support for locally led adaptation

Individual nations, states, provinces and communities must be able to tailor adaptation strategies to their unique contexts. To this end, the GGA should ensure that local populations, especially those most susceptible to the effects of climate change, are meaningfully involved. They should have true decision-making authority — including budgetary decisions — over which adaptation interventions are implemented in their communities, by whom and in what ways.

Compared to top-down approaches, locally led adaptation strategies can encourage ownership and effectiveness, reinforce social cohesion, and allow more flexibility in adaptation responses given the dynamic nature of climate change. However, they should still be aligned with national adaptation priorities.

The Principles for Locally Led Adaptation provide a useful framework to redistribute decision-making authority to the lowest appropriate level, including marginalized and particularly vulnerable groups such as Indigenous peoples, women, youth and others.

A locally led project in Mongu, Zambia aims to update an old canal system which is vital to the area's economy but often unusable due to climate-driven flooding. Context-specific projects like this are critical for enabling climate-vulnerable countries to implement national adaptation policies at the local level. Photo by CIF Action/Flickr Inclusive, science-based decision making

Adaptation actions should be based on the best available science as well as traditional and Indigenous knowledge to ensure effective and context-relevant strategies. The GGA must recognize the importance of integrating Indigenous peoples' wisdom into adaptation strategies, respecting their rights and knowledge systems, and promoting their active involvement in decision-making and designing solutions. Facilitating technology and knowledge transfer to developing countries will also be important to enhance local capacity for advancing adaptation efforts.

Alignment with other global sustainability goals

Adaptation efforts should complement and be integrated into other national and international development initiatives. This includes, for example, aligning with the broader Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

What's Included in the Current GGA Framework, and What's Missing?

The GGA framework put forth at COP28, named the "UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience" (UAE FGCR), highlights key areas in which all countries need to build resilience, such as food, water and health. These globally relevant themes can help bridge the gap between national and global adaptation priorities and ensure ambitious and unified messaging and outcomes.

The framework also lays out overarching (but not yet quantified) global targets which will help guide countries in developing and implementing National Adaptation Plans and other relevant policies. These include:

• Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment: By 2030, all Parties have conducted assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities, and have used the outcomes to inform their National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies. Furthermore, by 2027, all Parties have established systemic observation to gather climate data, as well as multi-hazard early warning systems and climate information services to support risk reduction.
• Planning: By 2030, all Parties have country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments and planning processes, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans.
• Implementation: By 2030, all Parties have progressed in implementing their National Adaptation Plans, policies and strategies, and have reduced the social and economic impacts of key climate hazards.
• Monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL): By 2030, all Parties have designed, established and operationalized systems for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built institutional capacity to fully implement their systems.

These broad targets offer a good starting point to guide adaptation efforts. But there are important gaps in the framework, too. For example, it lacks specific, measurable indicators to track on-the-ground action and measure progress toward achieving global adaptation goals.

The GGA framework also reiterates that international climate finance for adaptation should be on par with finance for mitigation in developing countries, recognizing that current levels are far too low to respond to worsening climate change impacts. However, it is silent on how countries should mobilize this finance. Ambitious finance targets are necessary to ensure that adaptation efforts, especially in climate vulnerable countries and communities, can be implemented.

Also missing are references to "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (CBDR-RC). This concept acknowledges that different countries have different levels of responsibility in addressing climate change according to their wealth and development levels.

What Progress Has Been Made Recently, and What Comes Next?

Developing the Global Goal on Adaptation has been a complex challenge — in part because adaptation interventions are often hyper-local and context-specific, and in part because negotiators have struggled to reach agreement on key political issues (such who should pay for adaptation in developing countries, which are the least responsible for climate change but often bear its heaviest burden).

With a framework in place, negotiators are now working to resolve thorny questions about the GGA which were not answered in its initial text, such as how to track progress toward its overarching targets. They have already made some progress: At COP29 in 2024, for example, countries agreed to track means of implementation (finance, technology transfer and development, and capacity building). This will help measure how well countries are adapting to climate change and whether they are receiving the financial and technical support they need to do so.

But unanswered questions remain. Addressing the following issues will be critical to delivering adaptation action that truly meets the needs of developing countries:

• Financing adaptation action: Ensuring adequate and accessible funding for adaptation remains a formidable challenge in implementing the GGA. Closing the adaptation finance gap requires not only mobilizing highly concessional finance in a timely manner, but also developing innovative financing solutions to address current and future climate impacts. Adaptation methodologies and metrics should be set up to effectively track the quantity and quality of climate finance for adaptation to ensure these targets are not underfunded and poorly implemented. Attention must also be paid to ensuring that finance is accessible to communities and not bottlenecked in national capitals. Recent estimates indicate that only around 17% of adaptation finance ever makes it to the local level.
• Indicators and measurements: Negotiators are tasked with finalizing a set of indicators for tracking adaptation action and support. Eight groups of technical experts are now in the process of narrowing down thousands of proposed indicators to a final list of no more than 100 by COP30 in November 2025. The final set of indicators must be comprehensive, yet manageable and globally applicable. These indicators should effectively capture progress toward adaptation goals by encompassing a wide range of information, including environmental and social considerations as well as enabling factors (which was a key focus of discussion at COP29).
• Limited data and knowledge: Effective adaptation planning requires accurate and adequate data and knowledge about local climate impacts and vulnerabilities. Many countries, particularly those with limited resources, may lack the necessary scientific expertise, technical capacity and data to develop robust adaptation strategies, which can impact progress and tracking. Parties should consider measures to help develop and streamline data collection and analysis while pushing for improvements in data and knowledge sharing as part of GGA processes.
• Linking bottom-up metrics and solutions with top-down indicators: Metrics also need to be adaptable to different scales so they may be tailored to specific contexts but also aggregated at higher levels. Creating locally appropriate and context-specific indicator frameworks means defining metrics and solutions from the bottom up. However, these must be linked to national adaptation goals to ensure progress can be tracked systematically. In other words, a one-size-fits-all-approach is not an effective way to address adaptation issues, and the framework should not assume that. For countries to develop robust adaptation monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) systems, the GGA must help them take stock of local initiatives and systematically integrate this data into national and subnational-level MEL processes.

In addition, parties launched two processes — the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and the Baku High-level Dialogue on Adaptation, meant to foster implementation of the GGA — yet how they will do so remains unclear. As the scope of the roadmap and dialogue are developed, Parties must consider how indicators will be measured and tracked in practice; how adaptation finance links to the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance; how they can catalyze and strengthen regional and international cooperation to scale up adaptation action and support; and how other stakeholders can support its implementation.

Protecting the Most Vulnerable through the GGA

The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience adopted in 2023 marked a major achievement after nearly a decade of lagging progress. COP29 also made important strides in advancing the process to refine the goal's tracking indicators and establishing new mechanisms to support implementation.

However, for communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis, these advancements must swiftly translate into tangible action on the ground.

In the months and years ahead, negotiators must work to ensure that the GGA framework accelerates action towards strengthening resilience globally — such as through stronger protections for farmers facing drought, better infrastructure for coastal communities, and funding that reaches those who need it most — providing real support for the world's most vulnerable communities. Only then can the GGA truly drive adaptation action at the pace and scale necessary to meet the climate crisis head on.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in November 2023. It was updated in February 2024 to reflect progress made on the Global Goal on Adaptation at COP28 and in March 2025 to reflect progress made at COP29.

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Authors Fatuma Hussein Mohamed Adow Chukwumerije Okereke Gboyega Olorunfemi Henry Otchwemah Chikondi Thangata Kiyomi de Zoysa